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Contemporary center right parties in Europe are often known for their ideological focus on 
Ôbread and butterÕ issues such as the free market economy and law and order, alongside their 
promotion of traditional institutions and values in society. However, the strategies they use to 
emphasize the immigration issue are less discussed in academic literature, as are the issueÕs 
electoral implications for this party family in different economic contexts across the 21st 
century. The central research question of this dissertation investigates the electoral success of 
center right parties and how they are able to prosper electorally from emphasizing 
immigration in different economic contexts, often at the expense of populist radical right 
parties. The dissertation focuses on center right parties rather than the center left, as the 
center right is spatially and ideologically closer to the populist radical right on a number of 
issues. 
This dissertation tests an original aggregate level theoretical framework of Ôstrategic 
emphasisÕ that features a dynamic game of party competition. The theory argues that 
immigration is not an issue ÔownedÕ solely by populist radical right parties, but one that can 
also help todayÕs center right parties to prosper electorally. This theory proposes a discussion 
of the relative electoral success of center right parties in two different economic contexts, 
showing how in certain situation they can perform better electorally than the radical right 
when they emphasize immigration, as opposed to adopting specific positional stances on 
immigration. The central story in this dissertation is not about spatial positions in the form of 
anti-immigrant sentiment driving electoral success for center right parties. Rather, it is about 
issue salience and the emphasis that center right parties place on immigration in their party 
strategies that determines their electoral fortunes in the 21st century. 
This theory is then tested in three separate empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), 
which draws on the ParlGov dataset on European national parliamentary elections that has 
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been merged with the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey on party positions. The 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey data is also utilized. Chapter 7 comprises a case study analysis of 
four research cases derived from the results of the large N comparative analysis in Chapter 5. 
Chapters 5 and 6 set out an original contribution to knowledge in two different 
economic contexts, demonstrating through statistical models the electoral success of the 
center right. The findings show that when they emphasize the immigration issue, center right 
parties tended to perform better than populist radical right parties in different contexts, in 
times of economic crisis (2008Ð13) and particularly in times of economic stability (1999Ð
2007). Drawing on a research design consisting of four case studies (Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Finland and France), Chapter 7 investigates qualitatively how center right 
partiesÕ emphasis on immigration affects their electoral success in economic bad times and 
how in some cases, this strategy allows them to perform better electorally than the populist 
radical right. However, the case studies show that there are restrictions to center right party 
electoral success. For example, when center right parties are (i) incumbents and (ii) do not 
emphasize immigration; this allows the populist radical right to achieve electoral success at 
their expense. ÔChallengerÕ center right parties (specifically non-incumbents and those in 
opposition) tended to perform better electorally and further underlined incumbencyÐ
punishment patterns in the context of greater voter volatility. 
The dissertation argues that there may be a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in the 21st 
century, whereby specific center right parties profit electorally through strategically 
emphasizing the immigration issue, rather than on traditional issues such as law and order 
alongside the free market that the center right tend to be more historically associated with. 
These findings have implications for contemporary party politics, in showing the potential for 
center right parties to perform electorally well on the immigration issue and has important 
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Introduction: The 2008Ð13 Economic Crisis, its Effects on the Populist 
Radical Right in Europe and a Resurgent Center Right? 
	
In order to understand the electoral success of the center right in the 21st century around the 
issue of immigration, the story of this dissertation starts out with the 2008Ð2013 economic 
crisis that hit a number of European countries. This chapter sets the scene for the dissertation 
and begins by exploring the electoral effects of the 2008Ð13 economic crisis in Europe, in 
seeking to further our understanding of the empirical relationship between the recent 
economic crisis (2008Ð13) and its impact on support for the populist radical right.1 It has 
become received wisdom among some academics and political commentators that economic 
downturns tend to lead to a Ôpolitical earthquakeÕ that result in substantial increases in 
electoral support for radical right parties across Europe (see Ellinas, 2013; Mudde, 2013a). 
This theory has become known as the Ôeconomics breeds extremism theoryÕ and can be traced 
back to the inter-war period: Goodwin (2014) shows the shortcomings of Ôthe Weimar mythÕ 
that asserts that the Great Depression led to Hitler and MussoliniÕs rise to power. 
This chapter finds that the recent economic crisis did not lead to a substantial increase 
in electoral support for the radical right across Europe. Whilst the radical right advanced 
electorally in recent years in a number of countries, most notably in Finland, Austria, 
Hungary, Greece, the Netherlands and France, just as many contradictory cases exist. 
Countries such as Portugal, Ireland and Spain which were worst hit by the economic crisis 
and subsequent Eurozone bailout did not see any substantial rise in support for the radical 
right at the ballot box. Drawing on national parliamentary election data, this chapter makes an 
original contribution in finding that following the recent economic crisis, center right parties 
performed better electorally than populist radical right and center left parties.  
																																																						
1 The labels Ôpopulist radical rightÕ, Ôradical rightÕ and Ôfar rightÕ will be used interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 will examine party classifications in more detail and outline why the label Ôpopulist 
radical right partyÕ is chosen as the main classification for this party family in the dissertation. 
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The fact that economic factors do not appear to drive electoral support for the populist 
radical right motivates the primary focus of this dissertation. This chapter demonstrates that 
when emphasizing immigration in their party strategy, center right parties performed better 
electorally than populist radical right parties. The main argument put forward in this chapter 
is that radical right parties did not perform as well as expected in the recent economic crisis is 
because center right parties have strategically sought to capitalize on immigration, thus 
directly competing with the populist radical right on this issue dimension. 
From these preliminary empirical results, the central research question of this 
dissertation is generated: it seeks to further our understanding of competition on the 
immigration issue between populist radical right and center right parties, primarily in how 
center right parties are able to exploit this issue and achieve electoral success. The main 
theoretical story in this dissertation argues that the electoral success of center right parties 
depends on how far they can emphasize the immigration issue. How far they succeed in doing 
this depends largely on the emphasis placed on immigration, alongside factors such as 
incumbency and different economic contexts (times of economic crisis and economic 
stability). 
1.1 The Comparative Picture: The Rise of the Populist Radical Right? 
	
To paraphrase Karl Marx, there is a specter haunting Europe. In this dissertation, this specter 
takes the form of insurgent populist radical right parties, with this party family gaining 
prominence in recent years across Europe and seeking to shake up the political establishment. 
The march of the radical right is one of the enduring political phenomena of our times, one 
that has been documented extensively by political scientists (see Hainsworth, 2000; Mudde, 
2007; Eatwell, 2008; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2014). There are numerous examples 
of radical right parties that have gained electoral support since 2000, particularly in Western 
Europe, in countries such as Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
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Italy, and Switzerland (see Mudde, 2013a).  
Within this general picture of increased support for radical right parties, there have also 
been wide fluctuations. Drawing on empirical analysis from 1980 to 2011, Cas Mudde (2007: 
p. 3) downplays the rise of the radical right, arguing that Ô[d]espite some striking high and 
recent results, the alleged [radical right] ÒwaveÓ is clearly not lapping (equally) at the shores 
of all West European countries. In fact, [radical right parties] are represented in the national 
parliaments of just half of the seventeen West European countries.Õ To what extent has there 
been a comparative electoral rise in support for contemporary radical right parties across 
Western Europe? Drawing on data for (i) average electoral results from national 
parliamentary elections and (ii) radical right party involvement in coalition governments, 
across three decades (1980Ð89, 1990Ð99, 2000Ð9), Mudde (2013a) notes that there has been a 
steady increase in electoral support for the contemporary far right in Western Europe across 
the three decades.  
Firstly, the data shows that there has been an increase in electoral support for populist 
radical right parties from 1990Ð99 (+3%) and a more gradual increase (+1%) from 2000Ð09. 
Secondly, the number of far right parties that have been involved in coalition governments 
(most notably in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands) has increased, up from one in the 
period 1990Ð99 to seven in 2000Ð9 (Mudde, 2013a).  
A number of existing accounts in the literature seek to explain the electoral rise of the 
contemporary radical right. Various explanations have been put forward, ranging from the 
importance of the immigration issue, the possibility of a protest vote indicating wider 
dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, to declining macroeconomic conditions that may 
amplify and increase electoral support for radical right parties (see Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 
2014a, 2016; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).2 This chapter begins by considering the 
																																																						
2 This literature is discussed more comprehensively in Chapter 3. 
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role of economic factors. 
1.2 Economic Factors 
In autumn 2008, national economies were hit hard by the global financial and economic crisis 
that began in the United States after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This first phase was 
characterized by the bursting of a housing bubble and the subprime mortgage disaster, 
developing into an economic crisis by September 2008. The economic slowdown began in 
Europe in the second quarter of 2008 and Europe experienced the sharpest contraction in 
growth in the first quarter of 2009 (Kickert, 2012: p. 300). The second phase of the economic 
crisis began in late 2009 and ended in early 2013. By spring 2010, Europe had entered full-
blown crisis, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain seeing levels of public debt 
skyrocket and a dramatic increase in unemployment levels, alongside a severe contraction in 
GDP. The third phase of the economic crisis began in early 2013, with a continuation of the 
economic and political consequences of the first two phases (see Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). It 
is likely that the post-2008 economic crisis has increased votersÕ anxieties over immigration 
and threats to national identity, and fueled economic competition over scarce resources 
(Goodwin, 2014). In some views, these declining economic conditions are also likely to have 
created a fertile political climate for radical right parties to emphasize their core ideological 
appeals of nativism and protecting the dominant ÔinÕ group, espousing authoritarian polices 
on law and order and employing populist rhetoric in attacking mainstream political parties 
and politicians (see Mudde, 2007).  
The link between economics and radical right-wing support has received considerable 
attention in recent times (see Mudde, 2016; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2015; Halikiopoulou 
and Vasilopoulou, 2014; Fukuyama, 2012; The Economist, 2012). The empirical connection 
between economic downturns and far right support has also attracted attention in the fields of 
history and macroeconomics (see Payne 1996; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009; Mian et al. 
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2010). As Goodwin (2014: p. 16) notes: Ô[f]ollowers of radical and extreme right parties often 
believe that a crisis will bring them to power. As the old economic and political order breaks 
down they will be propelled into office by insecure and anxious voters, who are looking for 
parties that project discipline, strength and a nationalist ethos.Õ  
Mudde (2014a; 2016) has coined the term Ôeconomics breeds extremismÕ which is a 
theory that links together declining economic conditions with electoral increases in support 
for radical right parties. The Ôeconomics breeds extremism theoryÕ dates back to the inter-war 
period in the 1920s and 1930s when it was used by some political commentators to explain 
the electoral rise of fascism in Nazi Germany and MussoliniÕs Italy. Eminent historians such 
as A. J. P. Taylor (1961: p. 103) outlined the importance of the inter-war economic crisis, in 
asserting that Ô[o]nly the Great Depression put the wind into HitlerÕs sails.Õ  
However, as Mudde notes (2014a; 2014b) this theory is highly questionable in terms of 
its conceptual claims and its explanatory power. Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2014) also 
note that it is not even clear whether there has been a systematic electoral increase in support 
for populist radical right parties in the recent 2008Ð13 economic crisis. As Goodwin (2014: p. 
20) notes, Ô[m]uch of this marked a continuation of older thinking about the rise of fascism in 
interwar Germany and Italy.Õ Furthermore, scholars such as Eatwell (2008) argue that the 
Ôeconomics breeds extremismÕ theory shows a clear misunderstanding of European history. 
For instance, Italy was not faced with a severe economic depression or economic shock at the 
time Mussolini assumed power as Prime Minister in 1922 (see Goodwin, 2014). Recent 
research has also called into question the strength of the economics argument that led to the 
rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, with empirical evidence suggesting a weak correlation 




This section argues that much of the Ôeconomics breeds extremismÕ theory has become 
largely conflated with the ethnic competition theory that is often applied by political 
scientists to understand the electoral rise of the radical right in contemporary Europe. The 
ethnic competition theory argues that competition over scarce economic resources between 
different social groups is likely to increase hostile inter-group attitudes (see Tajfel, 1971; 
Pedahzur et al., 2004: p. 6). Ethnic in-groups may perceive ethnic out-groups as a threat to 
economic resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983). According to this theory, radical right 
parties present a propagandist ideology, using fear as a vehicle through scapegoating out-
groups such as immigrants, blaming them particularly during times of economic 
dislocation (see Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Arzheimer, 2009; Lucassen and Lubbers, 
2011; Ford et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2011). 
1.3 The post-2008 economic crisis 
	
In order to empirically examine whether the radical right has benefited electorally from the 
post-2008 economic crisis, this section draws on national parliamentary election data. 
Figure 1.1 below depicts the variations in electoral support for populist radical right parties 
across Western and Central-Eastern Europe in national parliamentary elections, before 
(2005Ð8) and during (2009Ð13) the current economic crisis.  
 The national parliamentary election data in Figure 1.1 shows contrasting results for 
the electoral fortunes of radical right parties. The five countries with the highest percentage 
change in electoral support are Finland (+15%), Latvia (+7%), France (+9%), Austria 
(+13%) and Hungary (+15%) (see Mudde, 2013b). The election results for Finland and 
Greece appear to provide some form of evidence for the Ôeconomics breeds extremism 
theoryÕ, with Greece in particular experiencing higher levels of unemployment, inflation 
rates and severe contraction of GDP in the economic crisis period. However, Figure 1.1 
also shows that while eleven countries have seen an increase in radical right support, nine 
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Figure 1.1: Change in percentage vote share for Populist Radical Right 
Parties in Elections before and during the economic crisis 
countries have not. Support has declined substantially for the radical right in Belgium, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and has also declined slightly in Denmark, Poland and 
Bulgaria.  
If we look at the broader electoral picture for populist radical right party support 
across Europe in the economic crisis period, we can see clearly that the Ôeconomics breeds 
extremism theoryÕ is not borne out. Only ten of the twenty-eight EU member states (i.e. 
36%) elected far right Members of Parliament (MEPs) in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections (Mudde, 2014c), demonstrating the widespread variation in electoral support for 
parties of the radical right. Furthermore, countries such as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal who 
were hit worst by the post-2008 economic crisis have not seen a rise in electoral support for 
populist radical right-wing parties.  
 
Source: Mudde (2013b)	
Drawing on original national parliamentary election data from the last election before 
the economic crisis and the first election after the economic crisis, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 
further show the variations in the empirical relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and aggregate level vote share for radical right parties. The scatterplot in Figure 
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1.2 shows a positive, but fairly moderate correlation (r=+0.19) between the change in 
unemployment (2008Ð12) and the percentage change in vote share for far right parties 
(2005Ð12) in the context of the economic crisis. Substantively speaking, this means that the 
populist radical right performed marginally better electorally in countries where the 
unemployment rate increased. In addition, Figure 1.3 explores the link between populist 
radical right party support and rates of GDP growth. Surprisingly, higher levels of GDP 
growth coincided with an increased percentage vote share for radical right parties, yet this 
was extremely weak (r=+0.04). This is a counterintuitive finding in suggesting that some 
populist radical right parties performed better electorally when macroeconomic conditions 
were less severe.  
Figure 1.2: The Unemployment Rate and Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties in 
National Parliamentary Elections 
 
Source: AuthorÕs own figures 
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Figure 1.3: Change in GDP Growth (2008Ð12) and Voting for Populist Radical Right 
Parties in National Parliamentary Elections 
 
Source: AuthorÕs own figures 
Notes: National Parliamentary Elections (2005Ð12) 
	
Which factors might then account for the failure of radical right parties to benefit more 
from the post-2008 economic crash? This section puts forward two arguments which seek to 
explain this puzzle. The first argument is based on a valence model of economic competence. 
Valence issues can be defined as those where voters base their judgments on which parties are 
most competent and best able to deliver on certain issues (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015: p. 2). 
The theory holds that during times of economic crisis, voters are more likely to trust 
established mainstream center left or center right political parties that can provide credible 
economic solutions through underscoring their economic competence (see Ivarsflaten, 2005).  
Populist Radical Right parties by and large are not known amongst voters for effectively 
outlining policies that can redress and resolve economic downturns; their central message is 
































-10 -5 0 5 10
Change in GDP Growth (2008-2012)
Change in Party Performance Fitted values
20	
	
2014). Scholars such as Ivarsflaten (2005) argue that a lack of economic competence is a 
central reason why radical right parties are not likely to benefit from times of economic crisis. 
Goodwin (2014) extends IvarsflatenÕs argument in questioning the basis of the Ôeconomics 
breeds extremismÕ model, suggesting that voters are unlikely to switch their vote to radical 
right parties during an economic crisis, primarily because these parties are not trusted to be 
competent in managing the economy. However, whilst economic competence may be a factor 
in explaining why radical right perform less well than expected in times of economic crisis, it 
is not always the case that mainstream center right and left parties are trusted to manage the 
economy or deemed as competent on this issue by voters, especially with incumbents tending 
to be punished in times of crisis (Hobolt et al., 2012; Tilley et al., 2011). 
1.4 The role of Center Right Parties 
	
The second explanation of why populist radical right parties do not benefit more from times 
of economic crisis, one that I argue has been more overlooked in the political science 
literature, is the role that mainstream center right parties can play in reducing the electoral 
impact of the radical right (see Bale, 2008). Cas Mudde (2014c) has argued that radical right 
party success during an economic crisis depends largely on whether this party family is able 
to ÔownÕ the immigration issue; and also that in the Western European context, radical right 
and mainstream center right parties are likely to mobilize ideologically around the socio-
cultural issue dimension. Mudde hypothesizes that issue ownership on the socio-cultural issue 
dimension (namely immigration and nationalism) is key in explaining party competition 
between the radical right and the mainstream center right. Immigration has traditionally been 
seen as an issue which radical right parties not only emphasize but can claim to ÔownÕ (see 
Pardos-Prado, 2015; Bale, 2008; Mudde, 2007). 
However, recent empirical studies have shown the degree to which center right parties 
can seek to counteract the electoral threat of the radical right by reducing its electoral space 
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on the immigration issue (Pardos-Prado, 2015; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Bale, 2008). It is 
also important to note that post-2000; radical right and center right parties have formed 
coalition governments together, most notably in Austria and more recently in the Netherlands. 
This further shows that both party families may appeal ideologically to a similar voter base 
and that the immigration issue is likely to provide a central party strategy for mainstream 
center right parties from which they can make significant political capital, especially in times 
of economic crisis (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015; Bale, 2008).  
 To explore how different party families have fared during the economic crisis, Table 
1.1 depicts bivariate correlations of the change in vote share for each party family between 
2005 and 2012. Table 1.1 suggests that in electoral terms, the ÔwinnersÕ of the economic 
crisis were center right, rather than populist radical right parties. The empirical results show 
that center right parties achieved the best electoral results in national parliamentary elections 
(+2% points) during the economic crisis and performed considerably better than radical right 
parties (+1% points). The table also highlights how center left parties were the main electoral 
ÔlosersÕ from the 2008 economic crisis (-4% points) and highlights a general decline in social 
democratic parties across Europe in this economic context. 
Table 1.1 also draws on the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey data of party 
positions from 2007/2008 which has been merged with national parliamentary election data 
from ParlGov (see Dring and Manow 2015). This allows the chapter to assess how 
important the salience of immigration was in determining different party familiesÕ electoral 
performance during the economic crisis. Table 1.1 draws on the Pearson r correlation 
coefficient which enables us to examine the relationship between the salience of 
immigration and electoral success for different party families. The salience of immigration 
issue is measured on a 1Ð7 scale, with a value of 1 meaning that the issue did not feature at 
all in a political partyÕs manifesto and a score of 7 indicating that the issue was very 
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important. Thus, higher and more positive scores on this variable imply that making 
immigration an important issue in a partyÕs manifesto allowed it to increase its share of the 
vote during the economic crisis. 
Table 1.1 shows that when making immigration an important issue in their party 
strategy, center right (r=+0.37) and populist radical right partiesÕ correlations (r=+0.46) 
were also particularly strong, with a strong positive correlation. Evidently, both party 
families prospered electorally from this strategy during the economic crisis period. Whilst 
the far right performed marginally better on the immigration issue, the correlations also 
show a general trend, with center right parties that emphasized immigration having a strong 
correlation. Center right parties also performed considerably better electorally on this issue 
than center left parties did (r=+0.08, p>0.05). One possible explanation for this weak 
correlation may be due to center left partiesÕ association with the promotion of freedom of 
movement throughout the 21st century and the party not being trusted on the immigration 
issue by working class voters (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). 
Whilst these results are bivariate correlations and do not contain control variables in a 
multivariate regression analysis, they do provide important preliminary empirical evidence 
to support the dissertationÕs theoretical argument that populist radical right parties did 
increase their vote share, but did not perform as well as expected in the recent economic 
crisis, conceivably because of center right partiesÕ ÔstrategicÕ use of immigration. Party 
competition by its nature is complex and there are considerable cross-national variations 
across Western and Central-Eastern Europe in regards to the dynamics involved (see 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012). Though factors such as incumbency effects are not 
included in the correlations above, it is likely that anti-incumbency effects will also be 
observed in this economic context amidst greater voter volatility. In turn, this provides a 
further dynamic in understanding populist radical right and center right party competition 
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on the immigration issue. In line with theories of protest voting (see Lewis-Beck, 1986; 
Alvarez et al., 2000; Duch, 2008; Hobolt et al., 2012), mainstream parties on both the left 
and right are likely to be punished by voters for being in government at the start of the 
economic crisis and held accountable at the ballot box. These factors are also likely to play 
important role in determining party competition in the recent economic crisis period and 
further underline patterns of electoral volatility, thus providing electoral opportunities for 
the populist radical right to prosper from. However, the preliminary results presented above 
do suggest that mainstream center right parties also have the capacity to challenge populist 
radical right parties on the immigration issue during times of economic crisis. 
Table 1.1: % Vote Share Change for Political Parties in the Economic Crisis Period 
(2005Ð2012) 









Radical Left +0.4 +0.05 34 
Center Left -4 +0.08 84 
Center Right +2 +0.37 71 
Radical Right +1 +0.46 20 
Figures have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. 
Source: AuthorÕs own figures 
Notes: National Parliamentary Elections (2005Ð12) 
	
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
In order to examine the electoral success of the center right around the immigration issue and 
how this party family can take the issue away from the populist radical right, the dissertation 
proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 builds on this chapter in examining party classifications, in 
outlining why the label Ôpopulist radical rightÕ is chosen instead of alternative labels. This 
chapter also lays the groundwork for the dissertation in discussing the features that 
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distinguish the populist radical right party family from mainstream center right parties. 
Chapter 3 then provides a literature review that outlines the gap in the academic literature and 
provides the rationale for the focus of the dissertation; in seeking to fill the gap in the 
literature by investigating party competition on the immigration issue between center right 
and radical right parties. Chapter 4 devises an original theoretical framework in examining 
the dynamics of party competition between contemporary center right and populist radical 
right parties in the 21st century. This theory highlights differences and identifies patterns 
during times of economic crisis and also during more economically prosperous times. The 
theory examines three distinct types of situations that underline the dynamic game between 
center right and radical right parties in different economic contexts. This theoretical 
framework is then tested in three interrelated empirical chapters and enables us to examine 
the electoral success of center right parties and their strategic choices on immigration in 
different economic contexts. 
Methodologically, Chapters 5 and 6 provide an aggregate level comparative test of the 
theory in economic bad (2008Ð13) and good times (1999Ð2007). Chapter 5 draws on the 
ParlGov (see Dring and Manow 2015) dataset on European national parliamentary elections 
that has been merged with the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider Expert Survey on party positions. 
This allows the theory to be tested in times of economic crisis. Chapter 6 draws primarily on 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) that spans more economically prosperous times. 
These expert surveys allow the dissertation to identify correlations and patterns, thus 
enhancing the external validity of the theory. However, these expert surveys are snapshots in 
certain time periods and due to data limitations, both chapters are unable to make direct 
causal inferences (internal validity) across time about how center right party electoral success 
plays out. Chapter 7 seeks to build on this limitation by drawing on a qualitative analysis that 
features four case studies that are generated from the main empirical findings in Chapter 5 
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and examine party competition between both party families in the context of economic bad 
times.  
Chapter 7 allows the dissertation to illustrate more systematically the internal validity 
of the theoretical framework. The case studies are structured around a thematic comparison 
(salience of immigration, crisis; incumbency) that allows the theoretical framework to be 
tested under four different situations that underline the dynamic game between center right 
and populist radical right parties on immigration. The case study provides added value to the 
theory in examining center right and populist radical right party competition dynamics around 
the emphasis placed on immigration in the crisis period. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation 
by discussing the main empirical findings and the implications that these have for the 
contemporary party politics literature in Europe. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the empirical connection between the post-2008 economic crisis 
and electoral support for the populist radical right is not as strong as expected, with 
widespread variations across Europe. This chapter argued that party competition is crucial in 
understanding the varying electoral fortunes of the radical right in the period since 2008. The 
primary argument that forms the dissertation is that the economic crisis has not led to the 
systematic rise of the far right as we would have expected, primarily because in specific 
cases, mainstream center right parties have capitalized on immigration, thus directly 
competing with the far right and profiting electorally from this issue.  
The central purpose of this dissertation will therefore be to test this argument 
empirically, investigating how center right parties across Europe seek to exploit economic 
conditions, good and bad, for their own electoral purposes, through seeking to emphasize the 
immigration issue; which in some cases allows them to take the issue away from populist 
radical right parties. The research puzzle of this dissertation will be further complemented by 
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examining the effects of incumbency and how this impacts on the dynamics of party 
competition between center right and populist radical right parties, particularly in influencing 
the center rightÕs electoral success in economic good and bad times across the 21st century. 
This dissertation will also enable us to better understand the patterns of party competition that 
drive the relationship between center right and populist radical right parties on the 







































Party Classifications: The Populist Radical Right and Center Right Party 
Families 
	
Before addressing the main findings in the literature in Chapter 3, it is important to first 
define the nature of the two party families on which this dissertation focuses. This chapter 
reviews the literature on populist radical right parties in detail, in justifying why the label 
Ôpopulist radical rightÕ is chosen instead of alternative labels. The chapter then proceeds by 
discussing important ÔborderlineÕ cases that have been contested in the literature. The chapter 
offers a briefer discussion of the center right party family literature and of the classification 
for both party families that this dissertation adopts. Drawing on CHES data from 1999Ð2014, 
the chapter shows empirically that there are ideological similarities between center right and 
radical right parties on their issue positions towards immigration. From a spatial perspective, 
both the center right and radical right are closer spatially on the immigration issue than center 
left parties are. The chapter concludes by theoretically outlining the features that distinguish 
the populist radical right party family from mainstream center right parties in Europe. 
2.1 ÔPopulist Radical RightÕ or ÔExtreme Right?Õ 
	
The populist radical right can be seen as a heterogeneous party family (see Mudde, 2007; 
Arzheimer, 2009). A multitude of different classifications have been identified for this party 
family in the literature. More than a decade ago, Mudde (2002: p. 11) identified around 26 
definitions that characterized this party family in the literature, with no less than 58 different 
features mentioned at least once. Arzheimer (2012: p. 37) notes the Ôstaggering number of 
labels and definitions [that] have been appliedÕ in the literature on the contemporary radical 
right. These labels have ranged from ÔNew RightÕ, ÔRadical RightÕ and ÔExtreme RightÕ to 
ÔPopulist RightÕ (see also Arzheimer, 2012). 
 The early 2000s literature on this party family tended to favor using the label 
ÔExtreme RightÕ to define this party family. Cas MuddeÕs (2002) study sought to create some 
28	
	
order from the chaos within the literature on the terminology surrounding the far right family. 
Mudde argued in favor of three key features Ð namely nativism, populism, and 
authoritarianism Ð as a parsimonious approach to defining and classifying contemporary far 
right parties across Europe. 
At the same time, an Ôanti-immigrationÕ classification was used by scholars such as 
Fennema (1997) and Van der Brug et al. (2000). As the name implies, a key feature of the 
anti-immigration classification was the central focus of nativism, protecting the Ôin-groupÕ in 
opposition to the Ôout-groupÕ. Scholars working in the anti-immigration literature tended to 
divide their party categorizations into ÔprotestÕ and ÔracistÕ parties. However, a shortcoming 
with this classification is that this typology included nativism or anti-immigrant ideology as a 
key feature of the this party family, when we know that there are a number of other key 
features such as authoritarianism and populism that must be taken into account (see Mudde, 
2002; Adorno et al., 1950). This anti-immigrant schema appeared frequently in the literature 
in the 1990s and early 2000s, but has more recently fallen out of popular use amongst 
scholars. Thus, the anti-immigrant label is arguably too narrow as it assumes that anti-
immigrant sentiment is the central ideology of this party family and does not sufficiently take 
into account other core ideological features such as Euroscepticism (see Mudde, 1999; 2007).  
Elisabeth CarterÕs (2005) research has outlined the heterogeneous nature of this party 
family and labeled these parties as being ÔExtreme Right.Õ Carter noted that there are a 
number of different key features that different types of extreme right-wing parties adopt in 
their party ideologies. In order to provide a semblance of order in classifying the extreme 
right-wing party family, Carter (2005) grouped extreme right-wing parties into five different 
sub-groups that form the extreme right-wing party family: Neo-Nazi Parties, Neo-Fascist 




The first sub-group comprises ÔNeo-Nazi PartiesÕ and political parties which hold a 
radically xenophobic ideology and adhere to classical racism while also rejecting existing 
democratic institutions. ÔNeo-Fascist PartiesÕ form the second category and are not inherently 
xenophobic or racist, but reject existing democratic institutions outright. Thirdly, 
ÔAuthoritarian-Xenophobic PartiesÕ are defined by their combination of a radically 
xenophobic ideological stance on the socio-cultural dimension with an advocacy of a bigger 
role for the state on the socio-economic dimension. ÔNeo-Liberal Xenophobic PartiesÕ, 
CarterÕs fourth category, are radically xenophobic on the socio-cultural dimension, but do not 
seek to overthrow existing democratic institutions, instead demanding reform of the existing 
system, through more democracy and less state intervention. ÔNeo-Liberal Populist PartiesÕ 
constitute the fifth group and are demarcated by not being overtly xenophobic or racist on the 
socio-cultural dimension, while seeking more democracy and less state intervention on the 
socio-economic dimension. Similarly to Neo-Liberal Xenophobic Parties, Neo-Liberal 
Populist Parties seek to work within the democratic confines of the political system, by 
demanding reform of the existing system. However, whilst CarterÕs typology is conceptually 
clear, it has not been operationalized by many scholars in the literature. Furthermore, this 
typology cannot be empirically tested using expert surveys such as the CHES, as such 
surveys tend not to adopt this more fine-grained approach in subdividing the far right party 
family.  
Mudde (2007: pp. 18Ð24) built on his earlier work in suggesting that the key feature that 
typified the radical right party family is nativism in the form of an ideological belief that 
Ôstates should be inhabited exclusively by members of the ÒnativeÓ groupÕ (Arzheimer, 2012: 
p. 37). This key feature applies to far right parties not just in Western Europe, but in Central-
Eastern Europe as well. Mudde further notes that this party family can be split into two 
distinct subgroups that comprise ÔRadical RightÕ and ÔPopulist Radical RightÕ parties that 
30	
	
have different features. Parties of the ÔRadical RightÕ seek to combine nativism and 
authoritarianism as central to their party ideology, whereas the ÔPopulist Radical RightÕ 
utilizes populism in order to get their message across to voters. An important point to outline 
is that Mudde (2007: p. 24) departed from his original classification (2000) in arguing that a 
key feature of ÔExtreme RightÕ parties is their anti-democratic ideology. Many contemporary 
scholars also tended to use the term ÔRadical RightÕ, as defined by Rydgren (2007), who 
classified radical right parties as those that displayed a general suspicion towards the liberal 
democratic state, while not seeking to overthrow the democratic system. 
2.2 The Mudde Party Classification: ÔThe Populist Radical Right Party FamilyÕ 
	
The first feature of populist radical right party family is a nativist ideology, where 
ethnocentric ideals and values are espoused which border on nationalistic and xenophobic 
sentiment. The nativist ideology also asserts the importance of the dominant ethnic in-group 
in society, arguing that this group Ôshould be exclusively inhabited by members of the native 
group (Òthe nationÓ), and the non-native elements are [seen as] fundamentally threatening to 
the homogenous nation-stateÕ (Mudde, 2014b: p. 99).  
The second feature of the populist radical right family is the advancement of populist 
ideals. According to Mudde (2014b), populism is an ideology that this party family uses to 
separate society into two groups: a homogenous and an antagonistic group. The homogenous 
group are the Ôpure peopleÕ, whilst the antagonistic group are seen as the corrupt political 
elite, or political establishment. Most importantly, populism can be seen as the overall 
expression of the general will of the people (see Mudde, 2014b: p. 99). Radical right parties 
frequently deploy populist rhetoric when outlining the notion of the Ôcorrupt political eliteÕ in 
supranational institutions such as the European Union through a ÔhardÕ Eurosceptic strategy, 
as well as in domestic politics. Nonetheless, these parties still seek to work under the 
democratic system and this sets them apart from the majority of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi 
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parties in the early post-World War II period that fall under the ÔExtreme Right-WingÕ label. 
The third feature that sets the contemporary radical right family apart from other 
contemporary party families in Europe is its authoritarian ideology, with these parties 
displaying a strong emphasis on law and order throughout society (Mudde, 2002; 2007; 
Arzheimer, 2009). These parties have traditionally placed strong emphasis on a hierarchically 
ordered society where Ôinfringements of authority are to be punished severelyÕ (see Mudde, 
2014b: p. 99). 
Drawing on MuddeÕs (2007) theoretical framework, the dissertation argued that this 
party family can be seen under the broad umbrella term of the Ôfar rightÕ label, with Ôpopulist 
radical rightÕ and Ôextreme right-wing partiesÕ falling under two distinct sub-groups. The 
terms Ôpopulist radical rightÕ, Ôradical rightÕ and Ôfar rightÕ will be used interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation. This label is primarily chosen in this dissertation because 
ÔPopulist Radical Right PartiesÕ has become the most widely accepted label in the literature 
and methodologically speaking this allows the dissertation to be consistent with the existing 
literature (see Mudde, 2007; 2016; Pardos-Prado, 2015; Rydgren, 2007). I do however 
acknowledge that Ôpopulist radical rightÕ and Ôextreme right-wingÕ parties have ideological 
differences. On the one hand, populist radical right parties accept the democratic process and 
seek to become democratically elected through elections. However, populist radical right 
parties tend to challenge the more ÔliberalÕ conception of democracy such as pluralism and 
minority rights.  
On the other hand and in contrast to the radical right, extreme right-wing parties tend to 
be deeply skeptical of the democratic process and seek alternative means to achieving power 
other than through elections. Extreme right-wing parties also tend to be outwardly 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic in their core ideology. Contemporary examples of extreme right-
wing parties include the Golden Dawn Party in Greece (XA), the British National Party in the 
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United Kingdom (BNP) and the National Democratic Party in Germany (NPD). In regards to 
populist radical right parties, this sub-group has tended to adopt party modernization 
strategies, such as rebranding their ideology, largely to appeal to a wider section of voters. A 
primary example of this is the transformation of the Front National (FN) under Marine Le 
Pen through distancing themselves ideologically from outright xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
language, such as was seen during her father Jean-Marie Le PenÕs leadership of the FN (see 
Mudde, 2014b). 
However, for the sake of parsimony and in order to increase the generalizability of the 
empirical findings in this dissertation, Ôpopulist radical rightÕ and Ôextreme right-wing partiesÕ 
will be grouped together under the Ôfar rightÕ party banner in the empirical analysis that forms 
the bedrock of this dissertation. Existing expert surveys such as the WhitefieldÐ
Rohrschneider and CHES adopt this methodology and this same methodological technique 
will be adopted throughout this dissertation that enhances the external validity of the 
dissertation through expanding the sample size of parties and also ensures consistency. 
2.3 ÔBorderlineÕ Cases 
Drawing on the recent 2014 CHES dataset, Table 2.1 below outlines a number of notable 
parties in Europe that are classified as populist radical right parties by country experts and 
have achieved parliamentary representation in recent years. Radical Right parties such as the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FP), the Front National in France (FN) and Flemish Interest 
(VB) in Belgium have been around for a considerable period of time (see Hainsworth, 2008; 
Mudde, 2014b). There are also newer and more insurgent radical right parties, such as Golden 
Dawn (XA) in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary that have appealed more to an Ôextreme right-
wing ideologyÕ than a Ôradical rightÕ one. However, of the radical right parties listed in Table 
2.1, there are a number of ÔborderlineÕ and contested parties in the literature (see Mudde, 
2014b) that are important to take into account and are these are discussed more 
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comprehensively below. It is important to discuss these cases as their inclusion will have an 
impact on the external validity and robustness of the empirical findings in this dissertation. 
 These ÔborderlineÕ cases include parties such as Northern League (LN) in Italy, the 
Alliance for the Future of Austria Party (BZ), the Finns Party (PS) in Finland3 alongside the 
Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. Parties such as the LN in Italy 
have been considered as regionalist and far right parties, in focusing on defending Northern 
Italian traditions and creating a federal state. However, in line with a majority of scholars (see 
Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Art, 2011; Betz, 2005; Rovny, 2013), the LN 
can be classified as a populist radical right party as the partyÕs ideology has traditionally 
emphasized nativism and a vehement opposition towards immigration.  
I also treat BZ as a populist radical right party in line with the majority of the existing 
literature (see Luther, 2009; Duncan, 2010; Ennser, 2012) as the party focuses on a nativist 
ideology and has tended to compete with the other far right party FP. The PS Party in 
Finland has been seen by some academics as an Ôanti-European populistÕ party (see Mudde, 
2013; 2014b), however the party has tended to focus on nativism, through strong opposition 
towards immigration and how it undermines the notion of Finnish identity and traditional 
values (see Art, 2011). Thus, I see this party as belonging to the radical right label as the 
Finns Party has tended to exhibit the three core criteria, of nativism, populism and 
authoritarianism that comprise populist radical right parties. Furthermore, the Finns Party is 
also considered as a populist radical right party by country experts in the CHES (see Bakker 
et al., 2015). The PiS Party in Poland has tended to be traditionally associated more with the 
conservative right than with the populist radical right. However, the party has shifted 
ideologically on the socio-cultural issue dimension in the last few years, particularly in its 
discourse on immigration (see Pytlas, 2015). Thus, in accordance with existing expert 
																																																						
3 The name ÔTrue FinnsÕ was previously used by the party. However, since August 2011, the party began using 
the name ÔThe FinnsÕ. This dissertation refers to this populist radical right party as ÔThe FinnsÕ throughout. 
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surveys such as CHES (see Bakker et al., 2015), this dissertation treats PiS as a populist 
radical right party in this dissertation and not as belonging to the mainstream center right. 
Two such parties that fall under the Ôanti-European populistÕ label comprise the Alternative 
for Germany Party (AfD) and the Italian Five Star Movement (see Arzheimer, 2015). 
Following Mudde (2014b), I do not include these two parties under the label of populist 
radical right as their primary focus is on Euroscepticism and has not focused predominantly 
on nativism. In addition, the rise of both parties also occurred after 2013 and this time period 
is beyond the scope of the dissertation.  
An additional ÔborderlineÕ case is that of the now governing party in Hungary, Fidesz. 
FideszÕs party classification is generally considered by the majority of academics as a 
ÔconservativeÕ party that falls under the center right ideology, yet the partyÕs ideology has 
changed across time and incorporated more nationalistic discourse and rhetoric (see Mudde, 
2014b). In recent years, under Viktor OrbnÕs leadership, Fidesz has frequently emphasized 
maintaining control of borders and creating a strong Hungarian state (see Pytlas and Kossack, 
2013; see Rovny, 2016; Rovny and Polk, 2016). Euroscepticism is important to Fidesz, but 
only in terms of how Euroscepticism is seen to undermine the nation-state in Hungary. 
However, in comparison to Jobbik, Fidesz tends to be seen as more ÔmoderateÕ in their 
ideology. Thus, in accordance with the majority of the academic literature and the party 
classification of expert surveys such as CHES (see Mudde, 2014b; Bakker et al., 2015), this 
dissertation will treat Fidesz as a center right party and not as belonging to the radical right 
party family. The radical right party Jobbik has similarly emphasized nationalism, through 
irredentist policies, in seeking to recover former lands and territories that were taken away 
from Hungary after World War I. Furthermore, JobbikÕs ideology has focused on hostile 
opposition to minority rights that has been aimed primarily against out-groups such as the 
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Roma and Gypsy communities (Pytlas and Kossack, 2013).4  
Table 2.1: Notable Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe 
Country Party Name Party 
Abbreviation 
Austria Freedom Party 
of Austria 
FP 
 Alliance for 












Finland The Finns PS 
France Front National FN 
Greece Golden Dawn XA 










Netherlands Party for 
Freedom 
PVV 











Source: CHES (2014) 
 
Like other party families across Europe such as the center left, the radical right party 
family is heterogeneous, particularly in regards to socio-economic policy stances (see Mudde, 
2007; Rovny, 2013). Some radical right parties such as the FP and the PVV in the 
Netherlands have tended to emphasize more neo-liberal economic policies, through 
																																																						
4 Jobbik effectively replaced the other radical right party MIEP (The Hungarian Justice and Life Party) at the 
2010 Hungarian National Election. 
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supporting a free market economy and low taxation. In contrast, parties such as the Front 
National in France have historically emphasized protectionist economic policies (see Rovny, 
2013). The Front National has also sought to present a chauvinistic welfare programme, 
through ensuring that socio-economic policy is directed to the ethnic Ôin-groupÕ. In addition, 
state protection in specific areas of the national economy against foreign competition has 
been important to a number of contemporary radical right parties in Europe (see de Lange, 
2007). Table 2.2 further underlines the heterogeneity of the radical right party family and 
depicts the average score of parties on the left-right ideological position variable across time 
from 1999Ð2014. Scores of 0 imply that a party is left-wing, whilst 5 denotes a centrist 
position and 10 corresponds to the absolute right-wing of the political spectrum.  
The second variable included in Table 2.2 is the average score of parties on the left-right 
economic position variable. Scores of 0 imply that a party adopts a left-wing economics 
approach, with 5 denoting a centrist position and 10 corresponding to being economically 
right-wing. Table 2.2 shows that populist radical right parties tended to score around 8 on the 
expert survey in regards to their left-right ideological position, whereas there is considerable 
variation by left-right economic position. Radical right parties in Belgium, Austria, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom tended to be much more economically right-wing. In 
contrast, radical right parties across Central-Eastern Europe in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia 









Table 2.2: List of Populist Radical Right Parties in the CHES 1999Ð2014 Expert Survey5 















Austria Freedom Party 
of Austria 
FP* 8.7 5.8 
 Alliance for 
the Future of 
Austria 
BZ* 8.3 6.8 
Belgium Flemish 
Interest 
VB 9.6 7.5 
 Front National FN 9.6 8.6 
Bulgaria National 
Union Attack 






USVIT 7.7 (2014) 5.3 (2014) 
Denmark Danish 
PeopleÕs Party 
DF 8.0 5.6 
 Progress Party FP 9.3 (1999) 8.9 (1999) 
Finland The Finns PS* 5.6 4.4 
France Front National FN 9.6 6.7 
Germany The 
Republicans 








NPD 10 (2014) 5.3 
																																																						
5 CHES Additional Notes: 
*The following populist radical right parties have CHES Average scores that differ from 1999Ð2014: 
 
Austria- BZ: 2006Ð2014  
France- FN: 1999Ð2010 
Finland- PS: 2006Ð2014 
Greece- LAOS: 2006Ð2014 
Hungary- Jobbik: 2010Ð2014 
Italy- AN: 1999Ð2010 
LN: 2006Ð2010 
Latvia- TB-LNNK: 2002Ð2006 
NA: 2010Ð2014 
Poland- PiS: 2002Ð2014 
Slovenia- SNS: 2002Ð2010 
Slovakia- SNS: 2002Ð2014 







LAOS* 8.8 5.5 




MIEP 9.7 (2002) 4 (2002) 
 Movement for 
a Better 
Hungary 
JOBBIK* 9.6 4.2 
Italy Brothers of 
Italy-National 
Alliance 
AN* 7.8 5.1 
 Northern 
League 
LN 8.7 7.3 
Latvia For Fatherland 
and Freedom 
TB-LNNK* 8.4 6.5 
 National 
Alliance 
NA* 8.0 5.5 
Netherlands The Pim 
Fortuyn List 
LPF 8.4 (2002) 8.1 (2002) 
 Party for 
Freedom 
PVV* 8.9 6.0 
Poland Law and 
Justice 
PiS* 7.9 3.2 
Romania Greater 
Romania Party 
PRM 7.1 3.3 
Slovenia Slovenian 
National Party 
SNS* 5.9 4.8 
Slovakia Slovakia 
National Party 
SNS* 8.2 4.4 
Sweden Swedish 
Democrats 
SD 8.1 5.5 
UK British 
National Party 













2.4 The Center Right Party Family in Europe  
	
By comparison with the literature on the populist radical right, the classification of center 
right parties has tended to be less contested. However, as with all party families in Europe, 
the core ideology of center right parties varies considerably across countries. Girvin (2005) 
outlines the ideological pragmatism of center right parties and how this party family has 
Ôdefined itself historically in terms of its reservations to modernity since the Enlightenment 
and the Industrial RevolutionÕ. A similar approach is adopted by Heywood (2012), who notes 
how, historically, center right parties began in the twentieth century as bourgeois parties and 
have evolved in adapting to significant political change. Generally speaking, contemporary 
parties of the center right in Europe tend to comprise Conservative, Christian Democratic, 
and market liberal parties (see Bale, 2008).  
Contemporary Conservative parties tend to be focused on preserving established 
traditions and institutions, seeking to maintain the status quo and hierarchical social orders 
(see Heywood, 2012). Historical examples of notable European Conservative parties include 
the UK Conservative Party, which achieved high levels of electoral success throughout the 
twentieth century (see Bale, 2012). The Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in France has 
also emphasized a nationalist ideology of Gaullism, seeking to build and maintain a strong 
French nation-state.  
Other notable Conservative parties in Central-Eastern Europe include HungaryÕs Fidesz, 
which has traditionally held similar perspectives on issues such as law and order to both 
UMP and the UK Conservative Party (see Heywood, 2012). The New Flemish Alliance (N-
VA) in Belgium has focused on Flemish nationalism, seeking independence for the Belgian 
region of Flanders and the protection of Flemish culture and the Dutch language. The party 
has also focused on a conservative ideology, in seeking to maintain traditional institutions 
within society (see Beyens et al., 2015). 
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Similarly to Conservative parties, Christian Democratic parties have tended to 
emphasize traditional values such as the family while also supporting the Church. Notable 
examples of Christian Democratic parties include GermanyÕs Christian Democratic Union 
Party (CDU), the Austrian PeopleÕs Party (VP), IrelandÕs Fine Gael, the NetherlandsÕ 
Christian Democratic Appeal Party (CDA) and the PeopleÕs Party in Spain (PP). Many 
Christian Democratic parties have also been affiliated with the center right European PeopleÕs 
Party grouping (EPP) in the European Parliament (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004). Under German 
Chancellor Angela MerkelÕs leadership, the CDU Party in Germany has advocated Christian 
democratic values, pro-Europeanism and an economic liberal conservatism that emphasizes 
the importance of free market economics (see Kalyvas, 1996; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 
2010; Heywood, 2012).  
 Market liberal parties in Europe are also often seen as belonging to the center right 
party family. Generally speaking, market liberal political parties tend to advocate neo-liberal 
economics and minimal government intervention in the economy. At the same time, they also 
tend to place importance on traditional issues such as European security and law and order. 
Contemporary examples of market liberal parties include the PeopleÕs Party for Freedom and 
Democracy in the Netherlands (VVD), which has tended to emphasize classical neo-liberal 
economics, arguing that the market should be left completely to the private sector, with 
minimal government intervention (see Keman, 1996; Anderweg and Irwin, 2014). Other 
contemporary market liberal parties include the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats 
(VLD), the Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre/Left), the economic right-wing of the 
Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) and the more economically right-wing liberal factions within 




2.5 Comparing the Contemporary Center Right and Populist Radical Right Families 
	
Populist radical right parties and mainstream center right parties are not too dissimilar 
ideologically speaking. Both party families have tended to place a strong importance on 
maintaining traditional values and institutions in society, alongside being tough on socio-
cultural issues such as immigration and crime (see Pardos-Prado, 2015; Van der Brug et al., 
2002; Lubbers et al., 2002). Both party families also share similarities on the European 
integration issue, with a number of contemporary center right parties holding ÔhardÕ 
Eurosceptic positions that makes them share ideological similarities with populist radical 
right parties (see Bale, 2008; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Scholars such as Pardos-Prado (2015) 
and Bale (2008) note that from a spatial perspective, the center right are much closer 
ideologically to the populist radical right than other mainstream party families such as the 
center left. Table 2.3 below further demonstrates this argument by drawing on the average 
party positions (1999Ð2014) of center right, center left and radical right party families across 
time on immigration policy through the CHES. The mean score of center right parties on 
immigration is 5.8 and is higher than the center left score of 3.7. The radical right party 
family has an average score of 8.9 and shows the general opposition of this party family 
towards immigration. From a spatial perspective, radical right parties tend to hold more 
restrictionist policies on immigration, yet spatially center right partiesÕ position on this issue 
are not too dissimilar and are spatially closer than the center left. 
 However, what sets both party families apart are nuances on two issue dimensions. 
The first is a nuance on the socio-cultural issue dimension, namely the radical rightÕs 
ideological focus on nativism in espousing hostile opposition towards ethnic-out groups such 
as immigrants in society. Center right parties tend to focus less on anti-immigrant positions 
and adopt more moderate positions on the issue compared to the radical right (see Mudde, 
2010). The center right party family will still play up and regularly emphasize the 
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immigration issue, but in a more ideologically palatable manner than the radical right do (see 
Pardos-Prado, 2015). A second and more fundamental ideological difference between both 
party families is rooted on the socio-economic dimension. As discussed more 
comprehensively above in this chapter, center right parties by and large tend to espouse free 
market economics; whereas populist radical right parties have been known to adopt both neo-
liberal free market and state interventionist economics in a number of countries (see Pardos-
Prado, 2015; Mudde, 2007). 
Table 2.3: Positions on Immigration (By Party Family) 
Notes: 0Ð10 Scale (CHES)  
0 = Strongly opposes tough policy, 10 = Strongly favors tough policy 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
	
This chapter has examined the divergent terminology in the political science literature 
concerning contemporary populist radical right and center right party families. It showed that 
the definitions of the radical right party family have been hotly contested in the academic 
literature. In order to classify the contemporary populist radical right party family, this 
dissertation draws on Cas MuddeÕs recent theoretical work (2007; 2014b) in defining this 
party family according to three core criteria of nativism, populism and authoritarianism. 
Drawing on recent party competition literature, the chapter defined center right parties as 
including Conservative, Christian Democratic and market (but not social) liberal parties. The 
chapter also showed that the mainstream center right party family is also considered diverse 
in its ideology and shares some ideological similarities on the immigration issue with the 
populist radical right party family. Now that both party families have been classified, the next 




Number of Observations  
(N) 
Center Right 5.7 246 
Center Left 3.7 147 
Radical Right 8.9 58 
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chapter examines the gap in the party competition literature on populist radical right and 
center right partiesÕ approach to the immigration issue in Europe and highlights the 














































Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
	
This chapter examines the diverse academic literature on the populist radical right. It briefly 
outlines the three waves of academic scholarship on the populist radical right, and examines 
the Ôdemand-sideÕ (votersÕ characteristics) and Ôsupply-sideÕ (party competition effects) 
aspects of the scholarship on the radical right to date. It argues that we know much more 
about the types of people that vote for the radical right, the key socio-demographic and 
attitudinal characteristics that explain votersÕ propensity to support the far right, and the 
ideology and strategies that radical right parties adopt, than we do about the effects of party 
competition and the way in which mainstream parties, particularly those on the center right, 
can affect and limit the electoral success of populist radical right parties.  
This chapter argues that few studies have systematically examined the type of 
competition that populist radical right parties can face from mainstream center right parties in 
different economic contexts, both in economic good and bad times. This dissertation 
therefore seeks to fill this lacuna in the party competition literature by investigating 
competition on immigration between both party families. From a party politics perspective, 
this will enable us to understand more about the strategic choices that center right parties can 
devise on immigration and how this can allow the center right to emphasize the issue and 
prosper electorally, conceivably at the expense of populist radical right parties. This chapter 
also briefly considers the electoral performance of contemporary center left parties on the 
immigration issue, outlining briefly the rationale for why this dissertation focuses on 





3.1 Micro-level factors: Voting for the Populist Radical Right 
 
Scholarship on the populist radical right is generally understood to consist of three ÔwavesÕ 
(see Mudde, 2002; 2017). The first wave has been seen as lasting from 1945 until 1980, with 
the majority of studies focusing on historical analysis of fascist and neo-fascist parties 
between the pre-war and post-war periods. The second wave of academic scholarship is 
considered as lasting from 1980 to 2000, in which scholars sought to understand why certain 
types of voters tended to vote for radical right-wing parties such as the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FP), the French National Front (FN), and the German Republicans (REP). The third 
wave of scholarship began at the start of the present century and has led to a growing field of 
scholarly research on the populist radical right. This research has tended to examine the 
reasons for the varying electoral fortunes of the contemporary radical right in Western and 
Central-Eastern Europe (see Mudde, 2017). The present chapter focuses primarily on this 
burgeoning third wave of scholarship as there has been a substantial increase of academic 
scholarship on the populist radical right during time period. 
The literature on populist radical right party support is diverse and spans a myriad of 
disciplines, with political scientists, historians, sociologists, and psychologists all having 
developed a wide range of theoretical explanations for electoral support for the radical right 
(Winkler, 1996). These explanations may be divided into two categories, the first concerned 
with the individual or ÔmicroÕ level, the second examining the aggregate or ÔmacroÕ level. The 
individual-level literature on the radical right has analyzed the types of voters that support 
radical right parties and more importantly, the reasons and attitudinal characteristics that lead 
them to do so (Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin 






In a recent extensive review of the literature on the radical right, the political scientist Kai 
Arzheimer (2012a) has outlined how the individual-level literature has focused on socio-
demographic factors and the political attitudes held by voters who support the radical right. In 
contrast, the aggregate-level literature has examined party competition and the positions that 
populist radical right parties hold on key issues, alongside the effects of such partiesÕ 
strategies on their electoral success (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers 
et al., 2002; Kitschelt, 1995) and the way in which they compete with mainstream party 
families (see Bale, 2008; Bale, Hough, and van Kessel, 2013; Pardos-Prado, 2015; Van der 
Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2005). Arzheimer (2012a) has also shown that scholars 
contributing to the aggregate-level literature on the radical right have also focused on factors 
such as economic conditions and immigration levels that are key determinants of radical right 
party support.  
Individual-level studies in France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany have 
analyzed the effects of socio-demographic factors on the radical right vote (Mayer and 
Perrineau, 1992; Goodwin 2010; Swyngedouw et al., 2009). The empirical research has 
confirmed that the social profile of the radical right in Western Europe tends show white, 
male, lower income, and younger voters in the 18-29 category (Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007; 
Arzheimer, 2009). In terms of social class, a core characteristic of the radical right electorate 
has been its appeal towards the working classes which some scholars have referred to as the 
ÔproletarianizationÕ of the radical right (Arzheimer, 2012) or the Ôleft behind votersÕ thesisÕ 
(see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). Ford and Goodwin (2014) 
argue that there has been a long-term pattern of partisan dealignment in the United Kingdom, 
where voters have shifted away from traditional left-wing parties such as the Labour Party, 
due to fears over socio-cultural issues such as immigration.  
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Ford and GoodwinÕs (2014) research showed that working class voters felt threatened by 
the influx of immigrants and that this resulted in the radical right party UKIP prospering 
electorally in recent years, in picking up discontented voters. Remarkably, this pattern has 
been shown on a cross-national level, in Western European countries such as France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Traditional social democratic parties in these countries used to be 
characterized by their strong working class support base, yet this long-term pattern of social 
class voting has declined significantly in recent years, with populist radical right parties 
profiting from this sharp decline in the working class vote (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). 
Scholars such as Norris (2005) have identified the strong gender divide that is present 
amongst populist radical right supporters and linked this to the authoritarian ideology of 
radical right party programmes. Empirical evidence across Europe has shown that female 
voters are far less likely to vote for the radical right than their male counterparts. The 
authoritarian and hierarchical nature of contemporary radical right parties is often cited by 
scholars as the key explanation for this gender divide in the radical right electorate (see 
Perrineau, 1997; Swyngedouw, et al., 2009; Goodwin, 2010). Another remarkably consistent 
pattern in the radical right voting behavior literature has shown that educational attainment is 
a key predictor of radical right support. Cross-sectional studies conducted on a number of 
radical right parties, such as Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest in Belgium), the French Front 
National (FN) and the British National Party (BNP) have confirmed that voters with lower 
levels of educational attainment are highly correlated with voting for the radical right 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2009; Hainsworth, 2000). The one exception is the Freedom Party of 
Austria which has consistently polled highly in first order elections amongst the professional 






The majority of empirical studies in the radical right voting literature have analyzed the 
attitudinal characteristics of radical right voters. The attitudinal characteristics of radical right 
voters towards immigration, dissatisfaction with the European Union, dissatisfaction with 
national governments, and a range of other issues have been explored; with radical right 
voters tending to hold negative attitudes towards all these issues (see Scheepers et al., 1990; 
Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2006; Rydgren, 2008). Academic studies have also examined 
the anti-Islamist rhetoric that parties such as the British National Party and movements such 
as the English Defence League have deployed, with other research exploring rival drivers of 
Anti-Muslim sentiment (Goodwin; 2013, McLaren, 2011). Recent academic research has also 
shown how the United Kingdom Independence Party has drawn a wide range of its support 
from the working classes and dissatisfaction with the center left Labour Party, particularly 
around the immigration issue (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). 
Broadly speaking, the consensus in the academic literature is that in line with ethnic 
competition and protest vote theories, populist radical right voters hold anti-immigrant 
positions, are staunchly Eurosceptic, and tend to hold lower levels of political trust in national 
governments (Lubbers et al., 2001; Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; Kriesi et al., 2015). Numerous statistical 
models have shown the effect of the social disintegration theory in highlighting the strong 
effect of political attitudes when controlling for the effect of socio-demographic variables in 
statistical models (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Swyngedouw, 2007). Cross-sectional research 
conducted by opinion pollsters such as YouGov and Ipsos Mori on the British National Party 
in the United Kingdom has shown that a specific set of political attitudes tend to be the 
central drivers of support, with anti-immigrant sentiment and intolerant racial perceptions 
core drivers of support (see Goodwin et al., 2010; 2012; 2014). Similar to socio-demographic 
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factors, attitudinal research on the contemporary radical right has shown a remarkable degree 
of consistency about the types of voters that vote for this party family, that sets it apart from 
mainstream center right and center left parties in Europe.  
Recent literature has also analyzed the interplay of attitudinal and socialization models 
(Avdeenko et al., 2013). The latter type of empirical study has shown the strong relationship 
between generational influence amongst fathers and sons in transmitting political attitudes. 
These scholars showed that the formative years of childhood can be shaped crucially when 
young children are exposed to anti-immigrant rhetoric (Avdeenko et al., 2013: pp. 4Ð13). In 
turn, this anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to cause a young male to develop further 
antipathy towards immigrants during adulthood. The implications of this finding are 
important in showing how the transmission of right-wing attitudes during childhood can have 
a profound effect during adulthood (Avdeenko et al., 2013).  
Therefore, we know extensively about the Ôdemand-sideÕ level, i.e. the types of voters 
that vote for radical right parties across Europe. At the socio-demographic level, we know 
that younger, male, lower educated, and working class voters are much more likely to vote 
for radical right parties. At the attitudinal level, we know that voters who are more politically 
dissatisfied with national government, hold lower levels of political trust, alongside voters 
who are Eurosceptic are much more likely to vote for radical right parties (see Lubbers et al., 
2002; Givens, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009; Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 
2015). The next two sections of this chapter examine a more under-researched area in the 
radical right literature that comprises party competition and the primary focus of this 
dissertation. 
3.2 Macro-level factors: Populist Radical Right Party Electoral Success 
	
Now we have examined the main findings in the voting behavior literature as to why some 
voters are more likely than others to vote for populist radical right parties, we can move on to 
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examining the Ômacro-levelÕ literature. Such scholarship often argues that populist radical 
right parties perform better electorally when they hold more authoritarian stances on socio-
cultural issues, such as immigration, while emphasizing free-market economic positions 
(Kitschelt, 1995). This groundbreaking model, which has become known as the Kitscheltian 
model, outlined an Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ for populist radical right parties which sought 
to explain the electoral success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FP) and the French Front 
National (FN) in the 1980s and 1990s (see Kitschelt, 1995; Pardos-Prado, 2015). However, 
the Kitscheltian model has recently been challenged by de Lange (2007) and Bornschier 
(2010), who argue that holding neo-liberal economic positions is likely to be detrimental for 
radical right electoral performance as this will turn away working class voters. 
Recent literature on the radical right has examined party competition between center left 
and radical right parties over working class voters. Arzheimer (2013) challenges the 
Kitscheltian model (1995), arguing that radical right parties can steal disenchanted working 
class voters away from mainstream left-wing parties in Europe by having tough policies on 
immigration. ArzheimerÕs (2013) issue-based position account builds on BaleÕs (2003: pp. 
70Ð74) findings in demonstrating that radical right parties can seize a large proportion of the 
working class vote, due to the center left losing touch with its traditional voter base. 
Arzheimer also notes that center left parties face a significant dilemma on the immigration 
issue: whether to toughen up their rhetoric on immigration to counteract the threat of far 
right, or to de-emphasize the immigration issue in order to try and defuse it (see Bale et al., 
2010: pp. 413Ð414). Arzheimer (2013: p. 86) also notes that Ô[t]his ÒproletarianizationÓ is the 
result of the interplay between a long-term dealignment process and increasing worries 
amongst the European working classes about the immigration of cheap labour.Õ 
 In contrast to KitscheltÕs (1995) original model, de Lange (2007) adopts a case study 
based approach in arguing that a new type of Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ exists that accounts 
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for radical right party electoral success, where such parties adopt center left economic 
positions while also emphasizing both immigration and nationalist issues at the same time. 
Drawing on party positions of the French Front National (FN), the Flemish Interest Party 
(VB) in Belgium and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (LF), de Lange (2007) showed that specific 
radical right parties make use of this new Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ, but others do not. 
Other scholars have followed suit by arguing for a new Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ for 
radical right parties that includes a more centrist economic position that can appeal to a 
broader section of voters (see also Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Rovny, 2013).  
Nonetheless, previous literature has also shown that populist radical right parties are 
perceived by voters to lack economic competence (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Mudde, 2007). It 
therefore does not make sense for populist radical right parties to play the economic card and 
emphasize economic policies, as they are likely to not be trusted on this issue by the majority 
of the electorate, who are more likely to trust established parties on both right and left of the 
political spectrum (Rovny, 2013). In Western Europe, increased electoral support for radical 
right parties has often been associated with a focus on the socio-cultural dimension, in the 
form of anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalism (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2016). In 
addition, recent literature also suggests that populist radical right parties perform better 
electorally when capitalizing on nationalist sentiment during times of economic crisis (see 
Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2013; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).  
Recent evidence of this is provided in French politics, where under Marine Le Pen, the 
Front National (FN) have sought to blur their positions on traditional socio-economic issues 
and instead play to their strengths by emphasizing hostility to immigrants and opposition to 
Islam (Mondon, 2014). Thus, insurgent far right parties have effectively de-emphasized and 
blurred their position on socio-economic issues, in order to emphasize socio-cultural issues 
such as immigration and nationalism (see Rovny, 2013). Recent research has shown evidence 
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for this dual process, whereby populist radical right parties have performed better electorally 
when there is an interplay between economic and political crises (see Kriesi and Pappas, 
2015). Radical right parties may also exploit economic insecurity by scapegoating and 
emphasizing nationalist appeals that has direct electoral implications for this party family. In 
line with theories of ethnic competition, ethnic in-groups may scapegoat ethnic out-groups 
during economic downturns, using out-groups such as immigrants as rhetorical devices to 
channel economic frustrations (Arzheimer 2009; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin et al., 
2011). The next section of this chapter brings the Ômacro-levelÕ literature together in 
reviewing the literature on scholarship that has examined party competition dynamics 
between the center right and populist radical right parties. 
3.3 Party Competition: Center Right and Populist Radical Right Parties 
 
The party competition literature on how mainstream parties can restrict and prevent the 
electoral success of far right parties has been under-researched in the literature. As the 
preceding sections have demonstrated, the literature on the contemporary far right has tended 
to focus primarily on the ÔindividualÕ level (see Arzheimer, 2009; 2012; Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Mudde, 2010). Whilst scholarship at the ÔindividualÕ level has shown important findings, the 
party competition level allows comparisons to be drawn, where mainstream parties can be 
seen to compete with far right parties on key socio-cultural issues such as immigration. One 
important factor that explains why populist radical right parties do not perform as well as 
expected is the response of mainstream parties, such as the center right and center left. 
Odmalm and Bale (2015) argue that the popular narrative in the academic community is 
that populist radical right parties mobilize around the immigration issue. However, they add 
that the literature often neglects the role that mainstream parties can play when they too 
mobilize around the immigration issue, both within and outside periods of economic crisis, 
and the impact this can have on their electoral success. Previous studies in the party 
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competition literature have shown variations in how the immigration issue ebbs and flows as 
a central issue for center right and even center left parties in their electoral campaigns (see 
Cornelius et al., 1994; Thrnhardt, 1995; Pellikaan et al., 2007). Recent literature has also 
demonstrated how center left and social democratic parties may potentially be punished by 
voters on the immigration issue, as it is likely to impact on their core working class base of 
voters (see Bale et al., 2010 and 2012; Arzheimer, 2013; Givens and Luedtke, 2004). Scholars 
such as Pardos-Prado (2015) have argued that mainstream center right parties do not face the 
same difficulties on this issue as the center left do, as they are seen as the best placed party 
family that can restrict the electoral success of radical right parties as their positions on 
immigration are spatially closer to the far right than the center left party family. It follows 
that the overall party competition between center right and far right parties has generally been 
under-researched in the literature (Pardos-Prado, 2015). Mudde (2014b) argues that the key to 
radical right party success is issue ownership on socio-cultural issues such as immigration, in 
tapping into working class resentment. However the immigration issue is likely to cut across 
the middle classes in society that generally form the core electorate of center right parties in 
Europe (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Recent empirical research has also suggested that 
mainstream center right parties have the potential to reduce the electoral threat of populist 
radical right parties, by adopting more restrictive positions on immigration and achieving 
ideological convergence (see Bale, 2008; Bale, Hough, and van Kessel, 2013; van der Brug, 
Fennema, and Tillie, 2005).  
	
Issue Based Voting Models on immigration 
Pardos-Prado (2015) also recently demonstrated how mainstream center right parties can 
more successfully compete on the immigration issue from a spatial (issue position) 
perspective when immigration party positions correlate with economic and cultural 
dimensions of party competition. However, the party competition literature has tended to 
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explore the role of issue positions (Pardos-Prado, 2015; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 
2005) and valence models6 (see Mudde, 2014b) rather than the emphasis (issue salience) that 
the center right can place on the issue and how this influences their electoral fortunes.7 This is 
a crucial distinction to make, as these three competing models (issue positions, issue salience, 
and valence) on immigration are likely to combine in explaining whether or not center right 
parties perform electorally better on the immigration issue than populist radical right parties. 
Furthermore, the literature is not clear on whether it is electorally beneficial for center right 
parties to adopt hardline stances on immigration, or emphasize the importance of the issue 
more in their campaign strategies (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015). Simply put, this lacuna in 
the literature prevents us from examining whether center right parties benefit more electorally 
from adopting specific positions, such as anti-immigrant positions, appearing competent as 
the best party to handle the issue, or through emphasizing and raising the salience of the 
immigration issue amongst voters. This dissertation aims to fill this important gap in the 
literature, enabling us to understand more about the choices that center right parties can make 
on immigration and how under certain conditions they can benefit electorally from this issue 
and perform better than the populist radical right. 
3.4 Contextual and institutional factors 
	
Literature on macro political factors has found a consistently strong relationship between 
ethnic contextual variables and populist radical right party support. The majority of empirical 
studies have found that higher levels of immigrants and/or ethnic minorities at the country 
level tends to increase support for the radical right (see Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Arzheimer et al., 2003; Golder, 2003; Arzheimer et al., 2006; Arzheimer, 2009; Werts, 2010; 
Cochrane et al., 2014; Werts et al., 2012). Other empirical studies have shown similar effects 
																																																						
6 Valence models are often defined as the party best able to manage immigration, or seen as most competent on 
this issue amongst voters.  
7 The distinctions between these three issue based voting models will be analyzed in more detail in the next 
chapter that outlines the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
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at the level of lower geographic contextual units, such as regions and municipal districts 
(Lubbers et al., 2001, Rojon, 2012; Della Posta, 2013; Stephan, 2015). 
We also know from various studies that radical right partiesÕ success depends on a range 
of political and institutional factors. Such factors include the impact of differing electoral 
systems, which may hinder or promote the translation of votes into seat shares. One notable 
example is the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system used in the United Kingdom, which 
has restricted the electoral success of the United Kingdom Independence Party. However, in 
so-called Ôsecond orderÕ elections, such as the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections, 
proportional representation (PR) significantly helped the United Kingdom Independence 
Party electorally (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). Empirical research has also found that 
the adoption of electoral thresholds in some countries is also likely to restrict radical right 
party support (see Norris, 2005; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Additional 
Ôsupply-sideÕ research on the radical right has also shown the strong impact of party 
leadership and the nature of media coverage on levels of support (see Norris, 2005; Mudde, 
1999; 2007; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; 2009).  
	
Methodology!
As discussed in Chapter 1, contradictory evidence surrounds the connection and 
subsequent empirical relationship between economic conditions and radical right party 
support (see Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2015; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2014). It 
has often been hypothesized that economic crises lead to a systematic shift in electoral 
support for radical right parties (Mudde, 2014b). This can largely be charted back to the 
interwar period in the 1930s where the ÔWeimar mythÕ or Ôeconomics breeds extremismÕ 
thesis first took hold. Scholars such as Arzheimer (2012: p. 6) note that: Ô[t]hese explanations 
assume that changes at the macro-level (a declining economy) bring about changes in 
individual preferences, which lead to (aggregate) changes in individual political behavior, i.e. 
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an increase in electoral support for the extreme right [radical right]Õ. However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, declining economic conditions do not directly lead to a substantial 
increase in electoral support for populist radical right parties. Instead, there are a number of 
theoretical explanations for the lack of consensus on the link between economic conditions 
and radical right party support. The next section provides a more detailed explanation of 
these reasons.	
It is important to consider methodological factors as one explanation for the weak link 
between economic conditions and radical right party support. These factors are wide-ranging 
and include elements such as the timeframe and operationalization of variables that different 
researchers have used in their studies. Firstly, a number of studies have drawn on different 
time periods in examining the impact of economic downturns on radical right party support. 
For example, Knigge (1998) models aggregate level support for the radical right through 
Eurobarometer surveys in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, and 
Italy between 1984 and 1993. Knigge finds positive effects, suggesting declining economic 
conditions create a favorable climate for higher levels of radical right support. In contrast, 
Jackman et al. (1996) investigate the political and economic conditions that favor the success 
of far right parties from 1970 through to 1990.  
Building on these empirical findings, Funke et al. (2016) show the importance of 
distinguishing between different types of economic downturns in assessing populist radical 
right party support. This study drew on aggregate level models and covered an extensive time 
period consisting of the past 140 years. Moreover, recent studies such as Arzheimer (2009) 
have drawn on pooled Eurobarometer surveys from 1980 to 2002 in examining a range of 
political and economic factors that drive support for the populist radical right. More recent 
empirical studies have deployed different time periods, drawing on pooled cross-national 
European Social Survey data (ESS) from 2002 to 2008, to examine the relationship between 
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economic downturns and electoral support for the radical right (see Werts, 2010; Werts et al., 
2012).  
When it comes to operationalization, studies have drawn on different empirical measures 
such as rates of unemployment; inflation and GDP when examining the impact of economic 
downturns on populist radical right party support (see Arzheimer, 2009). The different 
operationalization of macroeconomic factors by different studies has arguably led to 
widespread variations. As Pardos-Prado (2015: p. 353) succinctly notes: ÔThe effect of these 
[macroeconomic conditions], however is not always consistent across space and time, and it 
seems to be dependent on a complex set of [statistical] interactions.Õ Simply put, empirical 
research at the cross-national level suggests that populist radical right parties benefit from 
higher levels of unemployment and increased levels of immigration (see Arzheimer, 2009: p. 
262). However, higher levels of unemployment do not generally by themselves increase 
radical right party support. When unemployment and immigration levels at the country-level 
are both high and combined together as interaction variables in statistical models, research 
indicates that support for the radical right will increase (see Golder, 2003; Arzheimer, 2009; 
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Norris, 2005). A core explanation that accounts for this diversity 
in empirical findings is that scholars have focused on different time periods, 
operationalization, and countries under investigation. Therefore, this methodological 
diversity has arguably accounted for widespread variations between different sets of 
macroeconomic conditions driving radical right party support across Europe 
Original Contribution: Party Competition 
The contextual level literature has also demonstrated that increased support for populist 
radical right parties has occurred both in economic good times and in times of economic 
stability (see Mudde, 2014b) that further adds to the puzzle. It is also puzzling that no clear 
academic consensus has emerged in the literature surrounding different economic contexts 
58	
	
and how mainstream parties such as the center right can frame their party strategies in 
response to radical right parties and exploit different economic conditions for their own 
electoral gains. The literature on populist radical right parties has often treated these parties in 
isolation from other types of party families, such as the mainstream center right and center 
left. Mudde (2014b) has noted how there has been an astonishing amount of research post-
2000 on the populist radical right, but at the same time much less has been written about 
other types of party families in Europe. Party competition by its nature is highly complex and 
the growth of far right parties in the 21st century inevitably means that mainstream parties on 
the center right and left have had to devise coherent strategies to counteract the electoral 
threat of this insurgent party family. Whilst immigration is the key issue dimension that 
populist radical right parties mobilize around, this chapter argues that it is often forgotten 
how the socio-cultural issue dimension of immigration is also interlinked with the ideology of 
the mainstream center right. The immigration issue is linked to other key issues such as 
keeping taxation low, maintaining law and order alongside national security that is likely to 
appeal to a core base of the center right electorate (see Bale, 2008). Therefore, there is a 
distinct rationale for mainstream center right parties to focus their electoral appeals on key 
issues such as immigration, as it can conceivably allow them to restrict the electoral success 
of the radical right party family and boost their own electoral fortunes. 
Building on the previous point, a shortcoming of recent party competition scholarship 
(see Bale, 2008; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Mudde, 2010; Pardos-Prado, 2015; Bale) is that 
these studies have not directly tested how mainstream center right parties can play up the 
immigration issue in different economic contexts, such as in economic bad times and in times 
of economic stability alongside the electoral implications that this poses. The dissertation 
therefore seeks to add a missing piece to this puzzle, in focusing on (i) party competition 
around the immigration issue, alongside examining the dynamics of competition between 
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mainstream center right and the radical right in (ii) different economic contexts across the 21st 
century through their ÔstrategicÕ use of this issue. This dissertation therefore seeks to add to 
the existing party competition scholarship on the populist radical right through devising an 
original theoretical framework. This theoretical framework seeks to understand how 
mainstream center right parties can prosper electorally from the immigration issue in different 
economic contexts, and at the same time restrict the electoral fortunes of the populist radical 
right on this issue dimension.  
Methodologically, the theoretical framework in this dissertation seeks to build on the 
methodological shortcomings of previous party competition studies on the populist radical 
right (see Pardos-Prado, 2015; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Bale, 2008) by examining a larger 
timeframe that spans two different economic contexts in the 21st century. Firstly, this allows 
the dissertation to investigate comparative patterns of party competition in economic good 
(1999Ð2007) and bad times (2008Ð2013). This procedure not only expands the number of 
parties under investigation, but also seeks to enhance the external validity of the dissertation. 
Secondly, the dissertation supplements the large N comparative test of party competition 
dynamics on immigration with a standalone case study analysis. This methodological 
pluralism allows the dissertation to examine both internal and external validity of the 
theoretical framework, whilst at the same time crucially focusing on party competition 
dynamics in specific countries across Europe. The next chapter lays out this original 




This chapter argued that much of the contemporary populist radical right literature has 
focused on the types of people that vote for radical right parties, often at the expense of the 
party competition literature. The party competition literature on the far right has examined the 
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unique issue stances that populist radical right parties adopt on core socio-cultural issues such 
as immigration, alongside the Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ that this party family adopts. 
However, the literature on the ÔindividualÕ level has been researched much more extensively 
than in comparison to the party competition side. Put simply, we know much more about the 
types of people that vote for the populist radical right at the individual level, and about the 
ÔnicheÕ and core party ideology that radical right parties adopt in their electoral campaigns, 
than about how mainstream parties such as the center right can challenge and even restrict the 
electoral success of far right parties in different economic contexts.  
Whilst recent empirical studies have begun to examine the party competition on 
immigration between the mainstream center right and far right in Europe (see Pardos-Prado, 
2015; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014) these studies have tended to focus on positional and spatial 
models. In addition, these studies have tended not to examine the effect that issue salience; 
more specifically how the emphasis placed on this issue by center right parties can have in 
restricting the electoral success of the radical right and providing a profitable electoral 
strategy for the center right. This chapter then argued that a key shortcoming of recent party 
competition scholarship is that they have not directly examined the effects of party 
competition in different economic contexts and how this can impact on the populist radical 
rightÕs electoral exploitation of immigration. Therefore, it is important to factor in how center 
right parties can play up the immigration issue in different economic contexts; such as in 
economic bad times and times of economic stability alongside the electoral implications that 
this poses. This is an important gap that this dissertation pursues as it allows us to investigate 
center right party electoral success and how this party family can potentially restrict radical 
right partiesÕ support in different economic contexts. My theory which is developed in the 
following chapter argues that mainstream center right parties are better placed ideologically 
than the center left to challenge and restrict the electoral success of the far right, in focusing 
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on the socio-cultural dimension of immigration that can bring considerable electoral benefits 
























Chapter 4  
Theory 
	
In this chapter, I build on Chapter 3 by outlining my theoretical framework of Ôstrategic 
emphasisÕ, which argues that the immigration issue is not ÔownedÕ solely by populist radical 
right parties, but one from which center right parties can emphasize and prosper electorally 
from. My theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ then offers an argument about the 
relative electoral success of mainstream center right parties in 21st century Europe and how 
they are able to perform better electorally than populist radical right parties when 
emphasizing the immigration issue, as opposed to taking specific positional stances on this 
issue. 
My original contribution to knowledge builds on recent findings from the party 
competition literature (see Bale, 2008; Mudde, 2014c; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-
Prado, 2015), and investigates how emphasizing the immigration issue affects the electoral 
success of both party families, considering in particular center right partiesÕ ÔstrategicÕ use of 
the issue. I investigate these matters in the contexts of periods both of economic crisis and 
non-crisis, to examine how the impact of the immigration issue on both party families varies 
according to the wider economic context. This theory has important implications for 
contemporary party politics, in enabling us to understand the link between different economic 
contexts, the immigration issue, and the dynamics of party competition between 
contemporary center right and populist radical right parties in Europe. 
4.1 Models of Issue Voting 
	
Before addressing my theoretical model, it is important to outline the three main models of 
issue-based voting in the existing literature that underpin it. The immigration issue has 
become a central site for political competition in 21st century Europe (Boswell, 2003; 
Dennison and Goodwin, 2015; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). The majority of countries 
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across the European Union have seen increased levels of migration in the 21st century, with 
the issue becoming increasingly salient and also a contentious one amongst a large proportion 
of voters (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). It has therefore become crucial for contemporary 
political parties in European politics to outline where they stand on this issue to voters and 
strategically frame this issue so that it can have electoral advantages. In order to examine the 
importance of socio-cultural issues such as immigration on center right party electoral 
success and the underlying party competition dynamics with the populist radical right, this 
section distinguishes three competing models of issue voting: spatial, valence, and salience 
models in the literature.  
Issue Positions 
The first model of issue based voting on immigration comprises the issue position/spatial 
model. At the Ôsupply-sideÕ, issue positions often involve two contrasting or opposing views 
that political parties can hold on an issue such as immigration. At the Ôdemand-sideÕ, voters 
are then likely to react to the opposing views that political parties hold on an issue (Downs, 
1957). Evidently the ideological strands that some populist radical right and mainstream 
center right parties adopt are not too dissimilar to one another. Research has suggested that 
both party families are much more likely than their center left counterparts to adopt tough 
policies on immigration (see Bale, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2015). A slightly more nuanced 
distinction that is important to make is the issue proximity model. The issue proximity model 
is interlinked with the spatial model of voting and examines the ideological convergence/ 
ÔdistanceÕ between different sets of political parties on a particular issue. The central 
assumption of the issue proximity model is that voters will vote for the party that is closest to 









A second competing model of issue based voting is the valence model first formulated by 
Stokes (1963) and seen as a ÔrivalÕ theoretical model to the original model developed by 
Downs (1957). Scholars such as Odmalm and Bale (2015: p. 2) note that ÔvotersÕ ideological 
preferences may matter less than their judgments about the ability of parties to deliver 
competently (see Stokes, 1963; Riker, 1996; Green, 2007). Valence issues can therefore be 
defined as ones where voters base their decisions on judgments about which parties are most 
competent and best able to deliver. Applied to the immigration context, voters may vote for a 
particular party based on Ôtheir ability to limit the numbers coming into the countryÕ 
(Odmalm and Bale, 2015: p. 2). Thus, some scholars argue that issue positions may matter 
considerably less than valence issues, with voters using cognitive shortcuts or ÔheuristicsÕ to 
decide which political parties can be considered best to deliver on the immigration issue.  
Issue Salience 
The third model of issue-based voting on immigration that is often explored in the party 
competition literature is the issue salience model. There are two central assumptions that 
form the aggregate level issue salience model (see Budge, 1982; Budge and Farlie, 1983a; 
Budge and Farlie, 1983b; Budge, 2015). Firstly, the theory assumes that parties compete over 
issues, in order to acquire and defend their issue ownership.8 Secondly, parties may compete 
over new issues and in competition with opponents, primarily in order to steal issue 
ownership from their opponents by ÔreframingÕ issues (Kaufmann, 2004; Blanger and 
Meguid, 2008). Budge (2015: p. 767) also notes that political parties tend to emphasize 
certain issues that are distinct to other party families and that there is a Ô[c]ontinuing 
association between certain parties and the topics that they emphasize.Õ Thus, in the Budge 
(2015) model of issue salience, there is a direct link between issue ownership and salience, in 
																																																						
8 Issue ownership is generally defined in the literature as an issue which voters associate with specific parties. 
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that political parties are likely to play up to their strengths, in strategically emphasizing issues 
that they are considered to perform well on and even ÔownÕ from other political parties. This 
is likely to constitute an electorally beneficial strategy and allows certain political parties, 
especially ÔnicheÕ parties to not only emphasize certain issues, but to become known by 
voters as the party which can best deliver on that issue (see Blanger and Meguid, 2008). 
Populist radical right parties across Europe are a direct example of this, placing frequent 
emphasis on socio-cultural issues such as immigration in their party ideology (see Mudde, 
1999; 2007).  
4.2 Center Right Parties in Europe: The Immigration issue 
	
Before outlining and developing my original theoretical framework, this section of the 
chapter provides more of a contextual background about how center right parties have 
adopted and integrated the immigration issue into their party strategies. This section makes an 
important argument that the immigration issue is not one that has only recently been adopted 
by the center right in its party manifestos and party strategy; rather, that there are frequent 
examples of center right parties adopting differing stances on the immigration issue, with it 
conceivably translating into electoral success for them (see Bale, 2008).  
The center right in Europe has tended to consist of pragmatic Ôoffice-seekingÕ parties that 
have generally focused ideologically on issues such as law and order, alongside creating a 
strong and stable state. It is only natural that this party family would focus on immigration, as 
it is an issue of national importance that could conceivably propel it to office (see Bale, 2008; 
Heywood, 2012). Therefore, this section argues that center right parties can be electorally 
successful when competing strategically on the immigration issue and that this strategic use is 
based primarily on the specific type of economic context faced (economic bad versus 
economic good times). It remains a puzzle as to why the academic literature has not more 
fully explored the role that mainstream center right parties can play on the immigration issue 
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(see Pardos-Prado, 2015). In some countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
some center right parties have made the immigration issue central to their electoral 
campaigns and emphasized the issue (Van Kersbergen et al., 2008). In other countries such as 
Germany however, the immigration issue has not been seen as important by some center right 
parties and the issue has even been downplayed (see Cornelius et al., 1994; Thrnhardt, 1995; 
Pellikaan et al., 2007). In comparison to populist radical right parties, center right parties are 
historically entrenched in Western European party systems, often having the advantage of a 
higher likelihood of being in government than far right parties, alongside tending to be 
perceived by voters as economically competent (see Ivarsflaten, 2005; Hanley, Szczerbiak, 
Fowler, Haughton, 2007; Bale, 2008).  
Historically, in terms of socio-economic policy, center right parties in Western Europe 
have been generally considered to be in favor of keeping taxes low and not interfering with 
market forces, largely holding neo-liberal economic policies, while also emphasizing the 
importance of national security (Bale, 2008). This also extends to socio-cultural issues, such 
as immigration and nationalism. Even before the French Front National came to prominence 
in France, the French President Jacques Chirac often talked up the issue of immigration. A 
similar strategy on the immigration issue was also adopted by center right parties in countries 
which did not have far right parties, such as Spain and Portugal (see Perlmutter, 1996; see 
Bale, 2008; Heywood, 2012). An additional example of center right parties focusing on 
immigration was the case in the Netherlands; with the Conservative-Liberal VVD Party 
(PeopleÕs Party for Freedom and Democracy) adopting hardline stances on immigration in the 
early 1990s under leader Frits Bolkestein (see Bale, 2008). 
A similar approach to immigration was also adopted by the German Christian 
Democratic UnionÐChristian Social UnionÐFree Democratic Party (CDUÐCSUÐFDP) 
coalition in the 1980s and arguably enabled them to achieve a considerable degree of 
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electoral success (Bale, 2008). The positioning and emphasis on immigration by center right 
parties are therefore not a new phenomenon, and has also been shown to be electorally 
successful in some countries (see also Cornelius et al., 1994; Thrnhardt, 1995; Pellikaan et 
al., 2007). In effect, mainstream center right parties are likely to frame immigration as central 
to their ideological programmes as it may lead to electoral rewards. 
	
Party Competition: Competing with Populist Radical Right Parties 
The incentive for center right parties to compete with populist radical right parties on socio-
cultural issues from a spatial perspective is outlined by Bale (2008: p. 319): ÔCalling for the 
tightening of borders and sounding off against the evils of multiculturalism might serve to 
counter the electoral threat of [radical right parties] populists or, by boosting the salience of 
such issues that parties thrive on, it might increase their vote-share and help the more 
respectable right to win back or maintain officeÕ (see also Bale, 2003; Meguid, 2005). The 
argument that mainstream center right parties can hurt populist radical right parties through 
adopting more restrictionist positions (i.e. limiting the number of immigrants) has been 
demonstrated by Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (2005). Van der Brug et alÕs (2005) 
study showed that center right parties can mobilize voters who are concerned with 
immigration and thus mobilize a large proportion of center right constituencies. 
	
Electoral Dilemma: Issue Positions on Immigration 
However, whilst some center right parties have arguably begun of late to emphasize the 
immigration issue more in their party strategies, there still exists a clear tension in the party 
ideology of many contemporary center right parties on the immigration issue. From a spatial 
perspective, Odmalm and Bale (2015: p. 5) succinctly outline this tension and the electoral 
dilemma that center right parties often face, and how this can potentially impact negatively 
on their electoral fortunes. On the one hand, competing on and adopting more hardline 
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immigration stances can lead to electoral rewards for the mainstream right, by capturing 
voters from far right parties. A contemporary example includes the 2002 French Presidential 
Election second round run-off, where President Jacques Chirac outperformed the far right 
anti-immigrant candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen. 
On the other hand, adopting hardline immigration stances can create internal party 
splits on ideology, moreover Ô[crystallizing] a tension between market liberal and culturally 
conservative wingsÕ (Odmalm and Bale, 2015: p. 5). Thus, from a spatial perspective, the 
market liberal wings are likely to prefer a more moderate and supportive stance towards 
immigration, whereas the cultural conservative wing is likely to advocate a more hardline 
stance, seeking to place restrictions on the number of immigrants that can enter the country. 
This is an ideological tension that is difficult for contemporary center right parties to resolve 
and can paradoxically weaken the electoral success of this party family, with internal party 
disagreements emerging amongst the core party leadership. A direct example of such a case 
is the UK Conservative Party which has faced numerous challenges from different sections of 
its parliamentary party and core leadership throughout the early 2000s on the best way to 
situate and frame the immigration issue. The 2005 UK General Election was a direct example 
of a flawed strategy on immigration, with the partyÕs issue position under leader Michael 
Howard generally seen as being too restrictive to win over the majority of British voters and 
playing a role in the partyÕs poor election performance (see Heywood, 2012). 
In contrast to Odmalm and Bale (2015), the theoretical framework that I develop 
argues that center right partiesÕ strategy on immigration does not need to depend on a 
resolution of internal party disagreements on immigration positions, but instead on economic 
context and knowing when to strategically ramp up and emphasize the issue to voters. Simply 
put, center right partiesÕ ideology is largely rooted in pragmatism: they are generally Ôoffice-
seekingÕ parties that have adapted effectively to different political and economic situations 
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throughout the 20th and 21st centuries (see Heywood, 2012). Therefore, the theoretical 
framework that is outlined later on in this chapter offers a rationale for how center right 
parties can be electorally successful when competing on the immigration issue, and shows 
how this is context dependent. In line with their ideological pragmatism (see Heywood, 2012; 
Girvin, 2005), my argument is that center right parties can play and emphasize (issue salience) 
the immigration issue at any time, but strategically they can focus on different economic 
contexts in order to maximize their electoral benefits. Times of economic crisis are likely to 
reduce ideological tensions within center right parties, with the party hierarchy and leadership 
realizing the distinct electoral opportunities that such crises can bring by tapping into votersÕ 
fears about rising immigration. However, center right parties must also seek to position 
themselves strategically on immigration during economic bad times, as too much of a hostile 
stance on immigration may also risk alienating a core section of voters. By focusing on issue 
salience and emphasizing the issue instead, this party strategy may enable the party to 
mitigate the electoral threat posed by the radical right in economic bad times. 
Secondly, economic good times may also result in internal party disagreements for 
center right parties about how best to articulate their strategies on immigration. The case of 
the Conservative Party at the 2005 UK General Election under Michael Howard is a direct 
example of such a flawed strategy. Nonetheless, internal party disagreements are unlikely to 
be as much of a hindrance to the electoral fortunes of the center right in economic good times. 
The theoretical argument offered here is that center right parties will realize that economic 
conditions are less favorable for the radical right to benefit from and that they therefore pose 
less of an electoral threat. This in turn may enable the center right to amplify the salience of 
the issue and sweep up voters who would otherwise be inclined to vote for the radical right, 




4.3 Center Left Parties in Europe: The Immigration Issue 
	
Recent literature has also argued that center left and social democratic parties, by contrast 
with center right and populist radical right parties, may potentially be punished by voters on 
the immigration issue, as it is one likely to affect their core working class support base (see 
Bale et al., 2010 and 2012; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Boswell, 2003). This is primarily 
because center left parties in Europe are often considered to be tainted by their association 
with immigration and the promotion of freedom of movement (see Bale, 2003; Bale, 2008; 
Arzheimer, 2013). It is therefore important to factor in historical context and this allows us to 
understand how social democratic parties have changed in recent years and why they are 
likely not to benefit from emphasizing immigration as much as center right parties do. Whilst 
post-World War II social democratic parties traditionally represented the working classes, 
this party family transformed itself in the 1990s across Western Europe. It shifted from being 
a Ômass-partyÕ predominantly representing the working classes to a more ÔprofessionalizedÕ 
and Ôoffice-seeking partyÕ (see Katz et al., 1994). As such, center left parties such as New 
Labour under Tony Blair and Gerard SchrderÕs Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 
focused much more on attracting the middle classes, in order to capture the median voter and 
win office (see Quinn, 2004; Bale et al., 2010; Bale et al., 2012).  
However, this office-seeking electoral strategy has arguably come at a high cost. A 
consequence of this electoral strategy was that working class voters felt disgruntled and Ôleft 
behindÕ by wider processes of globalization, and particularly by the center leftÕs perceived 
abandonment of the working class group which was the traditionally the main social class 
driver of its support. A large proportion of these disaffected working class voters have now 
ended up shifting away from center left parties such as the UK Labour Party and Parti 
Socialiste (PS) in France towards populist radical right parties, such as UKIP and the Front 
National (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; Marquand, 2015; 
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Arzheimer, 2013). Thus, when factoring in how center right and populist radical right parties 
seek to make political gains from the immigration issue, it is important to remember that the 
issue is also likely to affect the electoral chances of the center left, particularly as this party 
family has tended to have a negative association amongst voters on this particular issue of 
late (see Marquand, 2015). 
4.4 ÔStrategicÕ Emphasis on Immigration model 
	
The theoretical framework that is developed in this chapter builds on recent academic 
scholarship by Cas Mudde and Sergi Pardos-Prado. Mudde (2014c) has argued that 
competition between center right and far right parties in Western Europe is based on issue 
ownership, particularly around the topic of immigration. Pardos-Prado (2015) draws on a 
spatial perspective in showing the conditions under which mainstream center right parties can 
compete on the immigration issue and restrict the electoral success of populist radical right 
parties. Pardos-Prado (2015: pp. 365Ð366) shows that Ôthe proximity between voter and party 
immigration positions can strongly mobilize moderate center right electorates and thus limit 
the capacity of new [populist radical right parties] to monopolize the immigration issue.Õ  
Thus, Pardos-PradoÕs spatial findings also demonstrate how center right parties can 
reduce the electoral impact of populist radical right parties by making immigration Ð ÔownedÕ 
traditionally by the radical right Ð more palatable to moderate right voters. Pardos-PradoÕs 
findings suggest that center right parties can bring immigration into their platforms as part of 
a more moderate ideological strategy versus (an extreme) stance (see Ivarsflaten, 2005; Bale, 
2008; Bale et al., 2013).  
However, whilst Pardos-PradoÕs research exhibits novel findings for the role that center 
right parties can play in restricting the electoral success of populist radical right parties, the 
spatial account is much more focused on issue positions and does not systematically test the 
role played by issue salience on the electoral success of contemporary center right parties. 
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The next section outlines my original theoretical model that places much more importance on 
issue salience as opposed to the spatial model outlined by scholars such as Pardos-Prado. 
My theory departs from Pardos-PradoÕs recent study as it hypothesizes that issue salience 
will play a much more important role in shaping the electoral success of center right parties in 
the 21st century, rather than the role played by issue positions on immigration, which feature 
heavily in Pardos-PradoÕs account. In contrast to Pardos-PradoÕs spatial driven account, the 
theory that I develop empirically tests the combined effects of salience and spatial/positional 
models through a large N comparative research design in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
dissertation, alongside a case study analysis in Chapter 7 that complements the main 
empirical findings.9 
	 
Exclusion of the Center Left 
The Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework focuses primarily on the dynamics of party 
competition on the immigration issue amongst mainstream center right and populist radical 
right parties. Issues such as taxation and European integration are also two such issues that 
crisscross center right and populist radical right party strategies. However this dissertation 
concentrates solely on the immigration issue because this is the central issue that radical right 
parties tend to focus and compete on. There are two primary reasons why the theoretical 
framework excludes center left parties and does not treat them as central to the dissertation. 
Firstly, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, center right parties are closer 
spatially in empirical terms to populist radical right parties on immigration positions than 
center left parties often are (see Pardos-Prado, 2015). Center right parties have also been 
known to adopt dynamic stances on immigration and there are numerous cases, such as in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, where center right parties have been ÔcloserÕ to 
radical right spaces and have also made the issue salient in their party manifestos.  
																																																						
9 The empirical testing and methodology is outlined more comprehensively later on in the chapter. 
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As outlined previously in this chapter, whilst some center left parties have engaged 
with the immigration issue, they have generally seen mixed electoral fortunes on the 
immigration issue (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Marquand, 2015; Van Heerden et al., 2013). 
Some scholars have also argued that center left parties are more constrained on the 
immigration issue than center right parties are, due to their internationalist outlook and thus 
been less willing to emphasize the issue (see Van Heerden et al., 2013; Bale et al., 2010). The 
second justification for focusing on center right rather than center left parties is that the 
immigration issue is centrally linked to the core ideology of the center right. The immigration 
issue is directly linked to key center right issues such as keeping taxation low, maintaining 
law and order alongside national security that is likely to appeal to a core base of the center 
right electorate (see Bale, 2008; Bale et al., 2010; Van Spanje, 2010; Pardos-Prado, 2015). 
Thus, these two justifications provide a clear rationale for why the theoretical framework 
focuses on the center right and populist radical right party families.  
Though center left parties are not central to the theoretical framework, conceivably 
center right parties will benefit much more than the center left will from emphasizing the 
immigration issue. Primarily, this is because center left parties across Europe are generally 
considered to have been tainted by their association with the immigration issue and the 
overall pursuit of freedom of movement in the early 21st century (see Arzheimer, 2013; 
Marquand, 2015). Thus, drawing on the Ôleft behind votersÕ thesis (Goodwin and Milazzo, 
2015; Ford and Goodwin, 2014), a similar mechanism is likely at work, with center left 
parties in Europe not benefiting electorally from the issue largely due to the negative 







In the latter part of this chapter, the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework is developed, 
in highlighting differences and identifying patterns during times of economic crisis and 
during more economically prosperous times. While examples of strategic framing on issues 
are not new in the literature, this theoretical framework includes the often under-considered 
role of center right parties, alongside their capacity to strategically challenge issue 
ÔownershipÕ (here, immigration) and perform better electorally than the far right on this issue. 
The emphasis that mainstream center right parties place on immigration is likely to be 
much more important electorally than the spatial position that these parties adopt on the same 
issue. Three reasons may account for this. First, voters may not necessarily know about 
specific policy differences. Second, and linked, there may well be few significant spatial 
variations in immigration policy between center right and populist radical right parties (see 
Dolezal et al., 2014; Odmalm and Bale, 2015). This compounds the difficulty that voters 
might have in distinguishing the policy positions of the two party families. Thirdly, as 
outlined previously in this chapter, center right parties often face an electoral dilemma in 
regards to their positioning on immigration; whether to adopt a more hardline stance on the 
issue, or to adopt more moderate stances on the issue (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015). In order 
to minimize voter flight to the populist radical right, one such party strategy to get around this 
electoral dilemma is for center right parties to consider placing greater emphasis on 
immigration, particularly in economic bad times. Such a timely and strategic emphasis on the 
immigration issue could potentially undermine the electoral efficacy of the issue of 
immigration for the far right (see Meguid, 2005). Such Ôstrategic emphasisÕ could offer a 
credible and strategic exploitation of the issue at a crucial moment.  
	
The Dynamics of Party Competition: Issue Salience on Immigration 
In theoretical terms, the core dynamics of the party competition game are about the center 
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right party family and how best they can frame the immigration issue that can lead to 
electoral success. Far Right Parties across Europe by and large tend to always emphasize the 
immigration issue (make the issue salient) and therefore the center right party family must 
decide on the type of competition, in knowing when to ramp up and emphasize the issue in 
their party strategy. In party competition terms, the theory makes the assumption that far right 
parties will nearly always emphasize immigration as this has typically constituted a key issue 
of their party strategy. It follows that center right parties must decide strategically when to 
ramp up or ÔdownplayÕ and not emphasize the issue. It is therefore important to distinguish 
two key aspects of the theory, namely how parties emphasize immigration (ÔhighÕ emphasis) 
as opposed to how parties do not emphasize the issue (ÔlowÕ emphasis).10 My theoretical 
framework argues that different levels of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ are likely to influence the 
electoral success of center right parties in the 21st century. For instance, center right parties 
that place more ÔvisibilityÕ on this issue are likely to benefit electorally, with voters 
conceivably noticing the frequent coverage of the issue in their rhetoric. By contrast, center 
right parties that remain ÔsilentÕ or downplay the immigration issue are likely to suffer 
electorally. This is likely to provide more of an electoral opportunity for the populist radical 
right to benefit by emphasizing immigration, effectively taking the issue away from the 
mainstream center right (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015; Bale et al., 2010; Meguid, 2005). 
Figure 4.1 below outlines the simplified dynamic game in theory terms between center 
right and populist radical right parties that underlines the Ôscope conditionsÕ of the theoretical 
framework. It is important to note that this model applies more to times of economic crisis, 
than in economic good times, primarily because party competition is considered to be 
stronger between the center right and radical right on the immigration issue in times of 
economic crisis. The first situation of the theory argues that when specific center right parties 
																																																						
10 I use the terms ÔemphasisÕ and ÔsalienceÕ interchangeably throughout the dissertation. 
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emphasize immigration, they can wrest control of the issue from the radical right and perform 
better electorally. However, this scenario of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ may also play out in a more 
nuanced and complex manner. The second situation provides a different scenario of party 
competition. It is likely that in some countries, when both center right and far right parties 
emphasize immigration (party competition is strong); both party families are likely to 
perform better electorally. However, the third and final situation argues that when specific 
center right parties do not emphasize immigration, this opens up Ôissue salience spaceÕ for 
populist radical right parties to emphasize immigration and tap into concerned voters. Thus, 
this provides an electoral opportunity for radical right parties to prosper electorally, from an 
emphasis on immigration at the expense of center right parties. These three situations are 
likely to play out differently according to different economic contexts, particularly when 
incorporating incumbency patterns into the theoretical framework. 
	
Figure 4.1: The Dynamic Model of Party Competition 
 
Situation I: Center Right outperforms Populist Radical Right Parties: Center Right Parties 
emphasize immigration and perform better electorally than the Populist Radical Right 
	
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience                
  
CR PRR 
Situation II: Center Right and Populist Radical Right party competition is strong:  
Both party families emphasize immigration and both perform better electorally  
 
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience                
  
CR PRR 
Situation III: Populist Radical Right outperforms the Center Right: Center Right Party do 
not emphasize immigration and perform electorally worse  
 
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience    
  
CR PRR 
 Issue Salience Ôopening upÕ 
 
Notes: ÔCRÕ denotes Center Right Party 




4.5 Contexts: economic good times and bad 
	
The Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework focuses on three core factors (salience of 
immigration; incumbency and economic context) in examining the dynamics of party 
competition between center right and populist radical right parties. The theory is then tested 
in two distinct economic contexts throughout the 21st century in national parliamentary 
elections. This allows the dissertation to examine the electoral success of those center right 
parties that emphasized immigration in economic bad times (2008Ð2013) and in better 
economic times (1999Ð2007), helping us to understand further the resilience of the center 
right party family on this specific issue in two distinct economic contexts.  
	
Economic Crisis (2008Ð2013) 
Populist radical right parties may benefit from periods of economic crisis for a number of 
reasons. First and in line with theories of protest voting, they might benefit from discontent 
with mainstream center right and center left political parties (see Norris, 2005; Van der Brug 
et al., 2000; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Werts et al., 2012). Second, and linked, these parties 
may benefit from the punishment meted out to incumbent parties in government that tends to 
occur during economic bad times (see Lewis-Beck, 1986; Alvarez et al., 2000; Duch, 2008; 
Hobolt et al., 2012). However, there are restrictions on the degree that emphasizing 
immigration can provide an electorally successful strategy for incumbent center right parties 
in times of economic crisis. Whilst incumbent center right parties that emphasize immigration 
may be able to distract attention away from the economy and perform better electorally, it is 
more conceivable that incumbency will play into the hands of populist radical right parties 
during this economic period. Thus, the theoretical framework argues that in the context of the 
2008Ð2013 economic crisis, it is likely that there will be a wider anti-incumbency pattern and 
that when a center right party is an incumbent, emphasizing immigration is unlikely to allow 
the incumbent to achieve electoral success. In contrast, ÔchallengerÕ center right parties (those 
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in opposition) are not likely to be constrained as much during this electoral period, compared 
to incumbent center right parties. This is an important distinction to make, as this type of 
center right party has the advantage of being in opposition and does not have the hindrance of 
being in office at the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. 
	
Economic Stability (1999Ð2007) 
By exploring a second context at the outset of the 21st century, this allows the dissertation to 
examine the effect of immigration on the dynamics of party competition between center right 
and populist radical right parties when economic times are good, as opposed to when times 
are bad. The immigration issue is still likely to resonate particularly well with voters outside 
periods of economic crisis, benefiting center right parties and potentially hindering the 
populist radical right. Primarily this is because economic good times are likely to reduce the 
electoral threat of the radical right around immigration and make the issue less of an electoral 
advantage, as the radical right will not have an Ôout-groupÕ such as immigrants that they can 
readily scapegoat and link directly to economic dislocation (see Meguid, 2005; Carter, 2005; 
Mudde, 2007). At the same time, economic good times should lead to electoral rewards for 
mainstream parties, particularly incumbents of both the center right and the center left. 
Building on from the core assumptions of the theoretical framework, there are five 
overall hypotheses (H1-H5) that will be empirically tested in this dissertation. There are three 
main hypotheses (H1-H3) of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ during the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis that 
will be empirically tested (see Table 4.1). These are as follows: 
	
H1: In line with theories of protest voting, ÔincumbentÕ parties on the mainstream center right 
and center left will lose out electorally in the crisis period. This provides distinct electoral 
opportunities for the populist radical right in the context of economic bad times. 
	
H2: ÔChallengerÕ (non-incumbent/opposition) center right parties that emphasize immigration 
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will perform better electorally than populist radical right parties. 
 
H3: Center Right Parties (particularly Ôincumbents) that do not emphasize immigration will 
perform electorally worse, with populist radical right parties benefiting electorally. 
	
Therefore, there are two hypotheses (H4-H5) that will be empirically tested (see Table 4.1) 
covering the economic good period of 1996 to 2007 are: 
	
H4: In line with economic good times, ÔincumbentÕ parties on the mainstream center right and 
center left will perform better electorally. 
	
H5: Center Right Parties that emphasize immigration will perform better electorally than 
populist radical right parties. 
	
Empirical Testing 
Methodologically, the theoretical framework is tested in three interrelated empirical chapters, 
primarily through expert surveys. Expert surveys have been statistically proven to produce 
consistent results and be highly reliable, in examining party positions both across Western 
and Central-Eastern Europe (see Whitefield et al., 2007; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012). 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide an aggregate level comparative test of the theory in economic bad 
(2008Ð13) and good times (1999Ð2007). Chapter 5 draws on the ParlGov (see Dring and 
Manow 2015) dataset on European national parliamentary elections that has been merged 
with the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider Expert Survey on party positions. This allows the theory 
to be tested in times of economic crisis. Chapter 6 draws primarily on the CHES that spans 
more economically prosperous times. These expert surveys allow the dissertation to identify 
correlations and patterns, thus enhancing the external validity of the theory. However, these 
expert surveys are snapshots in certain time periods and due to data limitations, both chapters 
are unable to make direct causal inferences (internal validity) across time about how center 
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right party electoral success plays out. Chapter 7 seeks to build on this data limitation by 
drawing on a qualitative analysis that features four case studies that are generated from the 
main empirical findings in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 7 allows the dissertation to illustrate more systematically the internal validity 
of the theoretical framework. The case studies are structured around a thematic comparison 
(salience of immigration, crisis; incumbency) that allows the theoretical framework to be 
tested under different conditions that underline competition between center right and populist 
radical right parties on immigration. The case study provides added value to the theoretical 
framework in examining center right and populist radical right party competition dynamics 
around the emphasis placed on immigration in the crisis period, focusing in particular on the 
three situations that are outlined. Table 4.2 below outlines the Ôstrategic emphasis on 
immigration modelÕ and the main operationalization of the two main competing models of 




There are a number of ÔcaveatsÕ that are important to outline that the theoretical framework 
does not include in this dissertation. Firstly, the valence model of issue based voting tends to 
be an individual-level model, with voters outlining which party is deemed most competent to 
handle the immigration issue. As the theoretical model is an aggregate level model, the 
valence model of issue voting is not directly tested in this dissertation. A limitation caused by 
not including the valence model of issue voting is that the dissertation cannot claim 
empirically that center right parties perform better on immigration due to credibility or 
perceived competence amongst voters on this issue. A second limitation of the theoretical 
framework is that it does not capture Ôideological convergence/ÕdistanceÕ measures on 
immigration between center right and populist radical right parties as this is beyond the scope 
81	
	
of the dissertation. Instead, the dissertation is more focused in examining the combined effect 
of issue salience and positions together empirically, in economic bad and good times. 
 A third limitation and an additional caveat to add is that the theoretical framework 
does not capture party competition dynamics in countries which do not have a far right party. 
This is primarily because the theory is focused on examining party competition between 
center right and far right parties. Two direct examples of countries which have not had far 
right parties recently are Portugal and Spain and provide interesting cases. The dominant 
center right party in Spain, the PeopleÕs Party (PP) has still managed to establish itself on the 
immigration issue, arguably adopting more anti-immigrant stances and spatially filling the 
void that the absence of a radical right party has provided. The center right party in Portugal 
(CDS-PP) has similarly adopted tougher immigration restrictions and made the immigration 
issue salient in its electoral appeals (see Bale, 2008; Heywood, 2012). Whilst not central to 
the theoretical framework, center right parties in countries such as Spain have still 
emphasized immigration, even in the absence of a far right party. Furthermore, a party 
strategy such as this may serve as an electoral strategy to counteract center left parties such as 
the Spanish Socialist WorkersÕ Party (PSOE) in electoral terms.  
A final caveat is that the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework does not 
differentiate between different party systems (i.e. two-partyist v. multipartyist) systems as this 
adds another level of complexity that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It should also 
be noted that the majority of party systems in Western and Central-Eastern Europe tend to be 
multipartyist in their nature and that this more fine-grained distinction is therefore not 
necessary. A more simplified model of party competition is represented (see Figure 4.1) and 
still allows for a dynamic game to be theoretically depicted for both center right and populist 




Table 4.1: Theory of ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ Core Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Economic Context 
H1: In line with patterns of 
economic volatility, incumbent 
parties on the mainstream 
center right and center left will 
lose out electorally (decrease 
in vote share) 
 




right parties that emphasize 
immigration will perform 
better electorally than populist 
radical right parties 
 
Economic Crisis (2008 Ð
2013) 
H3: Center Right Parties 
(particularly Ôincumbents) that 
do not emphasize immigration 
will perform electorally worse, 
with populist radical right 
parties benefiting electorally 
Economic Crisis (2008Ð
2013) 
H4: In line with economic 
good times, ÔincumbentÕ 
parties on the mainstream 
center right and center left will 
perform better electorally 
(increase in vote share) 
Outset of the 21st Century 
(1999Ð2007) 
H5: Center Right Parties that 
emphasize immigration will 
perform electorally better 
(increase in vote share) than 
populist radical right parties 
 









Table 4.2 Strategic emphasis on immigration (key indicators) 
Issue Based 
Voting Model 










Importance of the 
issue  
1= ÔNot importantÕ 
7= ÔVery importantÕ 
 
Importance of the 
issue  
Outset of the 21st 
Century (1999Ð2007) 
0= ÔNot importantÕ 






The position on 
immigration that 
political parties 











Outset of the 21st 
Century (1999Ð2007) 
Position 
0= ÔOpposes tough 
policyÕ 






The party that is 
seen by voters as 
being best able to 
deliver on 
immigration and 
is perceived as 
most competent in 
managing this 
issue 
Not directly tested Individual No 
Notes: The 2008Ð13 economic crisis draws on the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider 2007/08  
   Expert Survey (Chapter 5) 
   The 1999Ð2007 electoral period draws on the 1999Ð2007 Chapel Hill Expert  









This chapter developed an overarching theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ that 
highlighted differences and identified patterns during times of crisis and during economically 
prosperous times. Three core factors (salience of immigration; incumbency and economic 
context) were identified and play an important role in the dynamics that underline party 
competition between center right and populist radical right parties. The Ôstrategic emphasisÕ 
model is an aggregate level model that seeks to examine how emphasizing immigration 
provides electoral payoffs for the center right and can allow them under specific situations to 
outperform the populist radical right in the 21st century in two different economic contexts. 
This chapter outlined the original contribution to knowledge that this dissertation makes, in 
outlining a rationale for how center right partiesÕ strategic use of immigration can allow this 
party family to outperform populist radical right parties, in times of crisis and also in 
economically prosperous times. The next chapter empirically tests H1ÐH3 of the theoretical 
framework, in examining party competition between both party families in times of economic 
crisis (2008Ð2013) and seeks to understand some broader and general patterns that underpin 

















Chapter 5  
Center Right Party Electoral Resilience in the 2008Ð2013 
Economic Crisis: ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ and Non-Incumbent 
effects on the Immigration issue 
 
	
This chapter examines how mainstream center right parties and populist radical right parties 
responded to the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis and the strategies that they have adopted, in 
particular the degree to which they compete on and emphasize specific socio-cultural issues, 
notably immigration. This economic context allows the chapter to examine patterns of 
electoral volatility and protest voting (H1), namely the extent to which this has created an 
opportunity for insurgent populist radical right parties to benefit electorally at the expense of 
mainstream parties. Building on the central theory outlined in Chapter 4, this chapter argues 
that in party competition terms, mainstream center right parties will respond to the recent 
economic crisis through seeking to emphasize the immigration issue as a strategy that can 
provide electoral payoffs. Simply put, center right parties (particularly ÔchallengerÕ ones) that 
emphasize immigration and make the issue ÔvisibleÕ to voters are likely to perform electorally 
better than populist radical right parties (H2), primarily because they can emphasize the right 
salient issue in the economic crisis. The center right may also be seen as a more ÔmoderateÕ 
and credible party family amongst voters on this issue (see Bale, 2008; Pardos-Prado, 2015).  
However, in line with the theoretical framework, if center right parties ÔdownplayÕ or 
Ôremain silentÕ on immigration, then this allows the far right to gain coverage of the issue 
amongst voters and conceivably profit electorally from the center rightÕs absence on this issue 
domain (H3). This chapter therefore provides the first aggregate level empirical test of this 
theory in the crisis context, in empirically testing the dynamics of party competition on the 
immigration issue between both party families and its electoral implications in national 
parliamentary elections across 24 countries in Europe. Thus, this chapter tests three 
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hypotheses (H1ÐH3) of the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework in times of economic 
crisis: 
HYPOTHESES 
H1: In line with theories of protest voting, ÔincumbentÕ parties on the mainstream center right 
and center left will lose out electorally in the crisis period. This provides distinct electoral 
opportunities for the populist radical right in the context of economic bad times. 
	
H2: ÔChallengerÕ (non-incumbent/opposition) center right parties that emphasize immigration 
will perform better electorally than populist radical right parties. 
 
H3: Center Right Parties (particularly ÔincumbentsÕ) that do not emphasize immigration will 
perform electorally worse, with populist radical right parties benefiting electorally. 
5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data  
	
This chapter draws on two datasets which have been merged together to form a Ôchange in 
party performanceÕ dataset. The first is a widely used dataset on partiesÕ electoral 
performances in national parliamentary elections across Europe (ParlGov: Dring and 
Manow 2015). These data include the percentage of votes each party in each country won 
during parliamentary elections.11 The central dependent variable comprises the change in 
electoral performance and measures the overall electoral success of parties. The change in 
electoral performance is measured as the difference in percentage of aggregate votes between 
the national parliamentary election before the 2008 crisis to the first election after the crisis. 
In the case of an election during 2008, these elections are used as the base, so that each 
countryÕs parliamentary election data includes the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. A 
																																																						
11 The chapter also makes every effort to account for parties that changed coalition. 
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positive score means that a political party performed better electorally from the previous 
election and a negative score means it performed electorally worse.  
The chapter then merges the ParlGov data together with a well-known expert survey 
conducted across Western and Central-Eastern Europe that has been commonly used in the 
party competition literature (see Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012). The WhitefieldÐ
Rohrschneider expert survey conducted in 2007Ð2008 allows the chapter to examine partiesÕ 
issue positions and salience on key electoral issues such as immigration during the economic 
crisis. They recruited experts from a list of country-specific academics who had published a 
peer-reviewed article or book on their party system over the past ten years (N=209 experts). 
For each country, the lead researchers aimed to have ten completed questionnaires which 
were achieved in the majority of countries (see Appendix B), further adding to the reliability 
of this expert survey (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012). 
Two core criteria were used by Whitefield and Rohrschneider to justify the inclusion of 
political parties. Firstly, parties had to have achieved representation (seats) in the national 
parliament and secondly, they had to have received at least 2% of the national vote in the last 
parliamentary election.12 The WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey is primarily chosen 
because it has been shown to provide a high degree of reliability and consistency in terms of 
the empirical measures. Furthermore, analysis conducted on the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider 
expert survey has produced reliable empirical patterns that have matched other data sources 
such as the Comparative Manifesto Research Project and the Chapel Hill Expert survey (see 
Dalton et al., 2011).  
To position the parties, country experts in the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey 
placed them along the left-right ideological dimension. Political parties were then 
																																																						
12 This chapter is unable to include the following radical right-wing parties: The British National Party (BNP) 
Golden Dawn (Greece), the Swiss PeopleÕs Party (SVP) (Switzerland) in the empirical analysis as the 
WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey did not include these three parties. The Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party (MIEP) was also not included as this partyÕs change in vote share was minimal and deemed too 
insignificant to include. 
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distinguished between a ÔcenterÕ and a Ôradical/extremeÕ category, producing four categories 
of party that underpin the empirical analysis of this chapter: radical left, center left, center 
right, and populist radical right (see Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012).13 To check the 
reliability and accuracy of party classifications, party families were matched with the 2010 
Chapel Hill Expert survey (see Bakker et al., 2015). Furthermore, as discussed 
comprehensively in Chapter 2, scholars have had difficulty reaching consensus on which 
parties to include within the populist radical right party family (see Mudde, 2007). This 
chapter therefore drew on Cas MuddeÕs recent classifications (2013; 2014) of far right parties, 
checking these classifications of this party family with the CHES to ensure further 
consistency. This chapter was therefore able accurately to cross-check codings and identify 
parties as belonging to the radical right and center right party families. Remaining parties 
were coded as belonging to the center left party family. 
 It is also important to note that some empirical research has disregarded smaller 
competitors to maintain focus on the mainstream right and mainstream left (see Meguid 
2005). This chapter adopts the empirical strategy of including all parties to maintain the 
number of observations Ð allowing for a deeper analysis and for the observed rise in populist 
radical right parties in Europe (see Hernndez and Kriesi 2016). The final sample size 
comprises 208 political parties across 24 countries in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. 
(The full breakdown of party classifications and measurement can be found in Appendices A 
and B at the end of the dissertation. The integrated WhitefieldÐRohrschneider expert survey 
codebook can also be found at the end of Appendix B.) The countries included in this chapter 
are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
																																																						
13 Specifically, the dimension of the left-right ideological position of each political party enabled a country-
specific mean to be produced for each country. The mean was then set to zero with a standard deviation of one 
for each country. Thus, ÔleftÕ is defined as including any party with a score of less than zero (to the ÔleftÕ of the 
mean) and ÔrightÕ as including any party with a score of more than zero (to the ÔrightÕ of the mean). ÔRadicalÕ 
parties were parties that fell outside of the first standard deviation. 
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Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.14 Table 5.1 
below lists the parties that comprise the center right and populist radical right party families 






















14 Moldova, Ukraine and Russia are not examined in this chapter as the political contexts are vastly different to 
make any meaningful comparisons. As a result, these three countries were omitted from the final dataset.  
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15 Detailed classifications of parties, alongside the full names can be found in Appendix B. 
Country Center Right Radical Right 
Austria VP FP BZ 
Belgium CD&V N-VA LDD 
MR VLD 
FN VB 





KDU-CSL ODS  
Denmark KF NA VENSTRE DF 
Estonia ER IRL RE  
Finland KD KESK KOK 
SFP 
PS 
France MO DEM MPF NC 
UMP 
FN 
Germany CDU CSU FDP  
Greece ND LAOS 
Hungary FIDESZ KDNP 
MDF 
JOBBIK 
Ireland FF FG PD  
Italy FI/PdL UDC AN LN 
Latvia JL LPP TP TB/LNNK 
Lithuania TS-LK LCS LRLS  
Poland LPR PO PIS 
Portugal CDS-PP PSD  
Romania PLD PNG PNL 
PNTCD UDMR 
PRM 
Slovakia KDH MKP SDKU SNS 
Slovenia NS SDS SLS SNS 
Spain CIU EAJ ÐPNV  
CC PP 
 














To measure populist radical right and center right party performance in the context of the 
2008Ð2013 economic crisis, two separate dependent variables were constructed (% change in 
vote shares for center right parties; % change in vote shares for radical right parties). The 
dependent variables are continuous and comprise the percentage change in vote share (i.e. the 
change in party performance) from the national parliamentary election before the 2008 
economic crisis to the first election after the crisis. A positive or higher score on this variable 
means that parties performed better electorally in the 2008Ð2013 crisis period relative to the 
previous election. A negative or lower score on this variable means that parties performed 
electorally worse during this period. An additional dependent variable measures the 
percentage change in vote shares for center left parties and provides an important point of 
comparison to the two main party families that are examined in this chapter. 
The main independent variables include party-level variables. In order to test the effect of 
issue salience factors and the emphasis that populist radical right and center right parties 
place on key issues, a number of issue salience variables are examined. The central 
independent variable is immigration and issue emphasis is measured on a 1Ð7 scale with 
higher values meaning that the issue featured prominently in the manifesto of center right and 
populist radical right parties. This measure also enables us to assess how important 
immigration was in determining the electoral success of populist radical right and center right 
parties in the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis. Additional issue salience variables feature 
nationalism and European Union integration. These variables are all scored on a 1Ð7 scale 
with the same methodological procedure. The chapter also measures the emphasis parties 
placed on socio-economic issues, namely welfare (state intervention) and the free-market 
economy. This allows the chapter to assess how important emphasis on socio-economic 





In order to test the role played by spatial/proximity factors, a number of issue positions are 
examined. In line with the literature (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2007; Odmalm and Bale, 
2015), socio-cultural issue positions on immigration are included. In order to examine the 
impact of immigration positions on populist radical right and center right parties, a variable 
measuring anti-immigrant positions is included. Higher values on this variable mean that 
parties performed electorally better when adopting more anti-immigrant positions in the 
economic crisis.  
Socio-economic issue positions include partiesÕ support for the market economy and for 
an active state role in providing welfare. Previous party competition literature has shown that 
populist radical right parties have tended to perform electorally better when holding neo-
liberal economic policies (see Kitschelt, 1995). However, recent research (see de Lange, 2007; 
Carter, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009; Rovny, 2013) has argued against this claim, providing 
empirical evidence to show that populist radical right parties tend to perform better 
electorally when they present a more centrist economic position (i.e. state and government 
intervention in the economy). Ideologically, center right parties are traditionally known for 
cutting taxation and emphasizing free market economics (see Girvin, 2005; Heywood, 2012). 
In line with this theoretical distinction, different variables are used to model socio-economic 
stances and emphasis for both sets of parties. These variables are selected as they enable us to 
examine the effect of different spatial positions and to what degree they influence electoral 
success. 
In measuring the severity of the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis, two key macroeconomic 
control variables were merged into the final dataset.16 These variables comprise the change in 
gross domestic product (GDP) and the change in unemployment, both measured between 
																																																						
16 The data on these variables were extracted from the World Bank and merged into the final dataset. 
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2008 and 2012. Higher values on the GDP variable correspond to an increase in economic 
growth, whilst higher values on the unemployment variable correspond to an increase in 
unemployment. The change in Income inequality (2008Ð2012) variable is also included in 
this chapter and is taken from the Solt Index in the World Income inequality database. 
Income inequality is measured through the Gini Index, with higher scores corresponding to 
more unequal resource distribution.	 This chapter also attempted to include the change in 
Migration levels (2008Ð2012) from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which has the largest and most comprehensive dataset. However, 
these data were not complete and there are some countries where official migration numbers 
could not be included, reducing the overall sample size considerably. As a result, this variable 
was dropped from the final empirical models. 
 In order to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, various institutional variables 
are included, in line with the existing literature. Plurality electoral systems tend to limit 
electoral support for the far right, whereas proportional representation electoral systems tend 
to facilitate support for populist radical right parties (see Norris, 2005; Carter, 2005; 
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). This chapter draws on the Gallagher Index of the change in 
disproportionality levels (2008Ð2012). 17 This single measure enables us to compare 
proportionality across electoral systems, examining how this changed across time. The 
Gallagher Index is also a commonly used measure in the party competition literature. Higher 
values on this variable imply that there is a higher level of disproportionality in electoral 
systems between elections and negative values mean that electoral systems are more 
proportional between elections. In line with the literature (see Hobolt et al., 2012) an 
indicator variable is included that examines how incumbent parties fared electorally in the 
economic crisis period.  
																																																						
17 Strictly speaking, this variable covers the change in disproportionality for the last two national elections in the 
2008Ð2012 electoral period. However the years vary slightly due to the different timeframes that national 





Preliminary statistics in the form of correlations were first produced to examine the empirical 
relationship between emphasizing immigration and the percentage change in vote share for 
center right, populist radical right and center left parties. To investigate the central 
hypotheses (H1ÐH3), four main OLS regression models with robust standard errors were then 
produced. Robust standard errors are produced instead of OLS standard errors, as they tend to 
be more reliable in correcting for heteroscedasticity and unequal variations across variables. 
Hierarchical linear regression models were not produced, for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
sample size of 24 countries is too small and renders multilevel modeling obsolete (see 
Steenbergen, 2012; Hox, 2002). Secondly, there are only 20 far right parties that feature in 
this economic context and multilevel models would not be able to converge with such a small 
sample size, thus limiting and calling the external validity of this study into question. Models 
1Ð4 examine the electoral performance of center right, populist radical right and center left 
parties in the context of the economic crisis, particularly around the emphasis on 
immigration.18 Robustness checks on multicollinearity were made for each model through the 
variance inflation factor. In order to further supplement the main empirical analysis and 
examine key patterns and trends, a Ôuniverse of casesÕ table is constructed towards the end of 
this chapter. This table depicts the dynamics of party competition between the center right 
and populist radical right in further detail, enabling us to examine the broader picture of party 




To begin testing the relationship between the emphasis placed on immigration and levels of 
																																																						
18 Radical Left-Wing Parties were not included in the analysis as the sample size for this party family is small 
and not central to our empirical analysis. 
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party support, a Pearson r correlation coefficient is produced for the main party families 
under investigation. Table 5.2 shows that there is considerable variation by party family. 
Center right parties perform better electorally when emphasizing the immigration issue in the 
economic crisis period, with a strong correlation (r=+0.37). Populist radical right parties also 
performed well electorally (r=+0.46), showing that competition between party families is 
strong on this issue. In contrast, center left (r=+0.08) and radical left parties (r=+0.05) had a 
weak correlation and did not appear to benefit at all from emphasizing the immigration issue. 
Therefore, the correlations presented provide a general snapshot of how both center right and 
populist radical right parties appear to benefit electorally from emphasizing the immigration 
issue in the context of economic crisis. However, these results are snapshots and the inclusion 
of control variables through OLS regression modeling in the next section enables the 
dynamics of party competition between both party families to be investigated in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 
Table 5.2: Correlations between % Vote Share Change for Political Parties and the 
Salience of Immigration in the Economic Crisis Period (2005Ð2012) 






Radical Left +0.05 34 
Center Left +0.08 84 
Center Right +0.37 71 
Radical Right +0.46 20 
Source: AuthorÕs own figures 






OLS Regression Models 
The chapter now moves on to test these empirical relationships through OLS regression 
models, with the inclusion of control variables. Models 1 and 3 in Table 5.3 enable us to test 
H1 in investigating how incumbents on the center right and center left lost out electorally in 
the crisis period. Both models in Table 5.3 show that center right and center left parties were 
punished in the context of the economic crisis and are statistically significant. These results 
are in line with empirical evidence found by a number of scholars in the literature (see Lewis-
Beck, 1986; Alvarez et al., 2000; Duch, 2008; Hobolt et al., 2012; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). 
Model 1 in Table 5.3 enables us to test H2 and investigate the degree to which center right 
parties benefited from emphasizing the immigration issue in the economic crisis period. Most 
significantly, center right parties in Europe that emphasized the immigration issue performed 
well, increasing their vote share considerably (p<0.01). This finding provides strong 
empirical evidence for H1, showing how center right parties tended to outperform the far right 
on immigration (see Pardos-Prado, 2015; Odmalm et al., 2015; Bale, 2008). A notable case of 
this is the N-VA Party in Belgium which outperformed the populist radical right VB Party in 
Belgium through an emphasis on immigration. However, Model 1 shows that adopting 
hardline stances (issue position) on immigration decreased the center rightÕs electoral vote 
share and was not a vote-winning strategy.  
Model 2 in Table 5.3 examines how populist radical right parties performed on a 
number of issue positions and issue salience, alongside controlling for party and country-
level variables in the economic crisis period (see a similar approach in Pardos-Prado, 2015). 
The incumbency variable is not included for the populist radical right party model as there 
are only two cases (TB/LNNK in Latvia and SNS Party in Slovakia). Including the 
incumbency for these two variables caused multicollinearity and distorted the other 
coefficients in the regression model. In testing H2, Model 2 shows that populist radical right 
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parties that emphasized immigration did perform better electorally; however, this relationship 
is statistically insignificant. This finding calls into question whether the populist radical right 
party family can lay claim to ÔowningÕ the immigration issue, especially in times of economic 
crisis. Opposition towards EU integration increased electoral support for the far right, but this 
variable is non-significant. This is a surprising finding as the far right is often known for its 
issue ÔownershipÕ on this issue (see Werts et al., 2012; Arzheimer, 2009). Model 2 also 
provides surprising findings. Opposition to immigration actually decreased the overall vote 
share for populist radical right parties in the economic crisis. The negative finding for anti-
immigration is particularly noteworthy as it suggests that hardline stances on immigration 
taken by populist radical right parties may have been too hostile and unpalatable for voters in 
times of economic crisis (see Carter, 2005).  
Turning to macroeconomic conditions at the country-level, counter-intuitive results are 
found. The change in GDP (2008Ð2012) variable suggests that populist radical right parties 
performed better in the economic crisis and in countries which had higher levels of economic 
growth. However, the change in unemployment (2008Ð2012) variable is weak and further 
highlights the inconsistent pattern surrounding the relationship between economics and 
populist radical right voting at the aggregate level (see Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2014). Model 
3 also demonstrates that center left parties performed worse electorally in comparison to 
center right parties when emphasizing immigration. A closer inspection of the dataset showed 
that notable center left parties that did not particularly emphasize immigration, such as the 
Socialist Party (MSZP), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the UK Labour 
Party, saw the sharpest decline in their share of the vote in the economic crisis period. 
Similarly to incumbent center right parties, Model 3 also shows that left-wing incumbents 
experienced a substantial decline in their vote share in national parliamentary elections (see 
Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Table 5.4 includes an additional 
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populist radical right party model. As there are only 20 radical right parties in Model 2 and 
due to the limited sample size, the Model in Table 5.4 seeks a more parsimonious approach in 
modeling fewer independent variables, namely the most important variables that have been 
proven in past research to drive support for this party family (see Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 
2007; Werts et al., 2012). The salience of immigration is statistically significant (p<0.01) and 
shows that populist radical right parties did perform better electorally here. However, anti-
immigration positions again decreased electoral support for the populist radical right. These 
models were then tested for multicollinearity and are within the accepted limit. Whilst the 
empirical findings in this model do demonstrate that radical right parties prospered during the 
economic crisis when emphasizing immigration, the small sample size here must be treated 
with caution, especially in regards to making definitive inferences about external validity.  
Robustness Checks 
A multiple regression coefficient plot with 95% confidence intervals is also included in 
Figure 5.1 and provides additional robustness checks. This also allows us to visualize the 
magnitude of the electoral effect for center right, populist radical right and left-wing parties 
when emphasizing immigration, whilst including the main independent and control variables 
from Models 1Ð3 in Table 5.3. Figure 5.1 then includes the emphasis placed on immigration 
by left-wing parties and demonstrates how center right parties that emphasized immigration 
performed better electorally than radical right and left-wing parties during the economic crisis. 
Additional robustness checks were run for each of the three main party models through the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). Any offending variables above 10 were removed from the 
final analysis and no multicollinearity was present in the statistical models that have been 







Whilst the three OLS regression models show clear patterns for H1 (patterns of electoral 
volatility) and H2 (center right electoral success), due to data limitation and the small sample 
size of 20 far right parties, these statistical models are unable to empirically capture the 
dynamics of party competition between both party families and directly test H3 (different 
levels of emphasis on immigration) in combined statistical models. Instead, the next section 
of the chapter provides a more fine-grained approach in examining specific patterns and cases 
that are drawn from the change in party performance dataset. This enables the chapter to 
examine different patterns from the dataset that relate to party competition dynamics on the 
immigration issue between both center right and populist radical right parties in the economic 
crisis period and examine the three situations of competition derived from the Ôstrategic 





Table 5.3: Center-Right Party, Populist Radical Right and Center Left Party 
Performance, Economic Crisis: Statistical Models 







Salience: Immigration 0.031** 0.023 0.020 
 (2.85) (1.93) (1.50) 






Incumbent -0.10** - -0.054* 
 (-3.43)  (-2.53) 
Position: Welfare -0.02 -0.027 0.0005 
 (-1.05) (-1.24) (0.05) 
Salience: Welfare -0.045* -0.029 -0.035* 
 (-2.55) (-0.69) (-2.45) 
Position: Market Economy 0.004 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.29) (-0.18) (-1.42) 
Salience: Market Economy 0.031 -0.009 0.023 
 (1.69) (-0.53) (1.71) 
Position: EU Opposition 0.0019 0.048 -0.01 
 (0.17) (1.71) (-1.27) 
Disproportionality Index -0.007 -0.019 0.0008 
 (-0.84) (-1.75) (0.13) 
Change in Unemployment -0.002 0.003 0.0014 
(2008Ð12) (-0.58) (0.42) (0.50) 
Change in GDP Growth -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0015 
(2008Ð12) (-0.28) (0.16) (-0.38) 
Change in Gini Index -0.002 -0.004 -0.00006 

























    
Notes: OLS Regression Models run with robust standard errors 













Table 5.4: Populist Radical Right Additional Model, Economic Crisis 
 (M4) 
Salience: Immigration  0.021** 
 (2.65) 
Position: Anti-Immigration -0.03 
 (-0.97) 
Position: EU Opposition 0.007 
 (0.72) 



















Notes: OLS Regression Models run with robust standard errors 
















Figure 5.1: Regression Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals (Inclusion of 
Control Variables
!
Source: Original Dataset on Change of PartiesÕ Performance in European National Parliamentary 
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1.49 2.15 1.60 1.59 
Position: Anti-
immigration 
2.17 2.03 1.70 1.91 
Incumbent 1.56 - 1.26 - 
Salience: Welfare 1.97 1.72 3.25 - 
Position: Welfare 2.63 2.16 2.23 - 
Salience: Market 
Economy 
2.81 2.52 2.24 - 
Position: Market 
Economy 
2.63 3.03 3.07 - 
Position: EU 
Opposition 
2.31 4.09 2.86 2.57 
Disproportionality 
Index (2008Ð12) 




1.61 1.53 1.45 1.12 
Change in GDP 
Growth (2008Ð12) 
2.49 1.44 1.28 1.33 
Change in Gini 
(2008Ð12) 
2.56 2.79 1.54 - 
Mean VIF 2.10 2.25 2.03 1.66 
	
 
Case Study Approach 
Center Right Parties 
Whilst the OLS regression models demonstrate that center right parties appear to perform 
better electorally when emphasizing the immigration issue than radical right parties did in 
times of economic crisis, it is important to examine the findings from the statistical models by 
country and adopt a case-based approach. A closer inspection of the dataset reveals that a 
number of ÔchallengerÕ center right parties performed well electorally when emphasizing 
immigration. Notable examples include the New Flemish Alliance Party (N-VA) in Belgium, 
the PeopleÕs Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in the Netherlands, alongside the 
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Swedish Moderate Party (M), the UK Conservative Party (CON), the Liberal Alliance in 
Denmark (NA) and to a lesser extent the Danish Liberal Party (VENSTRE). Other center 
right parties who benefited from an emphasis on immigration were the PdL in Italy under 
Silvio Berlusconi, the PeopleÕs Party in Portugal (CDS-PP), the Homeland Union Party in 
Lithuania (TS-LK) and the PeopleÕs Party in Spain (PP). However, a number of center right 
parties performed poorly. Notable examples include incumbent center right parties that saw 
their vote share decrease in national parliamentary elections across the economic crisis 
period. These cases include the Center Party (KESK) coalition government with the National 
Coalition Party (KOK) in Finland and Angela MerkelÕs Christian Democratic Union Party 
(CDU) in Germany. Furthermore, whilst incumbent center right parties such as the UMP in 
France under Nicolas Sarkozy and the Austrian PeopleÕs Party (VP) emphasized 
immigration, they performed electorally worse. This pattern also suggests that even when 
emphasizing immigration, specific incumbent center right parties still lost out electorally in 
the economic crisis. However, the main patterns demonstrated here are that incumbency 
alongside a lack of emphasis on immigration is likely to have hindered the electoral success 
of these center right parties in the crisis context, providing more impetus for the far right to 
claim ownership over the immigration issue in these countries. 
	
Populist Radical Right Parties 
Upon closer inspection of the dataset, there are a number of populist radical right parties that 
benefited electorally from an emphasis on immigration during the crisis context. Most 
notably, the Finns Party (PS) in Finland, the Hungarian Party Movement for a Better Hungary 
(JOBBIK), Geert WildersÕ Party for Freedom (PVV), the French Front National (FN), the 
Swedish Democrats (SD) and the Northern League in Italy (LN) performed better electorally 
when emphasizing immigration. The results in Austria show that both far right parties, the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FP) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZ) increased their 
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overall vote share in national parliamentary elections. However, these findings also suggest 
that a number of populist radical right parties lost out electorally when emphasizing 
immigration. The Flemish Interest Party (VB) in Belgium, the Danish PeopleÕs Party (DF), 
the Francophone Front National Party (FN) in Belgium emphasized immigration but saw 
their respective vote shares decline over the electoral period. Other far right parties such as 
UKIP saw a marginal increase in their vote share (+1%) at the 2010 UK General Election, but 
did not win any seats in the Westminster Parliament, largely due to institutional constraints in 
the form of the FPTP electoral system. Evidently, placing emphasis on the immigration issue 
in these countries did not translate into concrete electoral gains for these populist radical right 
parties and center right parties also arguably played an important role in this process. 
	
Patterns of Party Competition: Economic Crisis Context 
Situation I: Center Right outperform the Far Right 
Thus, three key patterns can be observed from these preliminary findings. Table 5.6 below 
depicts the key cases from these three party competition situations in more detail. This Table 
outlines the percentage change in vote shares for both center right and populist radical right 
parties in key cases, alongside the emphasis placed on immigration by both party families. In 
terms of defining ÔlowÕ salience and Ôhigh salienceÕ on the immigration issue, this chapter 
makes two distinctions. Political parties that scored 1Ð4 on this measure did not particularly 
emphasize immigration, whereas parties that scored 5Ð7 on this issue emphasized the issue 
considerably in their party strategies. Table 5.7 then shows the Ôuniverse of casesÕ that 
comprise these different situations by country and the election years under investigation. 
Firstly, center right parties that emphasized immigration performed better electorally than far 
right parties did. A key finding is the Belgian case, which highlights how the non-incumbent 
center right N-VA (+8%) outperformed the populist radical right party VB (-4%) when 
emphasizing immigration. The Danish results provide an additional case where center right 
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parties (VENSTRE and NA) perform electorally better than the populist radical right (DF). 
	
Situation II: Center Right and Far Right Parties both achieve electoral success 
Secondly, in a number of countries party competition was strong, with both the center right 
and populist radical right emphasizing immigration and achieving similar levels of electoral 
success (Netherlands and Hungary). In the Netherlands, the far right PVV increased their vote 
share (+10%) alongside the center right VVD Party (+6%). In Hungary, there was strong 
party competition on the dual socio-cultural issue dimensions of nationalism and 
immigration, with center right nationalist party Fidesz increasing its vote share (+11%) 
alongside the radical right party Jobbik (+14%).19 Sweden is another example, where the 
Moderate Party (M) increased its vote share (+4%) and the Swedish Democrats (SD) also 
performing better electorally (+3%). In Italy, the center right coalition (comprised of PdL and 
LN) performed well electorally at the 2008 Italian General Election. The far right and 
regionalist party Northern League were also part of the coalition at this election and increased 
their vote share (+4%).20 
	
Situation III: Far Right outperform the Center Right 
A third pattern demonstrated that in specific countries, populist radical right parties 
outperformed center right parties on the immigration issue (Finland, Greece, Austria and 
France) largely due to two dual mechanisms taking place; (i) a wider anti-incumbency effect 
and by the center right (ii) not particularly emphasizing immigration. Finland is a notable 
case of both mechanisms, with the far right PS Party increasing its vote share (+15%) 
																																																						
19 Upon closer inspection, the Hungarian case showed that nationalism was a more prominent driver of support 
for both party families than immigration was. 
20In Italy, Forza Italia (2006) renamed itself The People of Freedom (PdL) and was joined by the National 
Alliance (NA). The totals for the PdL were divided by thirds with two thirds going to Forza and one third going 
to NA (based on their relative 2006 performance). In addition, a coalition of the left, The Left Ð The Rainbow, 
was a reconfiguration including the Communist Refoundation Party, Party of Italian Communists, Federation of 
the Greens, and The Democratic Socialists. The total for The Rainbow is divided in quarters among these parties 
and can be found in Appendix B at the end of the dissertation. 
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considerably, with the incumbents KESK (-7%) and KOK (-2%) suffering electorally in this 
economic context and not emphasizing the importance of the immigration issue. Greece is an 
additional example of this pattern, where the center right incumbent party New Democracy 
(ND) performed electorally worse (-8%) and LAOS increased their vote share (+2%) at the 
2009 Greek legislative election. The findings for France and Austria show that even though 
center right parties emphasized immigration (UMP and VP), being an incumbent was 
electorally damaging in this economic context. An added dimension is that specific center 
right parties in countries such as Spain (PP) and Portugal (CDS-PP) which have not tended to 
have designated far right parties within the political system, still performed well electorally 
on immigration and increased their vote shares respectively. Though these findings are 
preliminary, these results highlight different and complex patterns of party competition on 
immigration between both party families in the context of economic bad times. 
Table 5.6: Patterns of Party Competition (Key Cases) 





































Notes: % Change in Vote Shares are outlined for both Center Right and Radical Right Parties in 
parentheses. 
Bold figures denote Emphasis on Immigration (1Ð4= ÔLowÕ Salience on Immigration, 5Ð7= ÔHighÕ 









Situation II: Center Right and Populist Radical Right both achieve electoral success in 









































Notes: % Change in Vote Shares are outlined for both Center Right and Radical Right Parties in 
parentheses. 
Bold figures denote Emphasis on Immigration (1Ð4= ÔLowÕ Salience on Immigration, 5Ð7= ÔHighÕ 




























21 Strong party competition between the center right Fidesz and the populist radical right party Jobbik is largely 



















































Notes: % Change in Vote Shares are outlined for both Center Right and Radical Right Parties in 
parentheses. 
Bold figures denote Emphasis on Immigration (1Ð4= ÔLowÕ Salience on Immigration, 5Ð7= ÔHighÕ 
Salience on Immigration)   
	
	
Table 5.7: Center Right and Populist Radical Right Party Competition in the Crisis 
Period, by Country and Election Years (ÔUniverse of CasesÕ)  
Center Right 
outperformed 
Far Right  
(Electoral Success) 














































The empirical findings in this chapter suggest that there was a mechanism of Ôstrategic 
emphasisÕ at play during the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis period, particularly for non-
incumbent (ÔchallengerÕ) center right parties. The political scientist Herbert Kitschelt (1995) 
coined the phrase Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ to describe the dominance that specific radical 
right parties achieved in the 1990s by adopting neo-liberal economic positions alongside 
hardline positions on issues such as crime, law and order and immigration. Since KitscheltÕs 
landmark study, a number of scholars have shown how the immigration issue has come to 
dominate the ideology of the populist radical right and the attitudes of the voters that this 
party family attracts (see Lubbers et al., 2002 Mudde, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009; Werts et al., 
2012). This chapter provided preliminary evidence for a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in 
this economic context, whereby mainstream center right parties can profit electorally from 
this issue when they emphasized the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. In certain 
cases, the center right can even perform better electorally than the populist radical right on 
this issue. 
This chapter found that there were three distinct patterns that underlined the party 
competition game on the immigration issue between populist radical right and center right 
parties in the context of the recent economic crisis. Firstly, the OLS regression models 
demonstrated that center right parties appeared to perform better electorally than radical right 
parties and center left parties which were provided as points of comparison. Notable cases 
included Belgium, with the center right opposition party N-VA outperforming the far right 
VB Party. Whilst the OLS regression models showed the average causal effects of these 
empirical relationships, the populist radical right model sample size is small and this limits 
the overall generalizability of these empirical findings. There are additional limitations to the 
empirical findings in Chapter 5. The empirical analysis in this chapter examined two snapshot 
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elections, one during the economic crisis and one before the economic crisis in 24 countries 
across Europe. This means that the empirical analysis can identify patterns from the 
regression models, but cannot establish internal validity (causality). Building on these 
limitations, a more fine-grained approach was needed and the chapter examined some key 
patterns from the dataset. Building on the OLS regression models through a closer inspection 
of the dataset, a second and more complex pattern of party competition was found in this 
economic context. There were a number of countries that exhibited ÔstrongÕ party competition. 
In a number of countries such as the Netherlands, Hungary, Sweden and Italy, both center 
right and far right parties emphasized the immigration issue and prospered electorally in 
national parliamentary elections across the crisis period. Crucially, these cases demonstrate 
that party competition on the immigration issue acted as a central dimension of political 
contestation in these countries.  
A third general pattern that is important to highlight is that there are electoral 
restrictions and caveats to the emphasis placed on immigration by center right parties. Thus, a 
caveat to center right party electoral success in this economic context is incumbency and not 
emphasizing the immigration issue. That is, even when emphasizing immigration, incumbent 
center right parties tended to lose out electorally in national parliamentary elections. Notable 
cases include Finland, France, Austria and Greece, where the populist radical right 
outperformed the center right when emphasizing the immigration issue. This chapter also 
found that anti-immigrant positions did not appear to explain center right party electoral 
success or indeed that of populist radical right parties in the crisis period. Rather than anti-
immigrant positions explaining center right party electoral success, the central theoretical 
argument in this chapter is one of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, whereby specific center right parties 
are able to emphasize and benefit from a salient issue, namely immigration (see Bale, 2008; 
Pardos-Prado, 2015; Odmalm and Bale, 2015). At the same time, this chapter demonstrated 
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that from a spatial perspective, holding anti-immigrant positions decreased the electoral vote 
share for populist radical right parties during the economic crisis. Thus, the issue position 
findings on immigration provide evidence to show that the radical right may have been too 
hostile and unpalatable for voters during the crisis (see Carter, 2005; Odmalm and Bale, 
2015). 
These findings have implications for the contemporary party competition literature in 
suggesting that center right parties, particularly those in opposition, have the potential to 
benefit electorally from emphasizing the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. 
Whilst these empirical findings do point to the electoral resilience of center right parties in 
being able to challenge and in some cases outperform the populist radical right on their core 
issue of immigration during periods of economic crisis, there are a number of situations 
where the center right perform electorally worse; particularly when they are (i) incumbents, 
or (ii) when they do not emphasize the immigration issue. Thus, these cases show that there 
are electoral restrictions to emphasizing immigration in economic bad times, with potential 
electoral gains for populist radical right parties. The next chapter seeks to further understand 
the resilience of the center right across Europe, through examining how the dynamics of party 
competition play out, particularly in determining the electoral success of center right parties, 
and identifying patterns outside periods of economic crisis and across a longer time period, 
enhancing the external validity of the dissertation. This chapter allows us to understand more 
about how the patterns of party competition on the immigration issue diverge during 
economic good times, alongside the role of incumbency and how this affects the electoral 






Chapter 6  
Center Right Party Electoral Resilience at the outset of the 21st Century: 
ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ and Incumbency effects on the Immigration issue 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that at the aggregate level, center right parties appeared to benefit 
electorally from emphasizing the immigration issue during the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis, 
alongside specific populist radical right parties. Distinctive patterns were found that related to 
the salience of immigration alongside incumbency. In the context of economic crisis, this 
chapter showed three different situations in regards to the underlying party competition 
dynamics between both party families. Firstly, the statistical models also suggested that in 
some cases, opposition and non-incumbent center right parties performed better electorally 
than populist radical right parties did when emphasizing immigration. Secondly, in countries 
where both center right and far right parties emphasized immigration simultaneously, both 
party families performed well electorally in national parliamentary elections. However, the 
third situation showed a more nuanced pattern: that in certain situations, the economic crisis 
context allowed some populist radical right parties to profit electorally at the expense of 
mainstream center right parties. Two mechanisms were displayed here and both conform to 
the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ outlined in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
The first mechanism comprised an anti-incumbency effect, with a number of center right 
parties performing worse as a result of a protest vote and enabling far right parties to prosper 
electorally. The second mechanism involved some center right parties not emphasizing the 
immigration issue and even ÔdownplayingÕ it in their party strategies. Consequently, this 
arguably led populist radical right parties to benefit from this Ôissue spaceÕ on salience and 
claim the immigration issue in economic bad times. 
 Building on the empirical findings in Chapter 5, the central theoretical expectation of 
this chapter is that the effect of immigration on voting choices is likely to be qualitatively 
different when economic times are good, as opposed to when times are bad. Thus, whilst the 
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immigration issue poses an electoral dilemma to center right parties, in whether to adopt 
more hardline or moderate stances on the issue, it is also likely to offer the center right 
particular benefits outside periods of economic crisis by hindering their populist radical right 
rivals. Primarily this is because economic good times are likely to reduce the electoral power 
of immigration, as the populist radical right will not have an Ôout-groupÕ such as immigrants 
that they can readily scapegoat and link to economic dislocation (see Meguid, 2005; Carter, 
2005; Mudde, 2007). At the same time, this chapter argues that center right partiesÕ policy 
pitches on immigration will not involve scapegoating out-groups during economic good 
times, as they can simply emphasize immigration strategically through greater ÔvisibilityÕ of 
the issue. This is likely to translate into significant electoral gains for the center right. 
Furthermore, the context of more prosperous economic times is also likely to translate into 
electoral advantage for mainstream center right and center left parties alike. This is because 
the incumbency effect works differently in the context of economic good times, where 
mainstream parties such as the center right are likely to possess an incumbency advantage 
and will not be as constrained by the threat of populist radical right parties. Thus, this chapter 
tests provides the second aggregate level test of the theoretical framework, through 
examining two core hypotheses (H4 and H5) of the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theory through the use 
of Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data from 1999Ð2007.22 The center left party family is 
again included in order to provide a comparison with the electoral performance of center right 











H4: In line with economic good times, ÔincumbentÕ parties on the mainstream center right and 
center left will perform better electorally. 
	
H5: Center Right Parties that emphasize immigration will perform better electorally than 
populist radical right parties. 
6.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
	
This chapter draws on the CHES dataset from 1999Ð2007 which features 24 countries across 
the European Union (EU). The aim of the CHES dataset is to estimate the issue positions and 
issue emphasis that political parties adopt across Europe. The CHES is chosen primarily 
because it contains a wide range of political parties, especially a large number of populist 
radical right parties that enhances the external validity of this chapter. This also allows the 
study to examine the salience of immigration for populist radical right and center right parties 
across time. More specifically, drawing on the CHES multiwave survey enables the study to 
examine the electoral resilience of center right parties around the immigration issue outside 
periods of economic crises from 1999Ð2007 in national parliamentary elections (see Bakker 
et al., 2015). 
In order to construct the center right party and populist radical right party variables, the 
chapter draws on the CHES left-right variable that places the position of political parties in 
terms of their overall ideological stances. The left-right variable is measured on a 0Ð10 scale. 
A score of 0 corresponds to a populist radical left party, with 5 denoting a centrist party and a 
value of 10 corresponding to a populist radical right party. Based on Benoit and LaverÕs 
(2006) expert survey of party positions, center right parties tend to be located between 5 and 
7 on the 0Ð10 scale, with populist radical right parties tending to be located between 8 and 
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10. A similar methodology is also outlined by Bale (2008) in classifying center right parties 
as Conservative, Christian Democratic or market liberal (see Hix and Lord, 1997). 
In order to measure the electoral success of political parties, this chapter draws on two 
dependent variables that measure the absolute percentage vote shares in national 
parliamentary elections for different party families from 1999Ð2007. This allows the chapter 
to have a substantial sample size of parties, including multiple national parliamentary 
elections in a number of countries across this time period.23 An advantage of this statistical 
procedure is that it enhances the external validity of the empirical findings from this chapter. 
Three vote share variables are deployed in this study, corresponding to center right, populist 
radical right and center left parties. In order to check the robustness of my results using this 
operationalization, an additional dependent variable was deployed. The aggregate vote share 
for populist radical right parties has been shown to be lower in national parliamentary 
elections. A range of institutional factors, such as the type of electoral system and the 
campaign resources that mainstream parties have at their disposal, may explain this 
relationship (see Norris, 2005; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009). The aggregate vote share for 
populist radical right parties has also been shown to be higher in second order elections, such 
as European Parliament elections (Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007; 2014). Thus the second 
dependent variable deployed is the overall percentage vote share for party families at the 
1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections.24 Table 6.1 below outlines the classification of 
parties from the CHES that comprise the center right and populist radical right party families 
that form the empirical analysis in this chapter. Appendix C provides a more comprehensive 
overview of party classifications and measurement of key variables that are deployed in this 
study. 
																																																						
23 The national parliamentary election years for each country can be found in Appendix C (see Classification of 
Countries III: Electoral Years) 
24 Since the results from the model using the European Parliament election results are very similar to those from 
the national parliamentary elections, I show the results for the latter only.  
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Table 6.1: Classification of Political Parties: By Party Family (1999Ð2007)25 
Country Center Right Radical Right 
Austria VP FP BZ 
Belgium N-VA CD&V CDH  
MCC  
FN VB 
Bulgaria ODS G-VMRO DSB L SDS NOA 
Czech Republic US-DEU ODS SNK-ED 
TOP09 
 
Denmark KF V DF FP 
Estonia IRL  
Finland KOK KESK PS 
France RPR/UMP DL MN RPF FN 
Germany CDU CSU FDP DVU/NPD 
Greece ND POLA LAOS 
Hungary MDF FIDESZ-M KDNP MIEP 
Ireland FF FG 	
Italy UDC PPI FI UDC CDU 
CCD/UDC NCD 
AN MS LN 
Latvia JL TP ZRP TB-LNNK 
Lithuania NKS TS-LK TT JL-PKS LLS 
Poland AWSP PSL PO PiS 
Portugal CDS-PP  
Romania CDR 2000 PMP PRM 
Slovakia KDH SNS PSNS 
Slovenia NS SDS SLS SNS 
Spain PP FP  
Sweden JL KD M SD NyD 
The Netherlands CDA VVD CU SGP CD LPF PVV 
United Kingdom CONS BNP UKIP 
Number of Parties (N) 64 32 
	
																																																						





The key independent variable in the CHES dataset that this study draws on is the emphasis 
placed by center right and populist radical right parties on the issue of immigration. In the 
CHES dataset, the salience of immigration is measured on a 0Ð10 scale that has been 
constructed by country experts. If a political party scored 0 on this variable it means that the 
issue is not important at all to their ideological programmes. Political parties that scored 10 
on this variable are those for which the issue is extremely important to their ideological 
programmes and party manifestos. The salience of immigration question was asked in the 
CHES from 1999 to 2010 and this study draws on the question from 1999Ð2006 that spans 
the context of more economic good times. A minor limitation of this question is that due to 
missing data, there is a reduced sample size on this variable.  
The CHES dataset also measures party positions and salience on a number of socio-
economic and socio-cultural issues that are important for party competition and are included 
in this study as control variables. The variable anti-taxation is included (spend vs. taxation), 
enabling us to examine partiesÕ positions on improving public services vs. reducing taxes. 
This variable allows us to examine how important center right and populist radical right party 
stances on the economy are for their electoral success. A score of 0 implies that a party 
strongly favors improving public services, whilst a score of 10 corresponds to a party 
strongly favoring reducing taxes (anti-taxation position). A limitation of both variables is that 
they were only asked in 2006 and 2010 and therefore the sample is limited to 2006.26 
	
Controls 
The issue position adopted by center right and populist radical right parties on immigration is 
also included. The immigration position variable is measured on a 0Ð10 scale, with a score of 
																																																						
26 The inclusion of this variable in Table 6.3 reduces the sample size slightly for party families (center right, 
radical right and center left) in this chapter.  
119	
	
0 capturing a liberal position and meaning that a party supports immigration. A score of 10 
captures a restrictive position and means that a party supports an anti-immigrant position. In 
order to further measure the positions on immigration for right-wing parties, a second 
indicator is provided. There is a second variable in CHES that measures right-wing partiesÕ 
stances towards the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. 
assimilation). However, due to multicollinearity, only the positions adopted on immigration 
are included in the three main OLS regression models. 
An additional variable is included that measures partiesÕ issue emphasis on the issue of 
EU integration. The EU issue has been shown to be highly important to the appeal of right-
wing parties, especially radical right parties (Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Ford and 
Goodwin; Milazzo, 2015; Werts et al., 2012). The variable taps the salience of EU integration 
and is measured on a 0Ð10 scale, with a score of 0 corresponding to EU integration having no 
importance, or never being mentioned, whilst a score of 10 corresponds to EU integration 
being an extremely important issue for a party. The chapter draws on a measure of party 
stances towards law and order, an issue which has been shown to have benefited the populist 
radical right (see Mudde, 2014; 2007; Arzheimer, 2009). A score of 0 means that a party 
strongly promotes civil liberties, whereas a score of 10 indicates that a party strongly 
supports tough measures to fight crime.  
The control variables used in the previous chapter are also drawn on here for the purpose 
of consistency. Incumbent parties are again included and are measured as an indicator 
variable. The inclusion of this variable enables us to examine how governing parties 
performed electorally in economic good times and provides an interesting comparison with 
the empirical findings for incumbents in economic bad times that formed the backdrop of 
Chapter 5. This chapter also draws on the Gallagher Index of the change in 
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Disproportionality levels (2002Ð2007)27 and enables us to examine how this variable changed 
across time instead of measuring the absolute level. Higher values on this change variable 
imply that there is a higher level of disproportionality in electoral systems between elections 
and negative values mean that electoral systems are more proportional between elections. 
Country-level control variables are included in the form of macroeconomic conditions, 
namely the change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (2002Ð2007) and the change in 
unemployment (2002Ð2007) from the World Bank Dataset. Higher values on the GDP 
variable correspond to an increase in economic growth, whilst higher values on the 
unemployment variable correspond to an increase in unemployment.  
	
Modeling approach 
Preliminary statistics in the form of bivariate correlations were first produced to examine the 
empirical relationship between emphasizing immigration and the absolute percentage vote 
shares for center right, populist radical right and center left parties. To investigate the central 
hypotheses in economic good times (H4ÐH5), four main OLS regression models with robust 
standard errors were then produced. Models 1Ð3 examine the electoral performance of center 
right, populist radical right and center left parties in the context of economic good times, 
particularly around the emphasis on immigration.28 Robustness checks on multicollinearity 
were again made for each model through the variance inflation factor and a regression 




27 Strictly speaking, this variable covers the change in disproportionality for the last two national elections in the 
2002Ð2007 electoral period. However the years vary slightly due to the different times that national 
parliamentary elections were held across Europe. 
28 Radical left parties were not included in the analysis as the sample size for this party family is small and not 







This chapter deploys Pearson r correlations to first assess the empirical relationship between 
the emphasis placed on immigration and the varying electoral success for center right and 
populist radical right parties in economic good times. Correlations are also provided for 
center left parties and this provides a point of comparison with both party families during this 
economic context. In Table 6.2 we can see a clear relationship (r=+0.31) between the 
emphasis placed on immigration by center right parties and their electoral fortunes. Upon 
closer inspection of the dataset, a number of entrenched center right parties across Europe 
that emphasized immigration in their electoral strategy performed well at the outset of the 21st 
century in national parliamentary elections (Union for a Popular Movement/UMP in France, 
the VP/Austrian PeopleÕs Party, Fidesz in Hungary, the PeopleÕs Party in Spain, the 
Christian Democratic Union Party in Germany, the Moderate Party in Sweden, and the VVD 
in the Netherlands). By comparison, the relationship between the emphasis placed on 
immigration and the electoral success of populist radical right parties (Table 6.2) is not only 
weak, it is negative (r=-0.55). The center left correlation is positive, but weak (r=+0.06) and 
further shows the center right parties performed better electorally during the period of 








Table 6.2: Correlations between % Vote Share Change for Political Parties and the 
Salience of Immigration at the Outset of the 21st Century (1999Ð2007) 






Center Left +0.06 92 
Center Right +0.31 108 
Radical Right -0.55 52 
Source: AuthorÕs own figures 
Notes: CHES (1999Ð2007) 
   Radical Left Party figures omitted from the table. 
	
OLS Regression Models 
To explore these empirical relationships more fully and with the inclusion of control 
variables, the chapter turns to OLS multivariate regression models (Table 6.3). The first 
model examines the percentage vote share for center right parties at the outset of the 21st 
century. Model 1 in Table 6.3 shows that center parties had an incumbency advantage during 
this electoral period and increased their vote share, thus finding strong support for H4. This 
finding corroborates the theoretical expectations of the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ model and 
underlines the incumbency advantage during more economically prosperous times for center 
right parties. Most significantly, the statistical model also finds strong evidence for H5, in 
showing that emphasizing immigration increased the vote share for center right parties 
considerably and is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Therefore, the salience of 
immigration provided significant electoral payoffs for the center right party family during this 
economic context. Similarly to the empirical findings outlined in Chapter 5, positions on 
immigration played no role in explaining center right party electoral success. Model 1 further 
demonstrates the wide-ranging appeal of center right parties, with an emphasis on EU 
integration increasing their vote share and proving significant at the p<0.001 level. These 
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results are in line with the center right party literature, in showing the key ÔtraditionalÕ issues 
from which this party family tends to profit electorally (see Heywood, 2012; Bale, 2008; 
2010). 
The second model in Table 6.3 outlines the empirical findings of the populist radical 
right party model in the context of economic good times. It is important to first note that the 
incumbency variable is not included for populist radical right parties, primarily because there 
are few cases of radical right incumbents and the sample size is very small (Austria: FP in 
1999 and 2002; BZ in 2006; Italy: AN in 2001; Latvia: TB-LNNK in 2002; Poland: PiS in 
2005). Thus, the incumbency variable is not run for populist radical right parties due to 
multicollinearity occurring and the variable is subsequently left out of this empirical model. 
This statistical model shows that populist radical right parties did not perform particularly 
well when emphasizing immigration in more economically prosperous times and the 
empirical findings are weak. Similar findings are found to Chapter 5 in regards to positions 
on immigration. It appears that when holding anti-immigrant stances, far right parties lose out 
electorally (p<0.05) and that this party family may again be seen by voters as too hostile in 
their positions on this issue (see Carter, 2005). The strongest variable in the populist radical 
right model comprises strong stances on law and order and this variable is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). This empirical finding has been previously found in the literature (see 
Mudde, 2002; 2007) and shows that when outlining strong and authoritarian stances on law 
and order, the populist radical right party family benefits electorally. 
Model 3 in Table 6.3 provides an interesting point of comparison with both the center 
right and radical right party families, in modeling how well center left parties performed in 
this economic context. Surprisingly, this empirical model shows that center left parties 
performed well electorally when emphasizing immigration during this electoral period and is 
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. In contrast to Chapter 5, this empirical finding 
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shows that center left parties performed better electorally on the immigration issue during 
economic good times, compared to economic bad times. Model 3 also shows that like center 
right parties, center left parties also benefited electorally from an incumbency advantage 
during this economic context (p<0.05) and provides an interesting comparison with the anti-
incumbency effect findings from Chapter 5. Two other variables also show the electoral 
appeal of center left parties during this electoral period, with the party family performing 
considerably better in electoral terms when emphasizing the EU issue (p<0.001) alongside 
strong stances on law and order (p<0.001). 
	
Robustness Checks 
A regression coefficient plot with 95% confidence intervals is again included in Figure 6.1 
and provides a robustness check. This allows us to visualize the magnitude of the electoral 
effect for center right, populist radical right and left-wing parties when emphasizing 
immigration, whilst including the main independent and control variables from Models 1Ð3 in 
Table 6.3 in the context of economic good times. Figure 6.1 depicts a particularly strong 
pattern for center right parties, showing that emphasizing immigration is a more electorally 
successful party strategy in comparison to populist radical right parties and to a lesser extent, 
center left parties. The confidence intervals are also narrow, further underlining the 
statistically significant effect for mainstream center right parties during this electoral period. 
The multiple coefficient plot in Figure 6.1 shows the opposite effect for populist radical right 
parties. In contrast to center right parties, the confidence intervals are much wider compared 
to center right parties and further underline the weak effect that emphasizing immigration had 
for this party family in this economic context. An additional robustness check is provided 
through the VIF statistic and again shows that all three models do not contain 
multicollinearity and are within acceptable levels. These tables can be in found Table 6.3 




Table 6.3: Center-Right Party, Populist Radical Right and Center Left Party 
Performance, Outset of the 21st Century: Statistical Models 







Salience: Immigration  3.73** 0.62 2.50* 
 (2.77) (0.45) (2.26) 






Incumbent  8.71** - 6.78* 
 (2.73)  (2.19) 
Position: Anti- Taxation 1.46 -0..13 -0.94 
 (1.33) (-0.22) (-0.69) 
Law and Order 2.41 3.44* 3.38* 
 (1.60) (2.02) (2.12) 
Salience: EU Integration:       2.63*** 0.26  3.11*** 
 (3.67) (0.40) (4.07) 
Disproportionality Index -0.46 0.60 -0.32 
 (-1.17) (1.07) (-0.09) 
Change in Unemployment -0.06 -0.23 0.42 
(2002Ð07) (-1.31) (-0.49) (0.83) 
Change in GDP Growth -0.63 0.43 -0.55 

























    
Notes: OLS Regression Models run with robust standard errors 
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Figure 6.1: Regression Coefficient Plot (Inclusion of Control Variables) 








































3.57 4.74 3.55 
Position: Anti-
immigration 
4.66 5.88 4.00 
Incumbent 1.26 - 1.22 
Anti-Taxation 1.28 1.90 1.59 
Law and Order 3.39 2.65 3.55 
Salience: EU 
Integration 
1.29 1.78 1.41 
Disproportionality 
Index (2002Ð07) 




3.40 3.41 2.95 
Change in GDP 
Growth (2002Ð07) 
1.96 2.16 1.64 
Mean VIF 2.41 3.29 2.25 
	
Center Right Party Electoral Success: Notable Cases 
To further illustrate patterns in the statistical models surrounding the electoral resiliency of 
the center right around the immigration issue in this economic context, this section briefly 
outlines four notable elections that serve as illustrative cases. These cases are descriptive 
examples showing specific center right parties that made immigration an important part of 
their party strategies in national parliamentary elections, allowing them to perform better 
electorally than populist radical right parties in the context of economic good times.  
	
Patterns of Party Competition: Outset of the 21st Century 
The 2002 Austrian Legislative Election 
The 2002 Austrian Legislative Election is a representative case of center right party electoral 
success at the expense of a populist radical right party in economic good times. Table 6.5 
below provides a short summary of the results from the 2002 Austrian national parliamentary 
election. From 1999 to 2002, Austria was governed by a landmark coalition government 
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between the center right Austrian PeopleÕs Party (VP) and the populist radical right 
Freedom Party of Austria (FP). The incumbent center right VP under leader Wolfgang 
Schssel received 42% of the votes at the 2002 election, seeing a substantial increase in their 
seat share (+27) in the National Council and becoming the largest party in Austria, winning 
79 of the 183 seats. To a lesser extent, the Social Democratic Party (SP) also performed 
better electorally, achieving 37% of the overall vote and marginally increasing their seat share 
(+4), winning 69 of the 183 seats. However, the populist radical right FP under their 
charismatic leader Jrg Haider saw a substantial reduction in their vote share (-16%) and lost 
34 seats in the National Council, with the party now only holding ten seats. 
Scholars such as Luther (2002) argue that changes in patterns of party competition, 
particularly around the socio-cultural issue dimension of immigration, were an important 
factor in this process. The incumbent center right VP increased their focus on the 
immigration issue in seeking to capture disaffected FP voters at this election. The VP 
sought to raise the profile of the issue and this strategy was an important party of the partyÕs 
manifesto (Luther, 2002). A second and linked explanation encompasses the incumbency 
status of FP. The political science literature has noted that part of the FPÕs core appeal has 
been its status as an insurgent ÔoutsiderÕ party that has rallied against the political 
establishment (see Luther, 2002; Hainsworth, 2008). Thus, including the FP as a coalition 
partner with VP ended this ÔoutsiderÕ status. As a governing party, the FP now had to deal 
not only with policy failures and dissatisfaction amongst voters, but also internal party dissent 
amongst a section of the party who were opposed to being in coalition government with the 
VP. In contrast, the center right VP is an entrenched party within the Austrian political 
system and did not face the same incumbency problems as the FP did. The VP was 
arguably able to strategically focus on capturing the immigration issue and used their 
incumbency status as an advantage, in blaming the FP for the breakup of the coalition 
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government that led to the election. Furthermore, the decision of the party to co-opt the issue 
and also include the populist radical right FP in the governing coalition during this electoral 
period proved to be an electorally successful party strategy. 
	























Source: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/austria/introduction.html  
Notes: The % Change in Vote Share figures (1999Ð2002) have been rounded to the nearest whole 
number and Minor Parties which did not achieve representation in the National Council have been 
omitted from this table. 
	
France: 2002 Presidential and Legislative Elections 
The second case that is briefly drawn on to highlight center right party electoral success at the 
outset of the 21st century is France. This case features both the Presidential and Legislative 
elections of 2002, in both of which the newly created center right party Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP) triumphed, performing better electorally than the populist radical right 
Front National (FN) and the center left Parti Socialiste (PS). Table 6.6 below outlines key 
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dominated by socio-cultural issues, notably in the form of terrorism amidst the 9/11 attacks in 
the United States (see Cole, 2003). The immigration issue was also of importance at this 
election. The 2002 French Presidential election was particularly historic, with the far right 
Presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen forcing a second round ballot and facing off against 
the incumbent center right Jacques Chirac of UMP. Whilst Chirac emphasized issues such as 
immigration at this election, his rhetoric was more moderate on this issue, compared to the 
hardline anti-immigrant approach adopted by the FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen (see Cole, 
2003; Mondon, 2014; Mondon, 2013). 
A core explanation for ChiracÕs victory at the 2002 French Presidential Election lies 
more with other parties such as PS endorsing their voters to vote for Chirac in the second 
round to stop the insurgent radical right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen from winning, than it 
does from immigration or any other issue. In the second round run-off, Chirac ended up 
defeating Jean-Marie Le Pen in a landslide, receiving 82% of the popular vote, compared to 
Le PenÕs 18%. Positive incumbency effects also played an influential role in explaining 
ChiracÕs victory, with voters opting for a tried and tested President, versus an ideologically 
unpalatable populist radical right candidate (see Perrineau, 2002; Cole, 2003). The French 
Legislative elections took place shortly afterwards and saw the center right UMP secure a 
majority (obtaining 357 seats), compared to Franois HollandeÕs PS (140 seats), with the 
radical right losing the single seat they had in the French Parliament and losing half of the 
voters who had previously voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 2002 French Presidential 
Election. The 2002 French Legislative Election provides further evidence of how center right 







































Source: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/france/  
Notes: A simplified table is presented, with only second round seat distributions presented. 
The breakdown of Minor Parties (ÔOthersÕ) is not presented for the sake of parsimony. 
	
2007 French Presidential Election 
The fourth snapshot case is the 2007 French Presidential Election. This election is an 
additional example of how the center right UMP performed better electorally than the 
populist radical right (and to a lesser extent the PS Party) in economic good times. From 2002 
to 2007, immigration was a key issue in French politics, with a number of deportations of 
illegal immigrants taking place and the issue becoming highly politicized (see Mondon, 
2014). During the election campaign, the center right UMP candidate Nicolas Sarkozy 
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to attract FN voters away from voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen (see Evans and Ivaldi, 2007; 
Mondon, 2014). This was seen to be an electorally successful party strategy, with Sarkozy 
winning the election (53% of the popular vote), compared to the PS candidate Sgolne 
Royal (47%) in the second round run-off. In contrast, Jean-Marie Le Pen failed to reach the 
second round and performed considerably worse than in 2002 (see Marthaler, 2007; Mondon, 
2014). Economic conditions (unemployment levels and GDP growth) were also more 
favorable during the 2002Ð2007 electoral periods and are also likely to have played an 
important role in explaining center right party electoral success at this election. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
	
This chapter further investigated the emphasis that center right parties and populist radical 
right parties placed on immigration outside periods of economic crisis. The main empirical 
findings in this chapter are that in economic good times, populist radical right parties do 
particularly badly from emphasizing the immigration issue. Furthermore, center right parties 
are electorally resilient on immigration in this economic context. As in Chapter 5, we see that 
center right parties did not benefit from adopting hardline stances on immigration; with the 
issue salience model playing a more prominent role in explaining electoral success for this 
party family than the spatial model (see Odmalm and Bale, 2015). This chapter also showed 
that spatial factors, such as positions on anti-immigrant sentiment, reduced the overall vote 
share for radical right parties. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that emphasizing the 
immigration issue corresponded to a substantial percentage increase in the aggregate vote 
share of center right parties in national parliamentary elections (H5). The central theoretical 
explanation of center right party electoral success offered here is not a valence nor a 
positional one, but simply that center right parties are able to trigger and emphasize the right 
issue during this electoral period through a mechanism of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, and also 
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benefit from an incumbency advantage (H4) in this economic context. In comparison, center 
left parties also appeared to benefit electorally in this economic context, particularly when 
emphasizing immigration and also the EU issue. However, the empirical findings still 
demonstrate that center right parties performed better electorally than populist radical right 
and to a lesser extent center left parties in more economic good times when emphasizing the 
immigration issue. Four cases from Austrian (2002 Legislative election) and French politics 
(2002 Presidential/Legislative elections alongside the 2007 Presidential election) were briefly 
drawn on to further illustrate center right party electoral success during this economic 
context. The Austrian 2002 Legislative election in particular provides an important snapshot 
to the story of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, in outlining how emphasizing the immigration issue 
arguably played an important role in patterns of party competition, particularly in explaining 
center right party electoral success during the context of economic good times. 
These empirical findings have important implications for contemporary party politics, 
in building on the empirical findings from Chapter 5 and showing how center right parties 
can make use of the immigration issue in diverse economic contexts. These findings suggest 
that mainstream center right parties are electorally resilient when they emphasize the 
immigration issue, in times both of economic crisis and of prosperity. Populist radical right 
parties, on the other hand, only seem to perform better when emphasizing immigration during 
economic tough times, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. This chapter sheds further light on the 
party competition dynamics and patterns between center right and populist radical right 
parties at the outset of the 21st century and provides further evidence that the center right may 
benefit from a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in 21st century European politics, specifically 
for center right parties that make Ôstrategic emphasisÕ central to their party ideology (see 
Kitschelt, 1995). Whilst the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework has been empirically 
tested in two diverse economic contexts, namely at the aggregate level, the next chapter seeks 
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to build on the empirical findings discussed in Chapter 5. The next chapter seeks to further 
unpack the three different situations in specific countries that underline party competition 
dynamics between center right and populist radical right parties in times of economic crisis. 
This case study analysis adopts a qualitative research design and seeks to add further value to 
this dissertation through investigating three different situations of party competition, 
examining the electoral fortunes of both center right and populist radical right parties in the 


















Chapter 7  
Center Right Party and Populist Radical Right ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ and 
Incumbency effects on Immigration? A Case Study Analysis of Belgium, 
The Netherlands, France and Finland 
	
Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation have demonstrated important empirical patterns and 
trends between contemporary center right and populist radical right parties on the 
immigration issue in two diverse economic contexts. The empirical findings from Chapter 5 
showed that when center right parties emphasized immigration, they tended to perform better 
electorally in national parliamentary elections during the context of economic bad times. 
Simply put, when emphasizing immigration, center right partiesÕ overall vote share was 
higher than both populist radical right and center left parties. A closer inspection of the main 
empirical findings showed that party competition dynamics were complex between both party 
families on the immigration issue across a number of countries. Whilst a number of non-
incumbent center right parties were electorally resilient on the immigration issue, the findings 
also highlighted how, in certain situations, center right partiesÕ electoral success was arguably 
restricted by (i) their incumbency status and (ii) not emphasizing the immigration issue in 
certain countries, allowing the populist radical right to make electoral gains.  
In line with the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, these situations 
provided two distinctive opportunities for specific populist radical right parties to prosper 
electorally. The empirical findings from Chapter 6 demonstrated that center right parties did 
even better in economic good times when emphasizing the immigration issue. This chapter 
also showed that patterns of party competition were qualitatively different in this economic 
context. The empirical models in Chapter 6 suggest that center right parties were not only 
able to make use of immigration emphasis in economic good times, but also prospered 
electorally from an incumbency advantage in this context. In contrast, populist radical right 
parties performed markedly worse; they did not have the advantage of protest voting or 
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indeed patterns of electoral volatility (greater voter volatility) during this economic context.  
 This chapter seeks to build on the main empirical findings from Chapter 5 in 
investigating patterns of party competition between mainstream center right and populist 
radical right parties on immigration that are derived from the theoretical framework. This 
case study chapter focuses on the economic crisis period for two main reasons. Firstly, there 
are broader patterns of electoral volatility (incumbencyÐpunishment), with incumbent parties 
suffering electorally. In this context, electoral volatility can be seen as a consequence of the 
economic crisis, meaning that voters are now less aligned to parties, and thus more prone to 
punish poorly performing incumbents. Secondly, center right and populist radical right party 
competition was stronger during this economic context, especially with the populist radical 
right performing better electorally compared to more economically prosperous times. The 
case studies seek to build on the large N findings from Chapter 5 in illustrating more 
systematically the patterns of the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework. Thus, the role of 
this case study chapter is to shed more light on the theory, in investigating how specific 
hypothesized conditions lead to different electoral outcomes (electoral success of center right 
and radical right parties). The case studies in this chapter are structured around a thematic 
comparison (salience of immigration; crisis; incumbency) that allows the theoretical 
framework to be tested under different situations that underline competition between center 
right and populist radical right parties on immigration. The case study chapter provides added 
value to the theory in examining center right and populist radical right party competition 
dynamics. Thus, the case studies investigate qualitatively how the choices that specific types 
of center right parties make on immigration (emphasizing v. not emphasizing) in times of 
economic crisis affected their electoral success, in tandem with the electoral opportunities 
with which downturns can provide populist radical right parties. The case studies allow us to 
examine within-system dynamics between the two party families. 
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7.1 CASE STUDY SELECTION 
	
This chapter draws on four case studies that were generated from the main empirical findings 
in Chapter 5 (see Table 7.1 below). Table 7.1 depicts a broad Ôuniverse of casesÕ that 
represent different patterns of party competition between center right and populist radical 
right parties in times of crisis. There are three main situations that underline party 
competition between both party families in the recent economic crisis period. This case study 
chapter acknowledges that specific center right parties performed well electorally when 
emphasizing immigration, in countries which had no far right party (such as the PP in Spain 
and CDS-PP in Portugal). However, this chapter does not examine these case studies as this is 
beyond the scope of the theory. Moreover, the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ 
focuses on party competition between center right and far right parties and does not account 
for center right party electoral success in countries which do not have a far right party. The 
first situation involves cases of center right party electoral success. The cases of Belgium, the 
UK and Denmark represent situations where center right parties prospered electorally in 
national parliamentary elections through emphasizing the immigration issue. The second 
situation represents a more nuanced dynamic of party competition. The Dutch, Hungarian, 
Swedish and Italian cases represent cases where both center right and far right parties were 
electorally successful, underscoring the importance of the immigration issue in the most 
recent national parliamentary elections.  
Due to variations on the third party competition situation, two cases are examined 
here in order to provide a more stringent test of the theoretical framework. The aim of these 
cases is to show how populist radical right parties emphasized immigration and outperformed 
center right parties, in examining the specific conditions at work here. There are four country 
cases here: Finland, France, Austria and Greece. The preliminary findings from Chapter 5 
demonstrated that conditions such as (i) center right party incumbency and (ii) not 
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emphasizing immigration were likely to explain why center right parties lost out electorally 
to far right parties. The primary aim of these four case studies is to choose a representative 
case from each situation that illustrates broader and generalizable patterns of party 
competition, providing further understanding of competition on the immigration issue 
between party families in times of crisis amidst greater voter volatility (see Lijphart, 1971: p. 
691). In examining these patterns of party competition, the cases are selected primarily on the 
independent variables that were found in Chapter 5 of the dissertation from the dataset 
observations: (i) what happens when there is an economic downturn (center right party 
incumbencyÐpunishment effect), (ii) the degree to which incumbent center right parties 
emphasize/do not emphasize immigration, and (iii) the degree to which ÔchallengerÕ center 
right parties emphasize/do not emphasize immigration.29 These independent variables form 
three conditions that underpin different electoral outcomes and are used as the primary 
method of case selection in this chapter. Table 7.2 outlines these hypothesized conditions that 
form the situations in the overall cases and how they lead to different electoral outcomes for 











29 In accordance with the empirical findings from Chapter 5, I define a ÔchallengerÕ party as one that is in 
opposition and not currently in government. The terms ÔchallengerÕ and Ônon-incumbentÕ parties are used 
interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
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Table 7.1: Center Right and Populist Radical Right Party Competition in the Crisis 
Period, by Country and Election Years (ÔUniverse of CasesÕ) 30 
Center Right outperformed 
Far Right  
(Electoral Success) 









































































































































































Yes No Yes Center Right and 
Far Right 
ÔChallengersÕ 
(VVD and PVV) 
S2: HungaryÕ 
(2006Ð2010) 







No Yes No** Center Right 
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Yes Yes No** Far Right 
ÔChallengersÕ 
(FP and BZ) 
S3: Greece 
(2007Ð2009) 





Notes: (S1-S3 denote the three different situations of the theoretical framework; C1-C3 denote the 
three core conditions that underpin the core electoral outcomes). 
*  = denotes ÔrelativeÕ levels of electoral success. 
** = denotes that there is no significant ÔchallengerÕ center right party in these countries. 
*** = denotes that although the center right ÔincumbentÕ party Venstre won the most votes and seats in 
Denmark, a center left coalition was formed after the election, meaning that the center right party now 
became the main opposition party. 
****= denotes that incumbent center left parties were punished electorally. 
 






















Note: * = denotes ÔrelativeÕ levels of electoral success. 
          ** = denotes that there is no significant other ÔchallengerÕ center right party in these countries. 
 
Situation I: Center Right Party Electoral Success  
	
Due to the differences in party competition between the regions of Flanders and Wallonia in 
Belgium, the Belgian case study only includes party competition in Flanders and does not 
examine Wallonia. Drawing on Table 7.2, the Belgian case study is chosen for three primary 
reasons that are in line with the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasis.Õ Firstly, the 
Belgian case study shows wider patterns of electoral volatility at the 2010 Federal 
parliamentary election, through anti-incumbency patterns for parties in Flanders during the 
economic crisis period (the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis). Secondly, the Belgian case 
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is underpinned by incumbent center right parties not competing on the immigration issue. In 
contrast, center right party ÔchallengersÕ competed heavily on immigration. The Belgian case 
therefore provides a case where specific center right parties that compete on the immigration 
issue perform better electorally. The Belgian case study seeks to show qualitatively how the 
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), a ÔchallengerÕ center right party, capitalized electorally from 
emphasizing immigration and performed considerably better in electoral terms than the 
populist radical right party Flemish Interest (VB) in national parliamentary elections (2010Ð
2007). An added dynamic in the Belgian case is that N-VA also outperformed other center 
right parties such as the incumbent Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) 
alongside List Dedecker (LDD). Thus, the Belgian case provides a representative case of 
Ôstrategic emphasisÕ as the issue was also a prominent one in Flanders in the run up to 2010 
election (see Pauwels, 2011). The UK case (2005Ð2010) is not selected, primarily because 
immigration was not a core issue at the 2010 UK General Election (see Ford and Goodwin, 
2014). The Danish case is also not selected for two main reasons. Although the center right 
parties NA and Venstre increased their vote share, this was fairly minimal and a center left 
coalition was formed after the election, meaning that the center right party now became the 
main opposition party. It is therefore debatable whether center right parties did achieve 
electoral success in Denmark in this economic context. Secondly, economic issues were more 
important than issues such as immigration at the 2011 Danish election and thus this case is 
not selected.  
	
Situation II: Center Right and Populist Radical Right both achieve Electoral Success 
The Dutch case study provides a representative test of the second party competition situation 
of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ. The Dutch case (2007Ð2011) is selected because it typifies the three 
main conditions in Table 7.2. Firstly, there is greater voter volatility, with incumbent parties, 
particularly on the center right losing out. This has arguably provided electoral opportunities 
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for non-incumbent and ÔchallengerÕ center right parties such as the Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD), alongside the populist radical right Freedom Party (PVV) to compete on 
the immigration issue and also benefit from wider anti-incumbency effects. Secondly, the 
immigration issue has played an important role in 21st century Dutch politics, not just at the 
2006 General Election, but also particularly at the recent 2010 General Election (see Van 
Kessel, 2010; Van Kessel and Crum, 2009). Thirdly, this case allows us to examine how 
specific non-incumbent center right and populist radical right parties competed on the 
immigration issue, compared to incumbent center right parties that did not compete on and 
emphasize the issue at the 2010 election. Thus, the Dutch case also allows us to examine 
party competition dynamics on the immigration issue between the center right VVD and far 
right PVV in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. The Hungarian case (2006Ð
2010) is not selected as whilst immigration emphasis arguably played a role, historically 
nationalism has been shown to be a much more important driver of political contestation than 
immigration in Hungary. This was also shown to be the case at the 2010 election (see Pytlas 
and Kossack, 2013; see Rovny, 2016; Rovny and Polk, 2016). The Swedish (2006Ð2010) and 
Italian (2006Ð2008) cases were also not selected, as immigration was not a central issue in 
either the 2010 or 2008 national parliamentary elections in both countries. In addition, both 
the Swedish and Italian cases coincided with incumbent center left parties losing out 
electorally, as opposed to incumbent center right parties.  
	
Situation III: Populist Radical Right Party Electoral Success 
In order to examine the third situation of party competition, two different cases are selected 
from Table 7.2 to provide an accurate representation of the patterns that underpin the 
Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical framework in times of crisis. The third situation of party 
competition shows how specific types of center right parties (namely incumbents) performed 
electorally worse compared to populist radical right parties. These two case studies are 
144	
	
selected, based on two variations on the independent variables (see Eckstein, 1975: pp. 104Ð
08; (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004; Gerring, 2007: Chapter 5). These two conditions comprise 
(i) incumbent center right parties that did not compete on and emphasize immigration and (ii) 
incumbent center right parties that did compete on and emphasize immigration. The Finnish 
and French case studies are selected as they comprise two divergent patterns of populist 
radical right party electoral success, at the expense of incumbent center right parties. The 
context of the Finnish case study is important, primarily because the 2011 election 
culminated in the largest ever increase in support for a single party (PS) in the Finnish 
Parliament, further typifying wider patterns of electoral volatility. The Finnish case therefore 
seeks to shed light on how two distinct conditions of (i) incumbency and (ii) lack of emphasis 
on immigration hindered the mainstream center right during this electoral period and allowed 
the populist radical right to prosper electorally from the opening up of Ôissue spaceÕ on 
immigration.  
 Secondly, this chapter draws on France (2007Ð2012) and serves as an additional case 
study in investigating the third party competition situation in more detail. Table 7.2 shows 
that this case study provides a more nuanced and fine-grained investigation of the theoretical 
framework, compared to the Finnish case. The French case shows a second and important 
variation, notably that there are electoral restrictions to emphasizing the immigration issue for 
center right parties. Even though the incumbent center right party UMP emphasized 
immigration at the 2012 national parliamentary election, their status as a governing party 
meant that anti-incumbency effects arguably swamped a focus on immigration. Thus, this 
case allows us to see that that emphasizing immigration in the crisis period does not 
guarantee electoral success for a center right party, particularly if that party is in government 
and presides under worsening economic conditions. In turn, this negative incumbency effect 
is likely to have created electoral opportunities for the populist radical right party FN to 
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benefit from greater voter volatility in the context of the recent economic crisis. Whilst the 
Greek (2007Ð2009) and Austrian (2006Ð2008) cases demonstrate similar conditions to the 
French case study, the latter is chosen as it provides a representative account of the theoretical 
framework; namely with the incumbent center right party losing out, even though they 
competed heavily on the immigration issue.  
	
Party Competition Model: Immigration  
Table 7.3 outlines the hypothesized conditions of the four cases studies that were selected and 
form the basis of this chapter. The three divergent conditions are presented and provide a 
summary of the cases. Figure 7.1 below outlines the party competition dynamics model and 
depicts the emphasis placed on immigration in the four country specific case studies of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and France. Drawing on the 2007/08 WhitefieldÐ
Rohrschneider expert survey, the figure models the salience of immigration (1Ð7 scale) that 
was deployed in Chapter 5. In interpreting what constitutes ÔlowÕ salience and Ôhigh salienceÕ 
on the immigration issue, this chapter makes two distinctions. Political parties that scored 1Ð4 
on this measure did not particularly emphasize immigration, whereas parties that scored 5Ð7 
on this issue emphasized the issue considerably in their party strategies. This is an important 
distinction to make and enables the chapter to shed further light on H2 (ÔChallengerÕ center 
right parties that emphasize immigration will perform electorally better than populist radical 
right parties) and H3 (ÔIncumbentÕ center right parties that did not emphasize immigration 
will perform electorally worse, with populist radical right parties benefiting electorally). This 
allows this chapter to further build on the party competition patterns that were outlined in 
Chapter 5 of the dissertation. Comparable features are also provided for each case study and 
include the percentage change in vote shares, seats shares and overall distributions, alongside 










Belgium (Flanders): Situation I: CR Party Electoral Success 
	
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience  
CD&V    VLD N-VA LDD VB  
(3.4)     (4.6) (5.0) (5.1)  (7.0)  
   
The Netherlands:  Situation II: PRR and CR Party Electoral Success 
 
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience  
CU CDA PvdA VVD  PVV 
 (4.0) (4.4) (4.5) (5.2)   (7.0)  
 
Finland:         Situation III(i): PRR Party Electoral Success 
 
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience  
 KESK KOK                  PS 
(3.7) (3.8) (6.3) 
	
France:         Situation III(ii): Anti-Incumbency Effects 
 
ÔLowÕ Salience ÔHighÕ Salience  
              PS         UMP  FN 
  (4.3) (5.3)  (6.9) 
	
Notes: Emphasis placed on Immigration (1Ð7) is denoted in parentheses (see Tables 7.4Ð7.7) 
for full party names and classifications) 
1Ð4= ÔLowÕ Salience on Immigration 
5Ð7= ÔHighÕ Salience on Immigration       
Black: ÔIncumbentÕ Center Right Party 
Orange: ÔChallengerÕ Center Right Party 
Blue: ÔIncumbentÕ Center Left Party 
Red: ÔChallengerÕ Radical Right Party 
Green: ÔChallengerÕ Center Left Party 












Situation I: Center Right Party Electoral Success 
Belgium 
Election Background 
The Belgian case study provides a more fine-grained test of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ in seeking to 
shed further light on patterns of party competition within a multiparty political system.31 This 
case allows us to investigate how the non-incumbent center right party New Flemish Alliance 
(N-VA) sought to emphasize the immigration issue by co-opting it and prospered electorally 
from this issue, at the expense of the populist radical right party Flemish Interest (VB). The 
case study also shows how the center right N-VA performed better electorally than other 
center right parties, such as the incumbent CD&V alongside LDD. From 2007Ð2010, the 
Belgian political system was characterized by political crises around constitutional reform, 
particularly between the Flemish and French-speaking communities over the bilingual district 
of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. Between 2007 and 2010, numerous governments led by the 
incumbent center right CD&V under Yves Leterme I, Herman Van Rompuy I, and Yves 
Leterme II replaced each other and further added to the ongoing political crisis in Belgium.  
The center right N-VA party created a political earthquake by becoming the biggest 
party in Flanders at the 2010 Federal election. The N-VA received the highest share of votes 
in Belgium, with 17%, and obtained more seats (27) out of 150 in the Chamber of 
Representatives than any other party. In contrast, the populist radical right party VB 
emphasized immigration, but saw a significant decrease in their vote share from 2007 (-4% 
points) and also lost five seats in the Chamber of Representatives at the 2010 Federal 
																																																						
31 The Belgian political system is a highly complex consociational political system that has historically led to 
frequent coalition governments due to its multipartyist system (see Lijphart, 2012; Deschouwer, 2012) with 
multiple political parties being represented in government and underlying party competition. 
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election. 32  Thus, VBÕs final seat tally came to 12 seats out of 150 in the Chamber of 
Representatives. This election also produced wider patterns of electoral volatility, through an 
anti-incumbency effect for the main coalition partners, with the exception of the Socialist 
Party (PS) in Wallonia. Government formation took a record-breaking 541 days, with 
gridlock occurring over the composition of the coalition. A deal on the next government was 
finally reached, with a government being formed on 6 December 2011. Although N-VA 
emerged as the largest party in Belgium at the 2010 election, the party was unable to agree a 
coalition agreement with the Francophone Socialist Party (PS) and talks broke down. A 
government coalition was formed without the center right N-VA, with the leader of the PS 
Party Elio Di Rupo becoming the Prime Minister. The governing coalition included liberal, 
socialist and Christian democratic parties from both Flanders and Wallonia. Table 7.4 outlines 
the Belgian electoral picture and key statistics from 2007Ð2010 that underline party 
competition in this economic context. The table also splits party competition across the two 
regions of Flanders and Wallonia. 
	
N-VA ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ on Immigration: Party Strategy 
This section explores the electoral rise of the center right N-VA party at the 2010 Federal 
parliament election, through their Ôstrategic useÕ of immigration.33 Longitudinal survey data 
has shown that the immigration issue has remained an important issue over time in Flanders, 
particularly since 2007. Belgium as a whole has also experienced high levels of immigration 
in the 21st century, with a number of non-EU migrants entering the country (see 
Swyngedouw, 2009; Pauwels, 2011) and the issue has become highly politicized in recent 
																																																						
32 For the sake of parsimony, the Belgian case study does not investigate the far right Francophone Front 
National Party (FN) in Wallonia as this party is seen as a minor party and has not played a particularly 
prominent role in the Belgian political system historically. Furthermore, by including the two Flemish speaking 
parties in the form of the center right N-VA and the radical right party VB this allows a greater degree of 
comparability. 




years. In turn, the immigration issue has offered distinct electoral opportunities to a number 
of parties in Flanders, particularly the populist radical right party VB who have often been 
seen to claim ownership over immigration (Pauwels, 2011). The immigration issue is also 
likely to catalyze parties on the center right of the political spectrum in Flanders, such as the 
N-VA and List Dedecker (LDD). Both center right parties are in competition with one another 
on this issue and seek to profit from the issue, particularly at the expense of the far right VB 
Party. Moreover, both center right parties also have the potential to steal voters away from 
VB and this issue dimension provides a large pool of disaffected voters for these center right 
parties to tap into. Recent survey research (Pauwels, 2011) has also demonstrated that former 
VB voters have shifted towards the center right parties N-VA and LDD largely due to 
concerns over issues such as immigration. 
Figure 7.1 outlines party competition dynamics on immigration and the emphasis 
placed on the issue by different parties in Flanders, thus investigating the first party 
competition situation from the Ôuniverse of casesÕ table in 7.1. The figure depicts emphasis 
placed on immigration by a number of parties. Drawing on the 2007/08 WhitefieldÐ
Rohrschneider expert survey, the figure models the salience of immigration (1Ð7 scale) that 
different political parties in Flanders adopted. The party competition model in Figure 7.1 
depicts VB emphasizing immigration (7.0) and forms a key part of the partyÕs strategy. In 
contrast, the incumbent center right CD&V did not particularly emphasize immigration (3.4). 
At the same time, Figure 7.1 shows that both center right parties, N-VA (5.0) and LDD (5.1) 
emphasized immigration more than the other political parties in Flanders. However, although 
emphasizing the immigration issue, Table 7.4 also shows that the other center right party in 
LDD saw a 2% reduction in their vote share at the 2010 election. This calls into question 
whether this strategy allowed LDD to profit electorally from the immigration issue and more 
importantly how N-VA were able to strategically frame the issue. 
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The central argument in the Belgian case is that N-VA sought to strategically co-opt 
and take this issue away from the populist radical right party VB during the 2007Ð2010 
electoral period. However, N-VA also faced competition from the center right Party LDD at 
this election. Pauwels (2011) notes that the immigration issue has become much more 
important to the center right N-VA under Bart De WeverÕs leadership. Dandoy (2014) concurs 
with Pauwels (2011) in suggesting that N-VA has benefited from the immigration issue in 
recent years. Coff (2005) and Hepburn (2009; 2011) have more recently argued that 
regionalist parties such as N-VA can combine immigration and nationalism, emphasizing the 
protection of regional identities and of the dominant Ôethnic in-groupÕ that comprises the 
Flemish-speaking community that provides electoral advantages. Building on Coff (2005) 
and Hepburn (2009; 2011), this case study argues that ideologically, N-VA has focused its 
party strategy more on the immigration issue in recent years and has sought to shift itself 
from its previous focus on Flemish nationalism (which implies separation from the Belgian 
state and forming an independent Flemish nation-state). In turn, N-VA has also sought to 
combine the issue of immigration with Flemish nationalism to form a dual party strategy. 
This strategy has enabled the N-VA to appeal not only to voters who are distrustful in light of 
the ongoing 2007Ð2010 political crisis, but also to traditional VB party supporters who 
tended to support separation from Belgium and were concerned about immigration (see Adam 
and Deschouwer, 2016).34 The N-VA has effectively been reborn under leader Bart De Wever, 
who has underscored the importance of immigration and linked this to a Ôcatch-allÕ party 
strategy of Flemish nationalism (see Abts, Poznyak, and Swyngedouw, 2010; Pauwels, 2011; 
Dandoy, 2014).  
In the run-up to the 2010 General Election, N-VAÕs party strategy on immigration also 
focused on emphasizing immigration through linking the issue to the importance of Flemish 
																																																						
34 VB also advocated separation from the Belgian state and forming a separate Flemish community, one that is 
based on ethnic grounds. 
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culture, identity and language. Flemish identity is often seen as being under threat from 
French-speaking Walloons in the North of Belgium, and also from new non-EU immigrant 
groups in Flanders (sees Baycan, 2016). Thus it is likely that this Ôcatch-allÕ party strategy of 
linking immigration with Flemish nationalism and frequently emphasizing immigration was 
electorally fruitful for N-VA, enabling the party to appeal to a wider range of voters and also 
to attract a large section of VBÕs core electorate (see Pauwels, 2011).  
In contrast to N-VA, VBÕs focus on immigration has tended to include frequent 
ideological rhetoric that combines xenophobia with hostility towards ethnic out-groups (see 
Pauwels, 2011; Mudde, 2007). In recent years this xenophobic rhetoric has been particularly 
aimed against Islam, and the perception that ÔIslamizationÕ is undermining the Flemish 
community in Flanders (see Swyngedouw, et al. 2009; Swyngedouw and Billiet, 2009; 
Swyngedouw, et al. 2007; Mudde, 2007). From a spatial perspective and in line with the 
empirical findings in Chapter 5, it is conceivable that VBÕs focus on immigration was too 
hostile and unpalatable for voters during the 2010 election (see Baycan, 2016; Adam and 
Deschouwer, 2016), and that N-VAÕs emphasis on immigration was a better electoral strategy 
than VBÕs narrow spatial focus on anti-immigrant positions. However, the unpalatable nature 
of VB does not fully explain how the center right N-VA party capitalized from emphasizing 
immigration and restricted their electoral success. It is therefore important to factor in the 
impact of internal party system factors such as the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ policy, 35  which 
complements the story of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ on the immigration issue in this case study.
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Notes: * = Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) contested the 2007 elections together, receiving 18.51% of the 
votes and 30 seats. No meaningful change in the seat share between the 2010 and 2007 elections could be calculated from available data sources. 
  N/A= Missing data 
Sources: Change in Party Performance Dataset (AuthorÕs own figures) and http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/belgium/ 
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Emphasis on Immigration and the ÔCordon sanitaireÕ policy  
The Belgian case study argues that institutional procedures such as the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ 
policy must be taken into account when examining the electoral success of the center right N-
VA and the electoral decline of the far right VB at the 2010 election. The Ôcordon sanitaireÕ 
policy was implemented in Belgian politics in the 1980s as a strategy to counteract the 
electoral threat of VB and to halt the partyÕs sudden rise. Mainstream Belgian political parties 
joined forces to exclude VB from any future coalition government, and this strategy has 
continued in the 21st century. The political science literature has pointed to the importance of 
Ôsupply-sideÕ factors such as the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ and containment policy, which has reduced 
VBÕs electoral potential and made it largely obsolete in recent years (see Pauwels, 2011; Van 
Heerden et al., 2013; Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2009; Rummens and Abts, 2009; Art, 
2007). The Ôcordon sanitaireÕ policy has arguably contributed to the electoral decline of VB 
and provided N-VA with a distinct electoral opportunity to profit from making the 
immigration issue more ÔvisibleÕ to voters.  
Pauwels (2011) has demonstrated the powerful effect of the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ policy 
in consigning VB to permanent opposition, effectively making the party irrelevant amongst 
voters (see Van der Eijck and Franklin, 2009: p. 103). Departing from PauwelsÕ (2011) 
analysis alongside Rummens and Abts (2009), this case study provides a more original line of 
argumentation, in arguing that a co-optation strategy on the immigration issue has taken 
place, in tandem with the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ policy. Thus, non-incumbent center right parties 
such as N-VA have been able to make the immigration issue more ÔvisibleÕ to voters in their 
electoral strategy. At the same time, N-VA has capitalized on the issue of immigration, over 
which VB has often claimed ownership, through linking it to Flemish nationalism and the 
preservation of Flemish culture over immigrant groups (see Pauwels, 2011). 
From a spatial perspective, N-VA has also tended not to adopt a hardline stance on 
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immigration and has held a more moderate party strategy (Pauwels, 2011). In line with 
Odmalm and BaleÕs (2015) rationale for center right party electoral strategies on immigration, 
this case study argues that N-VA were able to emphasize immigration strategically. Crucially, 
they strategically linked the immigration issue with the building of an independent Flemish 
nation-state, which arguably resonated with a large proportion of voters at the 2010 election 
in Flanders. N-VAÕs broad electoral appeal also potentially enabled them to effectively crowd 
out the competing center right nationalist party LDD on the issue and become the largest 
party in Flanders at this election. Thus, this electoral strategy also conceivably offered 
disaffected VB supporters a more Ôcatch-allÕ party for whom they could vote, rather than a 
populist radical right party such as VB that adopted hardline anti-immigrant positions and 
had become seen as largely irrelevant by voters (see Van der Eijck and Franklin, 2009) due to 
the long-term impact of the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ. In effect, Ôstrategic emphasisÕ on immigration 
combined with Ôsupply-sideÕ factors such as the Ôcordon sanitaireÕ and anti-incumbency 
conditions allowed the ÔchallengerÕ N-VA to take the immigration issue away from the far 













Situation II: Center Right and Populist Radical Right both achieve Electoral Success 
The Netherlands 
Election Background 
The Dutch case study provides an investigation of the second party competition situation, in 
examining how both the center right PeopleÕs Party for Freedom for Democracy (VVD) and 
the populist radical right Freedom Party (PVV) emphasized the immigration issue and both 
achieved electoral success at the 2010 Dutch General Election. The 2010 Dutch General 
Election took place after the collapse of Prime Minister Jan-Peter BalkenendeÕs fourth 
government, which comprised a coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDA), Labour 
(PvdA) and the Christian Union (CU) parties. An election was triggered after a dispute 
between withdrawing Dutch troops from Afghanistan. The coalition agreement had 
previously been unstable, with disputes regularly occurring over issues such as austerity and 
labor market policy (see Van Kessel, 2010).  
Firstly, the 2010 election was marked by patterns of high electoral volatility 
(conditions of anti-incumbency), with the center right incumbent CDA under Prime Minister 
Balkenende suffering a landmark loss (-13%) and losing 20 seats in the House of 
Representatives. CDAÕ s final tally of seats came to 21 out of 150 seats in the House of 
Representatives. To a lesser extent, the two other incumbent parties, the center left PvdA (-
2%) and the center right CU (-1%) also performed electorally worse. This has continued a 
trend of Ôpartisan dealignmentÕ in the Dutch political system across the 21st century, with 
some scholars referring to the Netherlands as having the highest level of voter volatility in 
Western Europe (see Mair, 2008; Van Kessel, 2010). Table 7.5 outlines the Dutch electoral 
picture and key statistics from 2006Ð2010 that underline party competition in this economic 
context. Secondly and more importantly, these conditions of electoral volatility arguably 
provided specific electoral opportunities for non-incumbent center right parties, such as VVD 
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who increased their vote share by 9% and gained nine seats (31 seats overall out of 150 in the 
House of Representatives). The VVD managed to gain one more seat than PvdA (30 seats 
overall) and thus became the largest party in the Netherlands, also finishing above the CDA 
(21 seats overall). Thirdly, the populist radical right party PVV under their charismatic leader 
Geert Wilders performed well (+10) and became the third largest party in the Netherlands 



























Table 7.5: Dutch Case Study (2010Ð2006) 
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Context of the Immigration issue 
Since the start of the 21st century, the salience of the immigration issue has increased in the 
manifestos of Dutch political parties (see Van Heerden et al., 2013; Van Kersbergen and 
Krouwel, 2008). Recent research has demonstrated that the center right party VVD has 
historical precedence on the immigration issue, having previously adopted a co-optation 
strategy on the immigration issue in reaction to List Pim FortuynÕs electoral success in the 
early 2000s (Van Heerden et al., 2013). The 2010 Dutch election was dominated by a number 
of socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. Socio-economic issues included labor market 
reforms and austerity in the wake of the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. Key socio-
cultural issues comprised immigrant integration (Aarts et al., 2010). However, issues such as 
European Union integration played little part in the Dutch election campaign (Van Kessel, 
2010). Unsurprisingly, immigration was an important issue for the populist radical right PVV 
at the 2010 election; however the center right VVD under leader Mark Rutte also campaigned 
on this issue heavily at the election as well.  
Survey research has shown how both VVD and PVV voters stated that immigrant 
integration was the Ômost important problem facing the NetherlandsÕ in the 2010 General 
Election. Both proportions were considerably smaller for voters that voted for the incumbent 
parties CDA, PvdA and CU (see Aarts et al., 2010) and demonstrate that both PVV and 
VVDÕs electorates were comprised of voters who perceived immigration as a problem that 
concerned the future of Dutch society. The key differences on immigration between VVD and 
PVV are located on the spatial dimension. The radical right PVV tended to adopt more 
hardline stances on immigration (anti-immigrant sentiment) focusing on the problem posed 
by Islam to the Netherlands. In contrast, the center right VVD has focused on a more 
moderate and ideologically palatable party strategy on the issue (see Van Kessel, 2010; Van 
Heerden et al., 2013), outlining restrictions on immigration, but not based around the PVVÕs 
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politics of race and incompatibility of Islam in Dutch society. This has arguably given VVD a 
broader base of voters to appeal to in Dutch politics. 
	
ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ on Immigration 
Through a content analysis of party programmes, Van Heerden et al. (2013) have 
demonstrated that under leader Mark Rutte, VVD placed more issue salience on the 
immigration issue in their party manifesto at the 2010 election, compared to the 2006 
election. Furthermore, VVD placed considerably more emphasis on immigration than 
incumbent parties did (CDA, CU and PvdA) in mentioning the issue much more frequently. 
This is likely to have attracted the attention of Dutch voters at the 2010 election, combined 
with the VVDÕs non-incumbency status. This further underlines how VVD were the closest 
party to the far right PVV on the salience of immigration. This case study builds on the Van 
Heerden et al. (2013) study in showing similar effects, in how the center right VVD has 
sought to challenge the radical right PVVÕs issue ownership on the immigration issue, 
through emphasizing the issue. 
Figure 7.1 depicts party competition dynamics on immigration emphasis in the 
Netherlands and the second party competition situation. The figure depicts emphasis on 
immigration by a number of parties. Drawing on the 2007/08 WhitefieldÐRohrschneider 
expert survey, the figure again models the salience of immigration (1Ð7 scale). Generally 
speaking, the three incumbent parties (CDAÐ 4.0; CUÐ 4.4 and PvdAÐ 4.5) placed lower 
emphasis on the immigration issue than the nearest center right party VVD. Moreover, 
VVDÕs emphasis on immigration (5.2) further demonstrates that the center right party made 
immigration an important part of their strategy, compared to the three incumbent parties. As 
befits a populist radical right party, PVVÕs emphasis on immigration (7.0) underlined how 
this issue was of paramount importance to the partyÕs strategy and still featured more heavily 
than VVDÕs. This is not surprising however as WildersÕ party has focused heavily on this 
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issue in previous elections and this issue has come to dominate their party strategy (see 
Mudde, 2007). The important point that needs to be made here is the party strategy of the 
center right VVD. Not only were more voters likely to vote for the VVD based on their 
perceived competence on socio-economic issues such as austerity and handling the economy, 
but at the same time, VVD sought to frame and make the immigration issue more ÔvisibleÕ to 
voters at the 2010 election (see Aarts et al., 2010). Underscoring immigration and tying this 
issue to a more moderate center right party strategy is likely to have enabled VVD to tap into 
voters who were concerned about immigration, but cautious of voting for the populist radical 
right PVV due to their unpalatable ideology. Conceivably, this framing and emphasis on the 
issue arguably provided electoral payoffs for VVD and may have even enabled the party to 
restrict the electoral success of the insurgent PVV under Wilders. 
 Therefore, the primary argument in the Dutch case study is about the dynamics on 
immigration within a multiparty system and how issue emphasis on immigration matters in 
explaining the electoral downturn of incumbent center right parties (CDA) in this economic 
context of voter volatility. Both the center right VVD under leader Mark Rutte and the 
populist radical right PVV gained substantially from anti-incumbency conditions (anti-
incumbency voting for center right and left parties). Clearly, the 2010 Eurozone crisis played 
a significant role in explaining these incumbency-punishment patterns. However, the primary 
theoretical argument here is about how the non-incumbent center right VVD was able to 
realize the electoral importance of emphasizing immigration in their party strategy and 
differentiate themselves from the CU, CDA and PvdA incumbents in emphasizing the issue 
more at the 2010 election. Evidently, WildersÕ PVV party benefited considerably from its 
anti-Islam rhetoric and continued emphasis on immigration amongst a core set of disaffected 
voters, in achieving a landmark electoral result. It is conceivable though that without VVDÕs 
playing up of the immigration issue, the PVV party under Wilders may have gained even 
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more voters at the 2010 General Election. Though the PVV created a Ôpolitical earthquakeÕ in 
the Netherlands at this election, the Dutch political system is built on compromise. 
Constitutionally, coalition governments are the norm, making it extremely difficult for any 
one party, particularly a populist radical right party, to govern alone. The best outcome they 
can often hope for is therefore to enter into a coalition government with the approval of 
established mainstream parties. Government formation after the election took 127 days, with 
a right-wing coalition finally being formed between the two center right parties, VVD and 
CDA, with the PVV making an ÔinformalÕ agreement to support the center right-led 
government (see Van Kessel, 2010; Lijphart, 2012). 
	
Situation III(i): Populist Radical Right Party Electoral Success 
Finland 
Election Background 
By comparison with the first two case studies, the case study of Finnish center right partiesÕ 
strategies on immigration offers a more nuanced variation of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ. This case 
study features a case that coincided with a remarkable anti-incumbency vote at the 2011 
Finnish national parliamentary election. It investigates the third situation in the Ôstrategic 
emphasisÕ theoretical framework, demonstrating two key conditions, namely how center right 
parties that (i) were incumbents and (ii) did not emphasize the immigration issue lost out 
electorally in the context of economic bad times. This case study shows that these two 
conditions are interlinked and arguably allowed the far right Finns Party (PS) to emphasize 
immigration, thus enabling their message to cut across a large proportion of disaffected 
Finnish voters at the 2011 Finnish national parliamentary election.  
Since the 2007 national parliamentary elections, Finland had been governed by a 
center right coalition between the National Coalition Party (KOK), the Centre Party (KESK), 
with the support of the Green League (VIHR) and the Swedish PeopleÕs Party (SFP). The 
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2011 Finnish election was a historic one, with the populist radical right party PS winning 
19% of the votes and the mainstream parties on the center right and left both losing out in the 
Eduskunta (Finnish Parliament). Table 7.6 outlines the Finnish electoral picture and key 
statistics from 2007Ð2011 that underline party competition in this economic context. The PS 
party was able to benefit electorally from these wide patterns of electoral volatility, by 
placing ÔhighÕ salience on the immigration issue, gaining 34 seats (39 seats out of 200 in the 
Eduskunta) at the 2011 Finnish national parliamentary election. This case study enables us to 
examine how the incumbent center right coalition, especially the center right KESK, lost out 
significantly at the same election, seeing a substantial reduction in their vote share (-7%) and 
losing 16 seats. KESKÕs final seat tally came to 35 out of 200 seats in the Eduskunta. The 
National Coalition Party (KOK) which was also a member of the KESK coalition did not 
emphasize immigration either and lost out electorally, losing six seats (44 seats out of 200). 
	
ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ on Immigration 
The context of the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election took place in the backdrop of the 
unfolding Eurozone crisis and subsequent bail-out measures that the Finnish government was 
involved in. The EU issue was an important issue at the 2011 election, in part fostering 
support for the far right PS party and antipathy for the center right governing coalition 
amongst Finnish voters. This case study acknowledges that the backdrop of the EU bail-outs 
played an important role, but makes an original contribution to the literature in arguing that 
the Finnish literature has tended to downplay (see Raunio, 2011) the role of the immigration 
issue, leading to patterns of electoral volatility (anti-incumbency vote) and creating fertile 
conditions for the populist radical right party PS to prosper.  
 In recent years, the immigration issue has gained significant traction in Finland 
amongst voters (see Rahkonen, 2011). Moreover, insurgent parties such as the populist 
radical right PS party have focused heavily on the issue. The PS has weaved a populist 
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narrative about the out-of-touch mainstream parties in Finland not representing traditional 
Finnish voters (Raunio, 2011). Mainstream parties by and large in Finland have tended not to 
engage with the immigration issue. This opening up of issue ÔspaceÕ has arguably provided 
distinct electoral opportunities for PS to benefit, particularly in the context of greater voter 
volatility. The Finnish case study is graphically represented in the party competition model in 
Figure 7.1. The Finnish case study demonstrates how the incumbent center right parties 
(KESK and KOK) did not emphasize immigration (3.7 and 3.8 respectively), thus leaving 
competition and ÔspaceÕ open on this dimension for the populist radical right PS party to 
emphasize (6.3) in their party strategy. In line with the third situation of party competition, 
this study argues that this large issue ÔspaceÕ and absence of the incumbent center right on 
immigration is crucial in explaining how the far right PS could profit electorally and claim 
the immigration issue at this election. Thus, the central argument in the Finnish case study is 
that through Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, the populist radical right party PS has been able to bring 
immigration narratives into the mainstream of political debate in Finland. At the same time, 
other mainstream parties on both the left and right alike have failed to articulate a clear 
strategy on immigration, according to Rahkonen (2011: pp. 433Ð434). A notable example of 
this are the incumbent center right parties, led by Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi, which 
failed to address the immigration issue, either downplaying it by focusing on more socio-
economic issues, or remaining ÔsilentÕ at the recent 2011 parliamentary election. According to 
Puuronen (2011), not featuring immigration in its party strategy impacted on the National 
Coalition PartyÕs electoral fortunes in 2011. Further, by remaining ÔsilentÕ on this issue, 
KESK effectively allowed PS to emphasize and articulate the immigration issue to a wide 
section of voters. Similarly, the center right KOK largely remained ÔsilentÕ on immigration, 
focusing on issues such as the economy instead. This is likely to have contributed to their 
substantial electoral downfall in 2011, culminating in PS effectively assuming ownership of 
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the immigration issue in Finnish politics. 
	
Table 7.6: Finnish Case Study (2011Ð2007) 
Sources: Change in Party Performance Dataset (AuthorÕs own figures) and 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/finland/ 
	
PS Party Strategy: ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ 
From a spatial perspective, scholars such as Sundberg (2011) have argued that the PS party 
made significant use of the fear felt by ordinary Finnish voters about the immigration issue. 
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increasing and immigrants were threatening the traditions of Nordic life (see Tervonen-
Gonalves and Oinonen 2012; Puuronen 2011: pp. 204Ð205). Recent analysis of the PS 
partyÕs policy positions has also shown how at the 2011 Finnish national election, the populist 
radical right party was heavily focused on depicting immigrants as undermining Finnish 
culture and national identity (see Sundberg, 2011). However, in contrast to Sundberg, this 
case provides a more nuanced explanation around issue salience, in arguing that the PS party 
focused much more on issue salience and getting this issue across to ordinary Finnish voters. 
Under its charismatic leader Timo Soini, PS still adopted hardline stances on 
immigration, but sought to tone down its rhetoric on anti-immigrant positions, by placing 
much more emphasis on the importance of protecting Finnish culture and language (see 
Raunio, 2012; Borg, 2012). Raunio (2012: p. 18) notes that PS placed considerably more 
emphasis on ÔFinnishnessÕ and on the protection of national identity than on other issues. 
Arguably, this provided an electorally successful party strategy for PS to emphasize the 
immigration issue, which mainstream parties such as KESK and KOK tended to ÔdownplayÕ. 
Thus, the PS party focused on frequently mentioning the immigration issue and brought this 
issue into public discourse at the 2011 national election, which likely proved to be an 
electorally successful party strategy (see Puuronen 2011; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009; 
Keskinen 2014). PS also arguably benefited from feelings of dissatisfaction amongst working 
class voters at the perceived absence of the incumbent center right led coalition on the 
immigration issue (see Pyrhnen 2015; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori, 2009: pp. 10Ð11). At the 
same time, declining economic conditions and the continuation of the Eurozone crisis also 
likely led to greater voter volatility in Finland and widespread anti-incumbency effects, with 
the punishment of the center right incumbents. 
 Pyrhnen (2015) argues that the populist radical right PS has been effective not only 
in ÔowningÕ immigration, but in providing a vehicle for dissatisfied working class voters. 
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Thus, by KESK and KOK not emphasizing immigration and with conditions of greater voter 
volatility (anti-incumbency effects), this is likely to have further enabled the PS party to 
make substantial electoral gains at the 2011 election. This arguably allowed PS to become 
more associated with the immigration issue amongst voters, ÔowningÕ it from incumbent 
center right parties that vacated this issue dimension and did not emphasize it at this election. 
Though the populist radical right PS achieved a landmark electoral result at the 2011 election 
and outperformed mainstream center right and left parties, the leader of the party Timo Soini 
refused to enter into coalition negotiations. Thus, a coalition government was formed of six 
parties. The center right KOK headed up the coalition with the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) and featured the support of the Left Alliance (VAS), the Green League (VIHR), the 
Swedish PeopleÕs Party (SFP) and the Christian Democrats (KD). 
	
Situation III(ii): Anti-Incumbency Effects 
France 
Election Background 
The fourth and final case of the 2012 French Legislative Election comprises a modification of 
the third situation outlined in the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ (see Table 
7.1). The French case (2007Ð2012) provides a more fine-grained investigation of the key 
patterns that underline competition on the immigration issue between the center right and 
populist radical right party families. Most significantly, the French case demonstrates that 
when emphasizing and making the immigration issue an important one, center right party 
incumbency (conditions of anti-incumbency) provided electoral restrictions for this party 
family. At the same time, these patterns of electoral volatility and protest voting arguably 
enabled the far right Front National (FN) to prosper electorally from emphasizing the 
immigration issue at the expense of the incumbent center right UMP during the economic 
crisis context. Table 7.7 outlines the French electoral picture and key statistics from 2007Ð
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2012 that underline party competition in this economic context. 
In the 2012 French national parliamentary election, the incumbent center right UMP 
emphasized immigration, yet still performed electorally poorly. Under leader Jean-Franois 
Cop, UMPÕs vote share decreased by around 8% from the previous election in 2007, with 
the party losing 119 seats in the National Assembly and only holding 194 out of 577 seats in 
the National Assembly. Although the party emphasized the immigration issue, this strategy 
did not prove electorally successful. Recent research (Mondon, 2013; 2014) has suggested 
that under French President Nicolas Sarkozy, UMP attempted to emphasize the immigration 
issue more and claim it from the Front National (FN). However, this electoral strategy had a 
limited effect and it appears that the partyÕs incumbency status, coinciding with the effects of 
the Eurozone crisis arguably played a significant role in the partyÕs electoral decline during 
this period (see Kuhn and Murray, 2012). The Socialist Party (PS) led by Jean-Marc Ayrault 
clearly benefited from the UMPÕs electoral slide in 2012 and wider patterns of electoral 
volatility. The PS Party saw its seat share increase by 94 and held 280 out of 577 seats in the 
National Assembly. Whist PS fell short of the 289 majority required governing alone, they 
still became the largest party in the French National Assembly. The FN led by Marine Le Pen 
increased their vote share by 4% and placed ÔhighÕ emphasis on immigration. Nonetheless, 
the results for the FN at this election constitute relative, rather than absolute electoral success. 
Electoral and institutional restrictions meant that the partyÕs vote share was not proportionally 
distributed into seats and the FN only won two seats in 2012 in the French National Assembly 








Table 7.7: French Case Study (2012Ð2007) 
Source: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/france/  
Notes: Only second round seat distributions are presented.  
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electoral opportunities for parties on the right-wing of the political spectrum in France (see 
Mondon, 2014; 2013). A simplified party competition model is outlined in Figure 7.1 for the 
French case and depicts the radical right FN emphasizing immigration (6.9) and was a key 
party strategy at the 2012 national parliamentary election. The incumbent center right UMP 
also placed considerably more emphasis on the issue (5.3) compared to the center left PS 
(4.3) and shows the importance of immigration to the UMPÕs party strategy at this election. A 
number of French political commentators have argued that the electoral strategy of 
emphasizing immigration (ÔvisibilityÕ) was adopted initially by Sarkozy in the 2007 French 
presidential election, focusing on key themes of national identity and sovereignty in order to 
reduce the electoral threat posed by Jean-Marie Le Pen and the FN (see Evans and Ivaldi, 
2007; Mondon, 2013). Mondon (2013) argues whilst this electoral strategy proved to be 
successful at the 2007 National parliamentary election, but not at the 2012 election, and he is 
among those scholars who argue that a paradoxical outcome of UMPÕs electoral strategy has 
been to bring the discourse of the FN into the mainstream of French politics, thereby 
legitimizing the FN amongst the French electorate. 
From recent research (Mondon, 2013; 2014), it seems that SarkozyÕs rightward shift on 
immigration between 2007 and 2012 arguably brought the discourse of the Front National 
into the mainstream of French politics. However, Ôstrategic emphasisÕ on immigration 
required an effective politician to wield this party strategy, and Marine Le Pen arguably 
provided this vehicle. She was elected leader of the FN on 16 January 2011, taking over from 
her father Jean-Marie Le Pen, who had led the party for over three decades. Since 2011, 
Marine Le Pen has undertaken a series of internal party reforms, seeking to rebrand the image 
and core ideology of the FN in ways that could make it more appealing to the French 
electorate (Ivaldi, 2012; Goodwin, 2014).  
Marine Le PenÕs ideological revamping of the FN sought to mark a clear departure from 
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the ideology propounded by her father. From a spatial perspective, Marine Le Pen has also 
sought to tone down the partyÕs anti-immigration rhetoric (see Mondon, 2014). Immigration 
is still central to the ideology of the FN Party, but Marine Le Pen has sought strategically to 
link the issue with a populist discourse that has resonated with the French electorate, 
particularly amongst the disaffected working classes (Ivaldi, 2012; Mondon, 2014). Le Pen 
has linked immigration with the undermining of the French state and national sovereignty, in 
particular emphasizing the problem that Islam poses to French society. She has also sought to 
link the discourse of immigration to the Eurozone crisis and the failure of the EU project to 
achieve reform. The French case also provides a more nuanced case in arguing that when 
center right parties are in government, conditions of anti-incumbency can also swamp a focus 
on immigration. The economy was also a key issue at the 2012 French legislative election, 
with the Eurozone crisis culminating in France experiencing higher levels of unemployment 
and declining GDP (Kuhn and Murray, 2013).  
Scholars have highlighted the importance of economic factors and how economic 
variables such as unemployment can act as key determinants in leading to the electoral 
punishment of incumbents (see Fauvelle-Aymar et al., 2011; Kuhn and Murray, 2013). 
Arguably, higher levels of unemployment are likely to have depressed the vote considerably 
for the incumbent UMP, with voters holding them accountable for the declining state of the 
French economy at the 2012 legislative election (Caramani et al., 2012). Caramani et al. 
(2012) also argue that a similar anti-incumbent process mechanism occurred a few months 
earlier at the 2012 French Presidential election, where the center right incumbent Nicolas 
Sarkozy was defeated by the PS candidate Franois Hollande, further highlighting patterns of 
greater voter volatility. The anti-incumbency effect in the French Presidential election was 
unprecedented and Sarkozy was the first incumbent President in over thirty years not to win a 
second term. This anti-incumbency effect is an important condition as it highlights that in 
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times of economic crisis, there are electoral restrictions to emphasizing immigration for 
center right parties, particularly for incumbent center right parties such as UMP. Evidently, 
the UMPÕs association with being an incumbent party in the context of the Eurozone crisis 
(higher levels of unemployment) is likely to have sealed their fate at the 2012 Legislative 
election and the strategy of playing up the immigration issue did not pay off. Therefore, this 
anti-incumbency context is likely to have provided a distinct opportunity for populist radical 
right parties such as the Front National to prosper electorally, by emphasizing immigration 
and benefiting from patterns of voter volatility in the context of the ongoing Eurozone crisis. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
	
In line with the theoretical framework of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, this chapter examined different 
patterns that illustrated the electoral success of specific center right parties during the context 
of greater voter volatility. The case studies in this chapter provide added value to the 
statistical models in Chapter 5, through showing more nuanced dynamics on competition 
between center right and populist radical right parties across Europe in national parliamentary 
elections. These cases outlined the importance of party competition dynamics and party-level 
factors in explaining the different processes of the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theory. The case 
studies also showed that the extent of center right party electoral success rested largely on 
two different conditions (namely an incumbencyÐpunishment effect and the emphasis of 
ÔchallengerÕ center right parties on the immigration issue). These findings have important 
implications for the nature of contemporary party politics in Europe. 
	
IncumbencyÐpunishment 
The case studies in this chapter showed important patterns of electoral volatility in the 
context of economic crisis, with voters less aligned to parties, and thus more prone to punish 
poorly performing incumbents. Two main generalizable lessons can be drawn from these four 
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case studies. Firstly, the case studies demonstrated the key variable of incumbencyÐ
punishment, in showing that incumbent center right parties tended to be punished electorally. 
This in turn allowed the far right to benefit from this pattern of electoral volatility in the crisis 
period. Whilst the raison d'tre of populist radical right parties is their focus on immigration, 
the Finnish case study showed that when incumbent center right parties fail to tap into and 
mobilize voters on this issue, this created fertile conditions for the populist radical right to 
achieve electoral success in this economic context. The French cases showed that even when 
incumbent center right parties emphasized and competed on the immigration issue, they were 
punished electorally, due to an anti-incumbency effect (declining economic conditions). This 
finding reinforces the condition of incumbency-punishment that was found in Chapter 5 of 
the dissertation and further underscores the importance of anti-incumbency effects in this 
economic context. 
	
Center Right ÔChallengerÕ Parties 
Secondly and interrelated, the case studies demonstrated that specific types of center right 
parties, namely ÔchallengerÕ center right parties that were in opposition, were electorally 
resilient. The Belgian and Dutch case studies showed that competing on and emphasizing the 
immigration issue provided electoral dividends for non-incumbent center right parties. Center 
right parties that were in opposition (N-VA in Belgium and VVD in the Netherlands) during 
economic downturns were not tainted by anti-incumbency effects and conceivably had more 
freedom to compete on the immigration issue with populist radical right parties. This is a 
much more nuanced finding and complements the findings from Chapter 5 in making an 
important distinction between types of center right parties, most notably ÔincumbentÕ and 
ÔchallengerÕ center right parties that characterize varying levels of volatility in economic 
downturns. These findings are also important as they suggest that the frequency of 
mentioning the immigration issue amongst voters and the amount of coverage the issue 
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gained may have mattered more than the actual policy positions on immigration in explaining 
electoral success for ÔchallengerÕ center right parties.  
 From a more analytical perspective, the case studies also show that two specific 
conditions exist, that conform to both ÔsufficientÕ and ÔnecessaryÕ conditions of center right 
party electoral success. A sufficient condition of center right party electoral success is the 
ability of these parties to emphasize immigration in this economic context. However, the 
ÔtypeÕ of center right party matters particularly in this economic context, with ÔchallengerÕ 
center right parties (those not in government) prospering markedly from this strategy. In 
contrast, incumbent center right parties did not benefit from such a strategy, in line with anti-
incumbency effects. These findings provide an important departure from the main empirical 
findings in Chapter 6, where incumbent center right parties prospered electorally in more 
economically prosperous times. Therefore, a key contribution of this case study chapter is in 
outlining a necessary condition of center right party electoral success in this economic 
context, in the form of ÔchallengerÕ center right parties that compete on and emphasize 
immigration. Though these cases are not definitive, they nonetheless show that non-
incumbent center right parties were the main electoral beneficiaries in the context of greater 
voter volatility. The next and final chapter contextualizes the dissertationÕs main empirical 
findings, examining whether there is a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in 21st century 
European politics for center right parties that place Ôstrategic emphasisÕ on immigration, and 









The central research question of this dissertation set out to further our knowledge by 
exploring party competition on the immigration issue between populist radical right and 
center right parties in the 21st century across Europe. The dissertation focused on mainstream 
center right parties as opposed to center left parties for two primary reasons. Firstly, center 
right parties were found to be closer spatially on the immigration issue than center left parties 
were. Secondly, center right parties share a number of ideological similarities with populist 
radical right parties, on issues such as keeping taxation low, maintaining law and order 
alongside national security that is likely to appeal to a core base of the center right electorate. 
These two factors provided the rationale for focusing on both party families in this 
dissertation. 
The dissertation makes an original theoretical contribution to knowledge in arguing 
that mainstream center right parties are best placed to compete with the radical right on the 
immigration issue and prosper electorally. Empirically, the dissertation shows comparatively 
at the aggregate level, that center right parties have the capacity to perform better electorally 
than populist radical right parties. This effect was particularly surprising in times of economic 
crisis but the effect was more pronounced in economic good times. This final section revisits 
the key findings of the three main empirical chapters, outlining the main contributions that 
the dissertation makes to the existing literature on party competition and on the overall 
project of the center right in Europe. This conclusion also highlights areas within these fields 







Center Right Party ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ on Immigration 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation first set out to examine whether populist radical right parties 
benefited electorally from the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis, since economic downturns are 
widely believed to precipitate a rise in support for such parties at the expense of mainstream 
parties, due to patterns of electoral volatility and anti-incumbency effects. The empirical 
relationship between the economic crisis and electoral support was shown to vary 
considerably across Europe, and it appeared that the populist radical right did not do as well 
as expected. Chapter 1 showed that center right parties performed better electorally than both 
populist radical right and particularly center left parties did during the crisis, and argued that 
the ÔstrategicÕ choices that center right parties made on the immigration issue was likely to be 
an important factor in this outcome. The central research question of this dissertation is 
generated: it sought to further our understanding of competition on the immigration issue 
between populist radical right and center right parties, primarily in how center right parties 
are able to exploit this issue and benefit electorally in diverse economic contexts. The 
primary theoretical story in this dissertation argues that the electoral success of center right 
parties depends on how far they can emphasize the immigration issue. Moreover, how far 
they succeed in doing this depends largely on the emphasis placed on immigration, alongside 
factors such as incumbency and different economic contexts, both during times of economic 
crisis, and times of economic stability. Chapter 2 then drew on the contemporary political 
science literature in providing concrete classifications for both party families, whilst outlining 
some ideological similarities and differences between both party families on the immigration 
issue. 
Chapter 3 exposed the lack of scholarly research on how populist radical right and 
center right parties compete on the immigration issue and how this party competition has 
affected their electoral fortunes. This chapter argued two main points: that the academic 
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literature has often neglected the role that the immigration issue can play in determining party 
competition and the electoral success that center right parties enjoy as a result (see Bale, 
2008; Mudde, 2014c; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-Prado, 2015). Secondly, the academic 
literature has tended to examine issue positions/proximity models (see Van der Brug et al., 
2005; Mudde, 2010; Pardos-Prado, 2015; Bale, 2008) in investigating competition between 
both party families. It follows that less research has focused on issue salience and the 
strategic framing of the immigration issue that center right parties have the capacity to 
provide on this issue dimension. From this lacuna in the political science literature, the 
dissertation outlined and tested a novel theory of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ in Chapter 4, which 
argued that center right parties are much more dynamic in their strategy on the immigration 
issue than we might think. My theory of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ argued that the immigration 
issue is not solely an issue which populist radical right parties ÔownÕ, but one from which 
center right parties can prosper electorally in the 21st century. The theory then offered an 
analysis of the relative electoral success of center right parties in two different economic 
contexts, suggesting a rationale for why they performed better than both populist radical right 
and center left parties when emphasizing Ð as opposed to outlining hardline positions on Ð the 
immigration issue. The theoretical framework also outlined a simple dynamic game of party 
competition, in showing that there were three main situations that underlined party 
competition between the center right and radical right, particularly in the 2008Ð2013 
economic crisis context. 
	
Center Right Party Electoral Resilience 
Whilst immigration is traditionally viewed as an issue which the populist radical right tends 
to profit from electorally and claim issue ownership over, this dissertation shows that this is 
not the case. Most significantly, center right parties that emphasized the immigration issue 
tended to perform better electorally than populist radical right parties, particularly in the 
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context of economic good times. Chapters 5 and 6 set out my original contribution to 
knowledge in two different economic contexts: it demonstrated through a series of empirical 
findings that when emphasizing the immigration issue, center right parties tended to perform 
better electorally than populist radical right parties, both in times of economic crisis (2008Ð
2013) and particularly in the period of relative economic prosperity at the outset of the 21st 
century (1999Ð2007). The empirical findings also demonstrated that spatial positions on 
immigration (i.e. more hardline positions on immigration) did not play a particular role in 
explaining center right party electoral success. This was likely due to two main reasons: 
firstly, voters did not know about the specific policies on immigration that the center right 
held; and secondly, voters might not necessarily know the differences in spatial positions on 
immigration policy between the center right and populist radical right (see Odmalm and Bale, 
2015). Instead of spatial positions explaining the center rightÕs electoral success, what 
mattered most was the ÔvisibilityÕ of immigration: frequently mentioning the issue to voters 
proved to be electorally fruitful. 
Chapter 5 showed this effect to be most pronounced during the economic crisis, with 
notable examples of ÔchallengerÕ opposition center right parties performing electorally better 
including the New Flemish Alliance Party (N-VA), the PeopleÕs Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD) in the Netherlands and the UK Conservative Party (CON). The biggest 
electoral losers among populist radical right parties on the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ of 
immigration were the Flemish Interest Party (VB) in Belgium and the Danish PeopleÕs Party 
(DP), who both saw their vote share decrease substantially. Chapter 5 also found general 
patterns of electoral volatility in the economic crisis period, with incumbents on both the 
center right and left losing out markedly. Surprisingly, despite the crisis being perceived as a 
crisis of capitalism, the center right was able to perform well when emphasizing the 
immigration issue during this period. This chapter also showed more nuanced findings, in 
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outlining three different situations that underlined party competition between both party 
families in the crisis period. The statistical models also demonstrated the resilience of the 
center right in performing better in electoral terms when emphasizing the immigration issue 
than center left parties did, both during the 2008Ð2013 economic crisis and at the outset of 
the 21st century. Chapter 5 also demonstrated that center right parties (most notably 
incumbents) that did not particularly emphasize the immigration issue tended to lose out 
electorally in national parliamentary elections and provided opportunities for populist radical 
right parties to benefit electorally. Chapter 6 provided an important illustrative case of the 
Austrian 2002 Legislative Election. This case showed how emphasizing the immigration 
issue played an influential role in explaining center right party electoral success during the 
context of economic good times and how they performed better than the populist radical 
right. 
Chapter 7 drew on the large N comparative findings from Chapter 5 in investigating 
qualitatively different types of party competition situations that were drawn from a Ôuniverse 
of casesÕ and underpin center rightÐpopulist radical right party competition. The four case 
studies were drawn from a Ôuniverse of casesÕ table and demonstrate further how the choices 
that center right parties made on immigration (emphasize v. did not emphasize) affected their 
electoral success across the 2008Ð2013 period, alongside the combined role of incumbency in 
this economic context. Two main generalizable lessons for party competition were drawn 
from the case studies in Chapter 7. Firstly, the case studies demonstrated the key variable of 
incumbencyÐpunishment, in showing that incumbent center right parties (Finland and France) 
tended to be punished electorally and allow populist radical right parties to prosper 
electorally. Thus, in the Finnish case, the Ôissue spaceÕ on salience is left open by mainstream 
parties on the right, thus allowing the far right to claim the immigration issue in times of 
economic crisis. A more nuanced case study was provided in France and showed that there 
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were electoral restrictions for center right parties in economic bad times. The French case 
showed that when center right parties were in government, anti-incumbency effects swamped 
a focus on immigration, with populist radical right parties prospering electorally in the 
context of electoral volatility. 
Secondly and most significantly, the case studies provided a nuanced finding that 
complemented the large N comparative findings from Chapter 5 of the dissertation. Center 
right parties that were in opposition (N-VA in Belgium and VVD in the Netherlands) during 
this economic context were not tainted by anti-incumbency effects and therefore had more 
freedom to compete on the immigration issue with populist radical right parties. This is a 
much more nuanced finding and complements the findings from Chapter 5 in adding another 
dimension to the story of center right party electoral success, particularly for ÔchallengerÕ 
center right parties. 
8.1 Implications for Party Politics 
	
The political scientist Herbert Kitschelt (1995) coined the phrase Ôelectoral winning formulaÕ 
to account for the electoral success achieved by the populist radical right in a number of 
Western European countries in the 1990s through adopting neo-liberal economic positions 
combined with hardline authoritarian positions on issues such as crime, law and order, and 
immigration. Pardos-Prado (2015) also recently demonstrated the importance of spatial 
positions on immigration to an understanding of how center right parties can compete on the 
issue with populist radical right parties. 
The main empirical findings of my dissertation are situated within the party 
competition literature and seek to build primarily on Kitschelt (1995) and Pardos-PradoÕs 
(2015) empirical findings. My dissertation argues that at the aggregate level, there is 
conceivably a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ that focuses on the immigration issue 
cleavage, but departs from KitscheltÕs and Pardos-PradoÕs assertions of the centrality of issue 
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positions. In contrast to Kitschelt, my theoretical argument on immigration is that issue 
salience is of greater importance to this electoral formula than hardline stances. My findings 
show the resilience of center right parties in profiting electorally from strategic emphasis of 
the immigration issue in both economic good and bad times. However, this Ôelectoral winning 
formulaÕ is context dependent and depends on important factors such as (i) incumbency and 
(ii) the degree to which parties emphasize immigration in their party strategies. 
These empirical findings pose a number of implications for the state of contemporary 
liberal democracy across Europe, and make a central contribution to the party politics 
literature about the dynamic nature of center right partiesÕ ÔstrategicÕ choices on the 
immigration issue (see Bale, 2008; Mudde, 2014c; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-Prado, 
2015). From a historical perspective, the project of the center right in Europe has been 
marked by a pragmatic necessity to adapt to significant political change throughout the 20th 
and 21st centuries. The empirical findings in this dissertation contribute towards an 
understanding of the dynamic nature of the center right project, demonstrating that the 
electoral success of center right parties in the 21st century cannot be put down to traditional 
issues such as law and order, the maintenance of social institutions in society and the free 
market economy. Instead, the dissertation demonstrated that the center right did not 
particularly benefit electorally from these traditional Ôbread and butterÕ issues.  
This dissertation has shown how the center right has been able to embrace new issues 
on the socio-cultural issue dimension such as immigration, which have become largely 
associated with parties of the populist radical right, particularly in 21st century Europe. 
Therefore, the central story in this dissertation has not been about the center right benefiting 
electorally from immigration when adopting hardline stances on the issue, or indeed being 
deemed by voters as competent or the best party to deliver on this issue. This dissertation has 
shown throughout that the explanation is much more nuanced. From an electoral perspective, 
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the center right has been able to benefit substantially from emphasizing immigration, through 
making the issue salient and ÔvisibleÕ in the public domain and mentioning it frequently in 
their electoral campaigns. The Belgian and Dutch cases in Chapter 5particularly 
demonstrated this effect. This dissertation makes an important first step in examining the 
electoral resilience of center right parties around the immigration issue and in identifying the 
different ÔtypesÕ of center right parties (ÔchallengersÕ) that succeed in diverse economic 
contexts. Furthermore, ÔdownplayingÕ or not emphasizing this issue proved to be costly, 
particularly for incumbent mainstream center right parties in Finland, and this pattern appears 
to fit in with the existing literature (see Bale et al., 2010). 
There are, however, limitations to the main findings of this dissertation. Firstly, the 
empirical results only cover up to the recent 2008Ð2013 economic crisis. The empirical 
analysis in Chapter 5 contains shortcomings, with two snapshot elections being investigated, 
one during the economic crisis and one before the economic crisis took place in 24 countries 
across Europe. The implications of this are that long-term trends cannot be examined across 
time. However a number of important patterns are found in this time period that shed further 
light on party competition dynamics between center right and populist radical right parties. In 
addition, the findings from Chapter 5 are not generalizable towards analyzing the theory of 
Ôstrategic emphasisÕ in the ongoing migration crisis, from 2015 onwards. Secondly, the theory 
of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ is an aggregate-level model that examines party competition and does 
not include individual-level factors that would enable us further to examine how important 
the immigration issue is in encouraging support for center right or populist radical right 
parties. Furthermore, as the dissertation examines the aggregate level, valence models of 
issue-based voting at the individual level are not directly measured or included. Future 
research should seek to expand out the Ôstrategic emphasisÕ theoretical model and incorporate 
individual and aggregate levels together. 
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Surprisingly, in Chapters 5 and 6 when factoring in the spatial positions of populist 
radical right parties and their electoral performance, populist radical right parties appeared to 
be punished by voters when holding more anti-immigrant positions both during the 2008Ð
2013 economic crisis and at the outset of the 21st century. Therefore, whilst the dissertation 
finds empirical evidence for the success of center right parties that emphasized immigration, 
the case study findings from Chapter 7 prevent the dissertation from making a definitive 
claim that there is a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in European politics. In order fully to 
understand the mechanisms of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ, future research should seek to build on 
these findings. 
8.2 Future Avenues of Research 
	
These limitations of the dissertation therefore provoke three main future avenues of inquiry 
that will further test the theory of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ and help determine whether there 
exists a Ônew electoral winning formulaÕ in 21st century European politics.  
	
Extending the timeframe of ÔStrategic EmphasisÕ 
Firstly, future research should seek to build on these empirical findings in further testing the 
resilience of the center right in the 21st century. The theory of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ can then be 
extended to understanding how center right and radical right parties have sought to place 
ÔhighÕ salience (ÔvisibilityÕ) on the immigration issue during the context of the ongoing 
migration crisis, and the electoral implications of this strategy for center right and populist 
radical right partiesÕ electoral success. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 below show that there has been a 
substantial increase in the salience of immigration amongst citizens across the European 
Union. Most significantly, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show that the salience of immigration 
increased considerably more during the recent migration crisis than it did during the 
economic crisis. The salience of immigration has risen amongst the public, particularly in 
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countries such as the United Kingdom and Hungary, and this suggests that further testing the 
theory of Ôstrategic emphasisÕ in the recent migration crisis period amongst center right and 
radical right parties would enable us to determine further how both party families benefit 
from such a party strategy in a differing political and economic context that spans the 21st 
century. 
	










Center Right Party Definition and The Ideology of Populism 
A second major line of inquiry involves examining the definitional shortcomings surrounding 
the center right party label and better understanding how to classify the center right from a 
comparative perspective, since the termÕs meaning varies considerably across Western and 
Central-Eastern Europe. This would help sharpen researchersÕ understanding of the center 
right party familyÕs approach to the immigration issue. Whilst Chapter 2 outlined how center 
right parties are generally comprised of conservative, Christian democratic and market liberal 
parties, there is a high degree of diversity within this party family that makes it difficult to 
accurately classify. In order to further investigate electoral variations for center right parties, 
future research should seek to disaggregate this party family and examine the electoral 
fortunes of conservative, Christian democratic and market liberal parties interchangeably, 
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particularly in their use of the immigration issue. Furthermore there are a number of center 
right parties who, because they have begun to propound a more populist and nationalist 
rhetoric, may be considered no longer to fall under this party label: most notably, center right 
parties such as Fidesz in Hungary. FideszÕs rhetoric on immigration in recent years is closer 
to that of populist radical right parties than to that of other center right parties (see Rovny and 
Polk, 2016). Thus, future research should seek to reach beyond the Ôpopulist radical rightÕ and 
Ôcenter rightÕ party competition labels, with the current party family labels arguably not 
capturing the core ideology of contemporary right-wing parties accurately. 
A recent landmark study (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) examined the scope of populism 
across Europe and analyzed the variations of right and left-wing populism found in different 
regions. Future research should seek to build on the findings of Kriesi and Pappas (2015) by 
examining further how best to define specific political parties such as Fidesz in Hungary, 
which started off historically as a center right party, but in recent years has shifted more 
towards being considered as a populist radical right party. This may also enable researchers 
to further understand the evolution of the center right party family on the immigration issue 
in the 21st century.  
	
Decline of the Center Left in Europe 
The third main area of inquiry that is generated from the empirical findings of this 
dissertation involves examining in further detail the decline of center left and social 
democratic parties across Europe, and whether there is a causal link with the partyÕs policy 
stances and Ôstrategic emphasisÕ on the immigration issue. Whilst we have witnessed specific 
center right parties performing better electorally in the 21st century, Chapter 1 in particular 
showed that established left-wing parties across Europe suffered an electoral decline during 
the crisis period. Chapter 5 also showed that the center left party family did not significantly 
benefit from emphasizing the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. Figure 8.3 
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depicts this electoral decline for center left parties graphically. Recent analysis by Marquand 
(2015) investigates this significant decline of traditional social democratic parties and notes 
that its root cause extends much further back than the recent economic crisis. Marquand 
(2015) argues that traditional working class voters who would consistently vote for social 
democratic parties across Europe have abandoned these parties.  
Two main explanations are put forward. The first explanation focuses on processes of 
globalization such as technological change, alongside increases in immigration across 
European Union member states which have caused working class voters to feel disaffected 
and under threat. The second explanation argues that social democratic parties across Europe 
have become professionalized party machines, eschewing state ownership in favor of a free 
market economy. Examples of this include the ÔprofessionalizationÕ of the British Labour 
Party, PASOK in Greece, the SPD in Germany, the French Socialists (PS) and Scandinavian 
social democratic parties. Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) in their recent book on UKIP argue 
that this Ôleft behindÕ class of voters can be attributed largely to the Thatcherite period and 
embodies a profound sense of de-alignment in British politics. Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) 
also argue that these disaffected former Labour voters have been swept away by the populist 
and nationalist discourse of UKIP. Therefore, this third main area of inquiry generated from 
the empirical findings of this dissertation would seek further to examine the decline of center 
left and social democratic parties across Europe, and investigate whether this is causally 








Figure 8.3: The Decline of the Left in Europe (Social Democratic PartiesÕ 
weighted share of vote in Western Europe, 1950Ð2015) 
 




This dissertation has sought to provide an original contribution to the party competition 
literature by investigating center right parties electoral success on immigration in two 
different economic contexts. It makes a key claim that immigration is not solely ÔownedÕ by 
the far right, and can also benefit the center right. It has demonstrated that immigration has 
traditionally been an important issue for the center right, one that brings electoral advantages. 
It has also shown that competition between party families has yielded different patterns in 
economic good and bad times that have implications for each familyÕs electoral success. 
Economic bad times create an electoral opportunity for populist radical right parties, with 
patterns of volatility and protest voting through voters punishing incumbent parties on the 
center right and left. Incumbent center right parties were punished electorally during this 
period (most notably in Finland and France). However, a number of ÔchallengerÕ center right 
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parties capitalized on the immigration issue (particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands) and 
benefited in national parliamentary elections. The main argument that this dissertation put 
forward is that populist radical right parties have not performed as well as expected on 
immigration in this economic context, primarily because non-incumbent center right parties 
have capitalized on the issue. A number of center right parties are shown to be electorally 
resilient, matching and even outperforming populist radical right parties in times of economic 
crisis.  
Patterns of party competition in economic good times are qualitatively different, with 
mainstream center right parties having a positive incumbency effect and also benefiting from 
emphasizing the immigration issue. During times of economic prosperity, the far right 
performed worse when emphasizing immigration and their party ideology was arguably less 
receptive towards voters during this electoral period, compared to times of economic crisis. 
Emphasizing immigration enabled center right parties to increase their electoral advantage in 
this economic context, with their incumbency status also aiding the partyÕs electoral fortunes. 
These core empirical findings suggest that there is conceivably a Ônew electoral winning 
formulaÕ in the 21st century that can aid center right partiesÕ election campaigns and 
contribute to their success. A key contribution of this dissertation is to show that center right 
parties across Europe are more dynamic than we think and are electorally resilient on the 
immigration issue. This party family should not just be associated with traditional issues such 
as law and order and creating a strong state, but also with immigration. It follows that the 
salience of immigration has increased in the 21st century, making the issue an important part 
of political contestation across Europe. It is likely that as the issue gains increased 
prominence in the context of the ongoing migration crisis, this will create new dynamics of 
competition between center right, populist radical right and center left parties. This provides 
ample opportunities for further scholarship in contemporary European politics to build on the 
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Appendix A: List of Key Variables 
	
Original Dataset on Change of PartiesÕ Performance in European National 
Parliamentary Elections and WhitefieldÐRohrschneider Dataset 
 
Dependent variables:  
 
Change in electoral performance: Dring, Holger and Philip Manow (2015). Parliaments and 
governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern 




Issue Position (Spatial/Proximity Model) 
 
¡! Anti- Immigration (1= Pro- Immigration, 7= Anti- Immigration) (Reverse coded) 
¡! EU Integration: Opposition (1= Support, 7= Oppose) (Reverse coded) 
¡! Pro- Welfare (1= Universal, 7= Means-tested) 
¡! Pro- Market Economy: (1= Against Markets, 7= Pro Market)  
Issue Salience (Salience Model) 
 
¡! Immigration (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important) 
¡! Welfare (1= Not Important, 7= Very Important) 










1= Incumbent Party; 0= Non-Incumbent: World Bank Data, Source: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/DPI2012.dta 
 




Change in Unemployment (2008Ð2012): World Bank Data, Source: 
www.worldbank.org/data.html 
 




Change in Gini Index (2008Ð2012): Source: Solt, Frederick. 2009. ÒStandardizing the 
World Income Inequality Database" Social Science Quarterly, 90(2):231-242. SWIID 
Version 4.0, September 2013. 
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Appendix B: Measurement of Variables 
Variable Name Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 
% Change in Party Vote (National 
Parliamentary Elections, 2005Ð
2012) 
0.006 -0.09 208 -0.35 0.40 
% Change in Populist Radical 
Right Party Vote Share, 2005Ð
2012 
0.02 0.07 20 -0.098 0.17 
% Change in Center-Right Party 
Vote Share, 2005Ð2012 
0.008 0.11 74 -0.35 0.40 
% Change in Center Left Party 
Vote Share, 2005Ð2012 
-0.009 0.08 84 -0.34 0.21 
% Change in Incumbents Vote 
Share, 2005Ð2012 
-0.05 0.09 65 -0.35 0.08 
EU Integration: Opposition 3.28 1.54 208 1 6.9 
Pro-Welfare 3.61 1.17 208 1 6.4 
Pro-Market Economy 4.08 1.38 208 1 7 
Incumbents 0.36 0.48 208 0 1 
Center-Right Incumbents 0.48 0.50 74 0 1 
Center-Left Incumbents 0.33 0.47 84 0 1 
Salience: Immigration 
(Combined) 
4.52 0.99 179 2.7 7 
Salience: Immigration (Radical 
Right Parties) 
5.99 1.15 18 3.6 7 
Salience: Immigration (Center 
Right Parties) 
4.39 0.85 74 2.7 6.6 
Salience: Immigration (Left-Wing 
Parties) 
4.34 0.81 84 2.8 6 
Anti-Immigration (Combined) 3.72 1.35 179 1 6.7 
Anti-Immigration (Radical Right 
Parties) 
6.03 0.79 18 3.8 6.7 
Anti-Immigration (Center Right 
Parties) 
3.95 1.05 74 1.8 6.3 
Anti-Immigration (Left-Wing 
Parties) 
3.02 1.04 84 1 5.5 
Salience: Welfare 4.47 0.93 192 1 6.75 
Salience: Market Economy 5.03 1.06 178 1 7 
Disproportionality Index (2008Ð
2012) 
1.62 2.18 179 -2.64 6.13 
Change in Unemployment, 2008Ð
2012 
0.69 3.87 179 -8.1 10.3 
Change in GDP Growth, 2008Ð
2012 
-2.78 -2.95 179 -11.9 2.3 




Classification of Parties and Countries I: Country/Electoral Years/Party 
	
Austria: 2006Ð2008 
Alliance for the Future of Austria  
Freedom Party of Austria 
The Greens 
Austrian People's Party  
Social Democratic Party of Austria 
--------- 
Belgium: 2007Ð2010 
Christian-Democratic and Flemish  
New Flemish Alliance  
Humanist Democratic Centre 
Ecologists  
National Front 
The Flemish Greens 
List Dedecker  
Reform Movement  
Socialist Party  
Socialist Party Different 
Flemish Interest  
Flemish Liberals and Democrats  
--------- 
Bulgaria: 2005Ð2009 
Bulgarian Socialist Party 
Bulgarian People's Union 
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria  
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
National Movement for Stability and Progress 
National Union Attack 
Union of Democratic Forces 
--------- 
Czech Republic: 2006Ð2010 
Christian and Democratic Union 
Czech Social Democratic Party 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 




Danish People's Party 
Unity List - The Red-Greens 




Socialist People's Party 






Estonian Centre Party 
Estonian Greens 
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 
Estonian Reform Party 
Estonian People's Union 
Social Democratic Party 
--------- 
Finland: 2007Ð2011 
Finnish Christian Democrats 
Finnish Center 
National Coalition Party 
The Finns 
Finnish Social Democratic Party 
Swedish People's Party in Finland 
Left Alliance 
Green Alliance 





Movement for France 
New Center 
French Communist Party 
Left Radical Party  
Socialist Party 




The Left (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS) 
Christian Democracy Union 
Christian Social Union 
Free Democratic Party 
Alliance 90/The Greens 
Social Democratic Party of Germany 
--------- 
Greece: 2007Ð2009 
Communist Party of Greece 
Popular Orthodox Rally 
New Democracy 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
Coalition of the Left, the Movements and the Ecology 
--------- 
Hungary: 2006Ð2010 
Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union 
Christian Democratic People's Party 
Hungarian Democratic Forum 




Hungarian Socialist Party  
Union of Free Democrats 
--------- 
Ireland: 2007Ð2011 
Soldiers of Destiny 








Italy of Values 
Left Democrats 




Italian Democratic Socialists 
Union of Christian and Centre Democrats 




Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party 
Fatherland and Freedom 
New Era 
Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way 
Union of Greens and Peasants 






Order and Justice - Liberal Democrats 
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance 
Labour Party 
Liberal and Centre Union 
LiberalsÕ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party/New Union - Social Liberals 
Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union 
Civic Democratic Party 
--------- 
Poland: 2007Ð2011 
Left and Democrats 
League of Polish Families 





Polish People's Party 
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland 
--------- 
Portugal: 2005Ð2009 
Democratic Social Centre 
Left Bloc 
Portuguese Communist Party 
Ecological PartyÐThe Greens 
Socialist Party 




Liberal Democratic Party 
New Generation Party 
National Liberal Party 
Christian Democratic National PeasantÕs Party 
Great Romania Party 
Social Democratic Party 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
--------- 
Slovakia: 2006Ð2010 
Direction - Social Democracy 
People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
Christian Democratic Movement 
Party of the Hungarian Coalition 
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
Slovak National Party 
--------- 
Slovenia: 2004Ð2008 
Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia 
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia 
New SloveniaÐChristian People's Party 
Social Democrats 
Slovenian Democratic Party 
Slovenian People's Party 
Slovenian National Party 
--------- 
Spain: 2004Ð2008 
Convergence and Union of Catalonia 
Basque National Party 
Navarre Yes 




Republican Left of Catalonia 
United Left 
People's Party 








Liberal People's Party 
Christian Democrats 
Moderate Rally Party 
Environment Party The Greens 
Social Democratic Workers' Party 
Left Party 
---------- 
The Netherlands: 2006Ð2010 
Democrats 66 
Labour Party 
Party for the Animals 




Reformed Political Party 
Socialist Party 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 
--------- 




Party of Wales 
Scottish National Party 





























Country Party Name in WhitefieldÐRohrschneider 
Expert Survey 
Label 
Bulgaria (11) Bulgarian Socialist Party CfB 
Bulgaria National Movement for Stability and 
Progress 
NMSS 
Bulgaria Movement for Rights and Freedoms MrF 
Bulgaria Union of Democratic Forces UDF 
Bulgaria National Union Attack  NUA 




Civic Democratic Party ODS 
Czech-
Republic 
Czech Social Democratic Party CSSD 
Czech-
Republic 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia KSCM 
Czech-
Republic 




Green Party SZ  
Estonia (10) Estonian Reform Party RF (RE) 
Estonia Estonian Centre Party EK 
Estonia Pro Patria and Res Publica Union IrL 
Estonia Social Democratic Party SDE 
Estonia Estonian Greens Er 
Estonia Estonian People's Union RL 
Hungary (9) Hungarian Socialist Party  MSZP 
Hungary Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union FIDESZ 
Hungary Union of Free Democrats SZDSZ 
Hungary Hungarian Democratic Forum MDF 
Hungary Christian Democratic People's Party KDNP 
Hungary Movement for a Better Hungary JOBBIK 
Latvia (10) People's Party TP 
Latvia Union of Greens and Peasants ZZS  
Latvia New Era JL 
Latvia Harmony Centre SC 
Latvia Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way LPP 
Latvia Fatherland and Freedom TB/LNN
K 
Latvia For Human Rights in United Latvia PCTVL 
Latvia Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party LSdSP 
Lithuania 
(10) 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party LSDP 




Lithuania New Union - Social Liberals NS  
Lithuania Order and Justice - Liberal Democrats TiT 
Lithuania LiberalsÕ Movement of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
LrLS 
Lithuania Labour Party DP 
Lithuania Liberal and Centre Union LCS 
Lithuania Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union LVLS 
Lithuania Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance LrA 
Lithuania Civic Democratic Party PDP 
Moldova (9) Communist Party of the Republic of 
Moldova 
PCRM 
Moldova Party Alliance Our Moldova PAMN 
Moldova Democratic Party of Moldova PDM 
Moldova Social-Liberal Party PSL 
Moldova Christian Democratic PeopleÕs Party PPCD 
Moldova Socialist Party from Moldova PSM 
Moldova Party of Socialists from Republic of 
Moldova 
PSRM 
Poland (9) Law and Justice PIS 
Poland Civic Platform PO 
Poland Left and Democrats LiD 
Poland Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland SrP 
Poland League of Polish Families LPr 
Poland Polish People's Party PSL 
Romania (8) Social Democratic Party PSD 
Romania Democratic Party PD 
Romania National Liberal Party PNL 
Romania Great Romania Party PrM 
Romania Conservative Party PC 
Romania Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania 
UDMr 
Romania New Generation Party PNG 
Romania Liberal Democratic Party PLD 
Romania Christian Democratic National PeasantÕs 
Party 
PNTCD 
Romania National Iniziative Party PIN 
Russia (10) Unified Russia ER 
Russia Communist Party of the Russian Federation KPRF 
Russia Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia LDPR 
Russia Fair Russia SR 
Russia Union of Rightist Forces SPS 
Slovakia (10) Christian Democratic Movement KDH 
Slovakia People's Party - Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia 
HZDS 
Slovakia Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SDKU 
Slovakia Direction - Social Democracy Smer 
Slovakia Party of the Hungarian Coalition SMK 




Slovenia (9) Liberal Democracy of Slovenia LDS 
Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party SDS 
Slovenia Social Democrats SD 
Slovenia Slovenian People's Party SLS 
Slovenia New Slovenia - Christian People's Party NS 
Slovenia Slovenian National Party SNS 
Slovenia Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia DSUS 
Ukraine (9) Party of Regions PRU 
Ukraine Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko BJUT 
Ukraine PeopleÕs Union Our Ukraine NSNU 
Ukraine Socialist Party of Ukraine SPU 
Ukraine Communist Party of Ukraine KPU 
Ukraine Bloc of Yuri Lutsenko ÒPeopleÕs Self-
Defense  
NS 
Ukraine Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine PSPU 
Ukraine People's Bloc Lytvyn NBL 
Ukraine Viche Party PV 
Ukraine Bloc of Borys Tarasyk BBT-UP 
Ukraine Green Party PZU 
Notes: The number in parentheses refers to the number of experts responding to the Notes: The 
number in parentheses refers to the number of experts responding to the WhitefieldÐRohrschneider 








































Austria (10) Social Democratic Party of Austria SP 
Austria Austrian People's Party VP 
Austria The Greens GRUNE 
Austria Freedom Party of Austria FP 
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria BZ  
Belgium (10) Christian-Democratic and Flemish CDV 
Belgium New Flemish Alliance N-VA 
Belgium Reform Movement MR 
Belgium Flemish Interest VB 
Belgium Flemish Liberals and Democrats VLD 
Belgium Socialist Party PS 
Belgium Socialist Party. Different SPA 
Belgium Humanist Democratic Centre CDH 
Belgium Ecologists ECOLO 
Belgium List Dedecker LDD 
Belgium The Flemish Greens GROEN 
Belgium National Front FN 
Denmark (9) Denmark's Liberal Party V 
Denmark Social Democracy S 
Denmark Danish People's Party DF 
Denmark Socialist People's Party SF 
Denmark Conservative People's Party KF 
Denmark Radical Liberals RV 
Denmark Unity List - The Red-Greens EL 
Finland (9) Finnish Centre KESK 
Finland National Coalition Party KOK 
Finland Finnish Social Democratic Party SDP 
Finland Left Alliance VAS 
Finland Green Alliance VIHR 
Finland Finnish Christian Democrats KD 
Finland Swedish People's Party in Finland SFP 
Finland The Finns PS 
France (10) Union for a Popular Movement UMP 
France Socialist Party PS 
France Democratic Movement MoDem 
France French Communist Party PCF 
France National Front FN 
France The Greens VERTS 
France Movement for France MPF 
Germany (10) Christian Democracy Union CDU 




Germany Social Democratic Party of 
Germany 
SPD 
Germany Free Democratic Party FDP 




Germany Alliance 90/The Greens GRUNE 
Greece (10) New Democracy ND 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 
Greece Communist Party of Greece KKE 
Greece Coalition of the Left, the 
Movements and the Ecology 
SYN 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally LAOS 
Ireland (10) Soldiers of Destiny FF 
Ireland Family of the Irish FG 
Ireland Labour Party LAB 
Ireland We Ourselves SF 
Ireland Green Party GP 
Ireland Progressive Democrats PD 
Ireland Communist SP 
Italy (10) Left Democrats Left_De
m 
Italy Communist Refoundation Party PRC 
Italy Italian Democratic Socialists SDI 
Italy Party of Italian Communists PdCl 
Italy Italy of Values IdV 
Italy Green Federation VERDI 
Italy National Alliance AN 
Italy Northern League LN 
Italy Union of Christian and Centre 
Democrats 
UDC 
Italy Forward Italy FI/PdL 
Portugal (10) Socialist Party PS 
Portugal Social Democratic Party PSD 
Portugal Portuguese Communist Party PCP 
Portugal Ecological Party The Greens PEV 
Portugal Democratic Social Centre CDS-PP 
Portugal Left Bloc BE 
Spain (10) Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE 
Spain People's Party PP 
Spain United Left IU 
Spain Convergence and Union of 
Catalonia 
CiU 
Spain Republican Left of Catalonia ERC 
Spain Basque National Party EAJ-
PNV 
Spain Aragonese Council CHA 
Spain Navarre Yes Na-Bai 
Sweden (10) Social Democratic Workers' Party SAP 




Sweden Centre Party C 
Sweden Liberal People's Party FP 
Sweden Christian Democrats KD 
Sweden Left Party VP 
Sweden Environment Party The Greens MP 
Sweden Sweden Democrats SD 
The Netherlands (9) Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 
The Netherlands Labour Party PvdA 
The Netherlands Socialist Party SP 
The Netherlands People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy 
VVD 
The Netherlands Freedom Party PVV 
The Netherlands Green Left GL 
The Netherlands Christian Union CU 
The Netherlands Democrats 66 D66 
The Netherlands Party for the Animals PvdD 
The Netherlands Reformed Political Party SGP 
UK (10) Labour Party LAB 
UK Conservative Party CON 
UK Liberal Democrats LD 
UK Scottish National Party SNP 
UK Party of Wales PC 
UK The United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
UKIP 
Notes: The number in parentheses refers to the number of experts responding to the WhitefieldÐ








¥! Because the People's Party (TP) in Latvia joined with First Party / Latvia's Way (LPP) in 
2010 but have different places in some dimensions, we divided the 2010 total of votes for 
the three parties by thirds, giving TP 1/3 (or 2.61) and LPP 2/3 (or 5.21).  
¥! Because the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Ecological Party - The Greens 
(PEV) joined in the 2009 election but were separate before, we give ! of the 2009 
combined votes to each of them.  
¥! In Italy, Forza Italia (2006) renamed itself The People of Freedom (PdL) and was joined 
by the National Alliance (NA). The totals for the PdL were divided by thirds with two 
thirds going to Forza and one third going to NA (based on their relative 2006 
performance). In addition, a coalition of the left, The Left Ð The Rainbow, was a 
reconfiguration including the Communist Refoundation Party, Party of Italian 
Communists, Federation of the Greens, and The Democratic Socialists. The total for The 
Rainbow is divided in quarters among these parties.  
¥! In Lithuania, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) formed a union with the 
New Union - Social Liberals (NS). We take the mean of their scores for both time 
periods.  
¥! In Romania in 2004, the National Liberal Party and the Democratic Party were together 
in the ÔJustice and Truth AllianceÕ. They ran separately in 2008. Their percentage for 
2004 is according to the distribution of seats (112 total (31.5% of total): 64 to NLP (57% 
of 122), 48 to DP (43% of 122)). For 2008, the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) was 
formed by the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) in 2007. We 
assigned 50% of the 32.4 total percentage to each. 
¥! For the second stage of the analysis in CEE, the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) and 
Christian Democratic National PeasantÕs Party (PNTCD) in Romania were dropped as 


















Integrated Codebook Ð Expert Surveys on Party Stances in Western and Central-
Eastern Europe 2007Ð2008 (WhitefieldÐRohrschneider) 
 
The questions in this codebook are the aggregated and recoded responses to the combined East West 
European expert surveys. Additional variables have been added in order to aid researchers (e.g. Year, 
Country, and partyname). Included are the original survey questions and accompanying variable 
names.  
 
Most Important Issues: We would like to begin by asking about the party system as a whole. Some 
countries may have multiple issue dimensions structuring party competition, others only one, and 
some of course may have none at all. 
Could you please indicate how important each issue dimension is in the party system of [country]? If 
two issue dimensions are about equally important, please still rank order them for the purpose of the 
next question. 
1.! Most important issue  
2.! Second most important issue 
3.! Third most important issue  
4.! Fourth most important issue 
5.! Insignificant as an issue (not mentioned by an respondents) 
A.! Economy: redistributional issues (for example, tax levels, welfare state spending)  
issue_a     Distributional Issues 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_ar     Distributional Issues 1 2 3 4 5th 
cleavage36 
issue_av    % selecting A 1-437 
B.! Economy: State-run versus market economy  
issue_b     State vs Market Econ 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_br     State vs Market Econ 1 2 3 4 5th cleavage 
issue_bv    % selecting B 1-4 
C.! Democracy: strengthening democratic institutions  
issue_c     Democracy 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_cr     Democracy 1 2 3 4 5th cleavage 
issue_cv    % selecting C 1-4 
D.! Ethnic rights (for example, minorities)  
issue_d     Ethnicity 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_dr     Ethnicity 1 2 3 4 5th cleavage 
issue_dv    % selecting D 1-4 
 
																																																						
36 This includes blanks and 99 as category 5 in question 1 in a new variable (to indicate insignificance of 
dimensions not mentioned).  




E.! Nationalism and Internationalism (for example, views about the EU)  
issue_e     Nationalism Intnat 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_er     Nationalism Intnat 1 2 3 4 5th cleavage 
issue_ev    % selecting E 1-4 
F.! Religiosity (role of church)  
issue_f     Religiosity 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_fr     Religiosity 1 2 3 4 5th 
cleavage 
issue_fv    % selecting F 1-4 
G.! Social rights (for example, choice of non-conformist lifestyle, womenÕs rights, etc)  
issue_g     Social Rights 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_gr     Social Rights 1 2 3 4 5th 
cleavage 
issue_g v    % selecting G 1-4 
H.! Views of the Communist past and its legacies 
issue_h     Communist Legacy 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_hr     Communist Legacy 1 2 3 4 5th 
cleavage 
issue_hv    % selecting H 1-4 
I.! Regional divisions  
issue_i     Regional Divisions 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_ir     Regional Divisions 1 2 3 4 5th 
cleavage 
issue_iv    % selecting I 1-4 
J.! Urban-rural divisions  
issue_j     Urban Rural 1 2 3 4th cleavage 
issue_jr     Urban Rural 1 2 3 4 5th cleavage 
issue_jv    % selecting J 1-4 
 
Party Positions on Most Important Issue: We would like to ask you next about the main parties' 
positions on the issues you just identified. Please note that we are interested in the official position of 
the party as represented by the main party leaders. (We ask you later to assess the extent to which a 
political party is internally divided on its policy stances.)  
Beginning with issue 1, could you now situate parties in [country]? Please use a seven-point scale to 
score the position of a party. A score of 7 indicates the most strongly liberal position and a score of 1 
indicates the least liberal position on any particular issue. If a party has no stance on a given issue, 





posA Party Position Distributional Issues  
 
Pro-distribution    Anti-Distribution No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posB State vs. Market Party Position Distributional 
Issues 
  
Against Markets    Pro Market No position 




posC Party Position Democracy 
   
Anti-Democracy    Pro-Democracy No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posD Party Position Ethnicity 
     
Anti-Ethnic Rights     Pro-Ethnic Rights No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posE Party Position Nationalism 
    
Nationalist    Internationalist No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posF Party Position Religiosity 
    
Religious    Secular No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posG Party Position Social Rights 
    
Pro Social Rights    Against Social Rights No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posH Party Position Communist Legacy 
    
Pro-communism    Anti-Communist No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
 
posI Party Position Regional Division  
    
Regional    National No position 







posJ Party Position Urban-Rural 
   
Rural     Urban No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
Additional:  
q2i1      un-recoded position - issue 1 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i1r      % valid responses to q2i1 
  
q2i2      un-recoded position - issue 2 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i2r      % valid responses to q2i2 
  
q2i3      un-recoded position - issue 3 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i3r      % valid responses to q2i3 
  
q2i4      un-recoded position - issue 4 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i4r      % valid responses to q2i4 
Salience of Most Important Issue: Next, and again using a 7-point scale, please indicate how 
important each issue is in defining a party's political orientation. Again, we are interested in the party's 
official stances. A 1 indicates no importance at all; a 7 stands for very important:  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
  Party Salience 
salA  Distributional Issues  
salB     State vs Market Econ  
salC  Democracy  
salD  Ethnicity  
salE  Nationalism  
salF  Religiosity  
salG  Social Rights  
salH  Communist Legacy  
salI  Reg Division  
salJ  Urban-Rural  
 












q2i1imp     un-recoded salience - issue 1 where '.' and '99' not '0' 





q2i2imp     un-recoded salience - issue 2 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i2impr     % valid responses to q2i2imp 
  
q2i3imp     un-recoded salience - issue 3 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i3impr     % valid responses to q2i3imp 
  
q2i4imp     un-recoded salience - issue 4 where '.' and '99' not '0' 
q2i4impr     % valid responses to q2i4imp 
 
Question 3.  
What position do parties take on social inequality in [country]? Does the party take the position that 
social inequality is unjustified and undesirable (in which case it would score 1) or that it is justified 
(because of incentives, justice etc) and desirable (in which case it would score 7) or something in 
between? 
Social inequality is 
unjustified and 
undesirable 
   Social inequality is 
justified and desirable 
 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q3      Social Inequality  
q3r      % valid responses to q3 
And how important is the issue of social inequality in the country to how the party appeals to the 
public? Is it very important (in which case score 7) or not important at all to how the party appeals (in 
which case score 1)?  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q3imp      Salience Social Inequality  
q3impr     % valid responses to q3imp 
 
Question 4.  
What position does each party take on taxation? First, in general, please say whether a party favours 
raising taxes to increase public spending (this would score 1) or favours cutting public spending to cut 
taxes (this would score 7) or something in between. 
Raise taxes to increase 
public spending 
   Cut spending to cut 
taxes 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q4      Taxation 






And how important is the issue of taxation and public spending to the way in which the party appeals 
to the electorate?  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q4imp      Salience Taxation  
q4impr  % valid responses to q4imp 
 
Question 5.  
And what position do parties take on the form that taxation should take. Do they favour progressive 
taxation in which those with higher incomes pay more in tax than those with low incomes (in which 
case they would score 1) or a flat tax, in which people pay the same rate of tax whatever their income 
level (in which case they would score 7) or something in between? 
Favour progressive 
taxation 
   Favour flat taxation No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q5      Tax Form 
q5r      % valid responses to q5 
And how important is the issue of progressive or flat tax to how parties appeal to the electorate  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q5imp      Salience Tax Form  
q5impr     % valid responses to q5imp 
 
Question 6.  
Now thinking about specific welfare and labour market measures, what stances do parties take on the 
following provisions? Do they strongly support (score 7) or strongly oppose (score 1) or something in 
between? 
And how important are their views of these specific welfare and labour market measures to how the 
party appeals to the public?  
a.! minimum wage laws  
Strongly opposed    Strongly in favour No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q6ia      Min Wage  
q6iar     % valid responses to q6ia 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 





q6iaimp     Salience Min Wage  
q6iaimpr     % valid responses to q6iaimp 
b.! maximum wage laws  
Strongly opposed    Strongly in favour No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
q6ib      Max Wage 
q6ibr     % valid responses to q6ib 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
        
 
q6ibimp     Salience Max Wage 
q6ibimpr     % valid responses to q6ibimp 
c.! universal or means tested benefits  
Favour universal 
welfare benefits 
   Favour means-tested 
welfare benefits 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q6ic      Welfare Benefits  
q6icr     % valid responses to q6ic 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q6icimp     Salience Welfare Benefits  
q6icimpr     % valid responses to q6icimp 
 
Question 7.  
And where do parties stand on the following question? Do they advocate that the government should 
provide universal free health care (in which case they would score 1) or that medical expenses should 
be paid by individuals and private insurance (in which case they would score 7) or something in 
between?  
Universal free health 
care 
   Individuals and 
private insurance  
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q7    Health Care 
q7r     % valid responses to q7 
And how important is the issue of health care provision to the way in which the party appeals to the 
public?  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 





q7imp     Salience Health Care 





Question 8.  
And what stance do parties take on support for higher education. Should the state make higher 
education available free to all who have the appropriate qualifications (in which case they would score 
1) or should higher education be paid for (for example, via savings and loans) by individuals (in 
which case they would score 7) or something in between? 
Higher education 
available free 
   Higher education 
should be paid for 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q8    Higher Education 
q8r     % valid responses to q8 
 
And how important is the issue of charges for higher education to parties? 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q8imp     Salience Higher Education 
q8impr     % valid responses to q8imp 
 
Question 9.  
First, can you say what position a party favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, equal 
opportunities for women, homosexuality or euthanasia (in which case it would score 1) or opposes 
liberal policies on such issues (in which case it would score 7) or something in between?  
Liberal policies    Oppose liberal 
policies 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q9    Higher Education 
q9r     % valid responses to q8 
 
And how important are issues such as abortion, equal opportunities for women, homosexuality or 
euthanasia to the party? 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q9imp Salience Liberal Policies  







Question 10.  
Next, can you say whether the party supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of some 
economic growth (in which case it would score 1) or supports economic growth, even at the cost of 
damage to the environment (in which case it would score 7) or something in between? 
Supports protection of 
the environment 
   Supports economic 
growth 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q10    Environment  
q10r  % valid responses to q10 
 
And how important are issues of the environment to political parties? 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q10imp  Salience Environment  
q10impr  % valid responses to q10imp 
 
Question 11.  
Can you say whether parties support policies to promote civil liberties, even when this hampers 
efforts to fight crime and promote law and order (in which case they would score 1) or supports tough 
measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even when this means curtailing civil liberties (in 
which case they would score 7) or something in between?  
Promote civil liberties    Promote law and order No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q11 Civil Liberties  
q11r  % valid responses to q11 
 
And how important are issues of civil liberties, crime and law and order to parties?  
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q11imp Salience Civil Liberties 
q11impr     % valid responses to q11imp 
 
Question 12.  
First, what about the partiesÕ positions on integration with Europe? 
Strong opposition    Strong support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q12      West Integration  





And how important an issue is integration with Europe to how the party appeals to the public? Again, 
we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all. 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q12imp Salience West Integration  
q12impr  % valid responses to q12imp 
 
Question 13.  
How about the EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do parties stand 
on creating a politically unified Europe? Do they strongly support a politically unified Europe (in 
which case they would score 7) or do they strongly oppose a politically unified Europe (in which case 
they would score 1) or something in between? 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q13 EU Political Unity  
q13r % valid responses to q13 
 
Question 14.  
To the extent that parties support political unity, do they favour an inter-governmental arrangement 
where the most important decisions are made by a Europe-wide executive that represents the national 
governments? Or do they favour a ÒfederalÓ Europe-wide government where a Europe-wide executive 




   Support federal No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q14      EU Political Unity  
q14r      % valid responses to q14 
 
And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide government (regardless of the specific 
form) in how the party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very 
important and 1 meaning not important at all. 
  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q14imp     Salience EU Political Unity  









Question 15.  
Where do the parties in [country] stand on creating a Europe-wide, integrated market for the European 
Union?  
Strong opposition    Strong support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q15      Market Integration  
q15r      % valid responses to q15 
 
And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide market in general to how the party 
appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 
meaning not important at all.  
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q15imp     Salience Market Integration  
q15impr     % valid responses to q15imp 
 
Question 16.  
And where do parties stand on the question of foreign ownership of land?  
Strong opposition    Strong support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q16      FO Land  
q16r      % valid responses to q16 
And how important an issue to the party is foreign ownership of land? 
  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q16imp     Salience FO Land  
q16impr     % valid responses to q16imp 
 
Question 17.  
And what about foreign ownership of industrial enterprises? 
Strong opposition    Strong support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q17      FO Industrial Enterprises  
q17r      % valid responses to q17 
 
And how important an issue to the party is foreign ownership of industrial enterprises? 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q17imp     Salience FO Industrial Enterprise  
q17impr     % valid responses to q17imp 
 
Question 18.  
And what about partiesÕ positions on Immigration of people in and out of [country]?  
Strong opposition    Strong support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q18      Immigration of People  
q18r      % valid responses to q18 
 
And how important to the party is the issue of Immigration?  
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q18imp     Salience Immigration of People  
q18impr     % valid responses to q18imp 
 
Question 19.  
First, what about the partyÕs view of how well democracy works in [country]? Do parties hold 
positive (7) or negative views (1)?  
Strongly negative    Strongly positive No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q19i1      Democracy Nation 
q19i1r     % valid responses to q19i1 
And what about the partyÕs view of how well democracy works in the EU? 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q19i2      Democracy EU 
q19i2r     % valid responses to q19i2 
 
Question 20.  
First, would you indicate whether parties in [country] are nationally organized (as opposed to simply 
regionally). 








Question 21.  
And does the party have a ÔsignificantÕ membership base in terms of numbers? We realize that the 
determination of a Ôsignificant membership baseÕ is somewhat arbitrary and may vary from country to 
country depending on its population. Our main concern is to distinguish between parties that have few 
members and those that relatively large numbers of members. We are interested in your expert 
judgment in this regard.  
q21 Significant Numbers 0 No 1 Yes 
 
Question 22.  
Does the party have an organisational affiliation with any interest group or civil society group, such as 
trade unions, business associations, church groups, etc? 
q22 Organisational Affiliation 0 No 1 Yes 
 
Question 23.  
Would you please estimate the extent to which each ÔfaceÕ of the party is strong in determining party 
policy? A 1 would indicate ÒNot at all importantÓ; a 7 would indicate that a party section is very 
important.  
a.! Party membership 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q23iaimp     Party Membership Important  
q23iaimpr     %valid responses to q23iaimp 
b.! Party apparatus  
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q23ibimp     Party Apparatus Important  
q23ibimpr     %valid responses to q23ibimp 
c.! Party leadership 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q23icimp     Party Leader Important  








Question 24.  
Can you say how divided each party in [country] is in policy terms? A division means that there are 
significant and public disagreements among party members at any level (leaders, apparatus, 
membership) about policy issues. These disagreements may also take numerous forms. Please provide 
an ÒaverageÓ assessment across those policy domains you deem central to the party where a 1 would 
indicate a Òstrongly dividedÓ party and a 7 a Òstrongly unitedÓ party. 
Strongly divided    Strongly united No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q24     Policy Divisions 
q24r     %valid responses to q24 
 
Question 25  
Thinking now about social differences between individuals and groups, do the parties make explicit 
claims about the importance of such social differences in their programmes? Please select from the list 
one that is most strongly appealed to in the partyÕs programme.  
 
q25_chall     Catch All  0 No 1 Yes 
q25_econ     Economic Class  0 No 1 Yes 
q25_eth     Ethnic Group  0 No 1 Yes 
q25_reg     Regional Group  0 No 1 Yes 
q25_gen     Gender 0 No 1 Yes 
q25_age     Age  0 No 1 Yes 
q25_cul     Cultural (i.e. education, taste, etc) 0 No 1 Yes 
q25_none    No appeal to social differences  0 No 1 Yes 
 
Question 26.  
Some distinctions have been made in writing on parties between different ideal-typical ways in which 
parties may build ties with the electorate. First, parties may appeal to the electorate through broad 
electoral programmes that specify alternative ways of running the country. Second, parties may appeal 
to specific social or geographic constituencies on the basis of providing them with targeted benefits 
(generally economic). Third, parties may appeal to the electorate on the basis of the charisma of the 
party leader. Please indicate the importance of each factor on a 7 point scale. A 1 means a factor is not 
important at all, a 7 means it is very important. 
a. Broad electoral programmes that specify alternative ways of running the  
 country 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q26iaimp     Party Appeal: Program  
q26iaimpr     %valid responses to q26iaimp 
 
b. Specific social or geographic constituencies on the basis of providing them 
 with targeted benefits  
 
Not at all  
important 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q26ibimp     Party Appeal: Targeted Benefits 
q26ibimpr     %valid responses to q26ibimp 
 
c. Charisma of the party leader  
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q26icimp     Party Appeal: Charismatic Leader 
q26icimpr     %valid responses to q26icimp 
 
Question 27.  
In [country], parties may be located to the left or the right of the political spectrum. In general terms, 
please locate each party on the ideological spectrum in [country], with 1 standing for left wing, and 7 
standing for right wing. 
Left wing    Right wing No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q27      Ideology 
q27r      % valid responses to q27 
 
   
 
And what would you say is the position taken by parties on the introduction of the Euro in [country 
x]? And how important an issue to the party is the introduction of the Euro? 
 
Oppose    Support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
Not at all  
Important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q11_03     Euro 
q11_03r     % valid responses to q11_03 
q12_03     Salience of Euro 
q12_03r     % valid responses to q12_03 
 
And what about partiesÕ positions on EU directives on the rights of ethnic minorities? And how 
important to the party is the issue of EU directives on the rights of ethnic minorities? 
 
Oppose    Support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 




q13_03r     % valid responses to q13_03 
q14_03    Salience of EU Directives Minorities 
q14_03r     % valid responses to q14_03 
 
And now what about their position on NATO? And how important an issue is NATO to the party? 
 
Oppose    Support No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
Not at all  
important 
   Very  
important 
No position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 99 
 
q21_03     NATO 
q21_03r     % valid responses to q21_03 














Appendix C: List of Key Variables 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999Ð2007 Trend Dataset 
 
Dependent variables:  
 
% Vote Share Radical Right Parties (1999 2007) National Parliamentary Elections: 
The overall percentage of aggregate votes for radical right parties in the 1999 2007 
electoral period. 
 
% Vote Share Center-Right Parties (1999 2007) National Parliamentary Elections: 
The overall percentage of aggregate votes for center right parties in the 1999 2007 electoral 
period. 
 
% Vote Share Center-Left Parties (1999Ð2007) National Parliamentary Elections: The 




Left Right Economic Position: (1999 2006)  
 
0= Radical Left 
5= Center 
10= Radical Right 
 
Spend vs Taxation (Anti-Taxation): 2006 
 
0= Strongly favors improving public services 
10= Strongly favors reducing taxes 
 
Immigration Position: Tough Policy: (1999 2006) 
 
0= Strongly opposes tough policy 
10= Strongly favors tough policy 
 
European Union (EU) Integration: Opposition (Euroscepticism) (1999 2006) 
 
1= Strongly opposed 
2= Opposed 
3= Somewhat opposed 
4= Neutral 
5= Somewhat in favour 
6= In favour 







Law and Order: (1999 2006) 
 
0= Strongly promotes civil liberties 
10= Extremely important 
 
Salience: Immigration (1999 2006) 
 
0= Not important at all 
10= Extremely important 
 
Salience: European Union (EU) Integration (1999 2006) 
 
0= European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned 
10= European Integration is the most important issue 
	
Western Europe (1999Ð2006) 
	
1= Western Europe 
0= Central-Eastern Europe 
	







¡! 1= Incumbent Party 
























Table A: Measurement of Variables 
 
Variable Name Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Minimum Maximum 




8.50 7.3 84 0.3 32.11 




20.4 13.7 147 0.4 45.4 








5.42 1.95 280 1 10 
Spend vs Taxation 
(Anti-Taxation) 
(2006) 









2.41 1.17 547 1 10 
Position: Law and 
Order (1999Ð
2006) 
5.16 2.28 232 0.5 10 
Incumbents (1999 
Ð2007) 









-2.49 3.46 524 -11.2 3 
Change in GDP 
Growth (2002Ð
2007) 













Country Party Name in CHES (1999Ð2007) Label 
Bulgaria The Coalition for Bulgaria KzB 
Bulgaria  Bulgarian Socialist Party BSP 
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Movement G-VMRO 
Bulgaria Lider L 
Bulgaria Union of Democratic Forces SDS 
Bulgaria National Union Attack  NOA 
Bulgaria Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria DSB 
Bulgaria United Democratic Forces ODS 
Czech 
Republic 
Freedom Union-Democratic Union USÐDEU 
Czech-
Republic  
Civic Democratic Party ODS 
Czech-
Republic 
SNK European Democrats SNKÐED 
Czech-
Republic 
Czech Social Democratic Party CSSD 
Czech-
Republic 
Tradition Responsibility Prosperity TOP 09 
Czech-
Republic 
Green Party SZ  
Estonia Estonian Centre Party EK 
Estonia Pro Patria and Res Publica Union IRL 
Estonia Social Democratic Party SDE 
Estonia Estonian Greens EER 
Hungary Democratic Coalition DK 
Hungary Hungarian Socialist Party  MSZP 
Hungary  Politics Can Be Different LMP 
Hungary Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union FIDESZ-M 
Hungary Alliance of Free Democrats SZDSZ 
Hungary Hungarian Democratic Forum MDF 
Hungary Christian Democratic People's Party KDNP 
Hungary Hungarian Justice and Life Party MIEP 
Latvia Harmony Centre/Social Democratic Party 
ÒHarmonyÓ 
SC/SDPS 
Latvia  People's Party TP 
Latvia Union of Greens and Peasants/Farmers ZZS  
Latvia ZatlerÕs Reform Party ZRP 
Latvia New Era JL 
Latvia Harmony Centre SC 
Latvia Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way LPP 
Latvia Fatherland and Freedom TB/LNNK 
Lithuania  Lithuanian Social Democratic Party LSDP 




Lithuania Front Party FRONT 
Lithuania Moderate Conservative Union NKS 
Lithuania Fatherland Union TS-LK 
Lithuania New Union - Social Liberals NS  
Lithuania Order and Justice - Liberal Democrats TT 
Lithuania Young Lithuania- New Nationalist and 
Political PrisonerÕs Union 
JL-PKS 
Lithuania LiberalsÕ Movement of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
LrLS 
Lithuania Labour Party DP 
Lithuania Lithuanian Liberty Union LLS 
Poland Union of Labour UP 
Poland Alliance of Democratic Left SLD 
Poland Social Democracy of Poland SDPL 
Poland Coalition Electoral Action Solidarity of the 
Right 
AWSP 
Poland  Law and Justice PIS 
Poland Civic Platform PO 
Poland Polish People's Party PSL 
Romania National Union for the Progress of 
Romania 
UNPR 
Romania  Social Democratic Party PSD 
Romania Romanian Democratic Convention of 2000 CDR 2000 
Romania PeopleÕs Movement Party PMP 
Romania National Liberal Party PNL 
Romania Great Romania Party PRM 
Slovakia Christian Democratic Movement KDH 
Slovakia Direction Ð Social Democracy SMER-SD 
Slovakia Direction Ð Third Way SMER 
Slovakia Christian Democratic Movement KDH 
Slovakia Slovak National Party SNS 
Slovakia Right Slovak National Party PSNS 
Slovenia United List of Social Democrats ZLSD 
Slovenia Liberal Democracy of Slovenia LDS 
Slovenia Active Slovenia AS 
Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party SDS 
Slovenia  Liberal Democracy of Slovenia LDS 
Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party SDS 
Slovenia Social Democrats SD 
Slovenia Slovenian People's Party SLS 
Slovenia New Slovenia - Christian People's Party NS 
Slovenia Slovenian National Party SNS 









Country Party Name in CHES (1999Ð2007) Label 
Austria  Social Democratic Party of Austria SP 
Austria Austrian People's Party VP 
Austria The Greens GRUNE 
Austria Freedom Party of Austria FP 
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria BZ  
Belgium Christian-Democratic and Flemish CDV 
Belgium New Flemish Alliance N-VA 
Belgium Reform Movement MR 
Belgium Flemish Interest VB 
Belgium Flemish Liberals and Democrats VLD 
Belgium Socialist Party PS 
Belgium Socialist Party. Different SPA 
Belgium Humanist Democratic Centre CDH 
Belgium Ecologists ECOLO 
Belgium List Dedecker LDD 
Belgium The Flemish Greens GROEN 
Belgium National Front FN 
Belgium Citizens' Movement for Change MCC 
Belgium Green Party AGALEV 
Denmark Denmark's Liberal Party V 
Denmark Social Democracy SD 
Denmark Progress Party FP 
Denmark Danish People's Party DF 
Denmark Socialist People's Party SF 
Denmark Conservative People's Party KF 
Denmark Radical Liberals RV 
Denmark Unity List - The Red-Greens EL 
Finland  Finnish Centre KESK 
Finland National Coalition Party KOK 
Finland Finnish Social Democratic Party SDP 
Finland Ecological Party KIPU 
Finland Green Alliance VIHR 
Finland The Finns PS 
France Independent Ecological Movement MEI 




France Socialist Party PS 
France Liberal Democracy DL 
France Democratic Movement MoDem 
France French Communist Party PCF 
France National Republican Movement MN 
France National Front FN 
France The Greens VERTS 






Germany Christian Democracy Union CDU 
Germany Christian Social Union CSU 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 
Germany Human Environment Animal 
Protection 
DieTier 
Germany Free Democratic Party FDP 




Germany Alliance 90/The Greens GRUNEN 
Germany Republikaner REP 
Germany German PeopleÕs Union/National 
Democratic Party of Germany 
DVU/NP
D 
Greece New Democracy ND 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 
Greece Ecologist Greens OP 
Greece The River POTAMI 
Greece  Political Spring POLA 
Greece Communist Party of Greece KKE 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally LAOS 
Ireland Soldiers of Destiny FF 
Ireland Family of the Irish FG 
Ireland Labour Party LAB 
Ireland We Ourselves SF 
Ireland Green Party GP 
Ireland Communist SP 
Italy Democratic Party of the Left PDS/DS 
Italy Democratic Party PD 
Italy Left Democrats Left_Dem 
Italy Left and Freedom/Left Ecology 
Freedom 
SL/SEL 
Italy Italian Socialist Party PSI 
Italy Federation of Greens FdV 
Italy Italian Popular Party PPI 
Italy Forward Italy FI 
Italy Italian Democratic Socialists SDI 
Italy Party of Italian Communists PdCl 
Italy Italy of Values IdV 
Italy New Centre-Right NCD 
Italy Green Federation VERDI 
Italy  Tricolor Flame Social Movement MS 
Italy Northern League LN 
Italy National Alliance AN 
Italy United Christian Democrats CDU 




Portugal Socialist Party PS 
Portugal  Earth Party MPT 




Portugal Democratic Social Centre CDS-PP 
Portugal Left Bloc BE 
Spain Catalan Socialist Party PSC 
Spain Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE 
Spain The Greens VERDE 
Spain People's Party PP 
Spain Initiative for Catalonia IC 
Sweden Social Democratic Workers' Party SAP 
Sweden June List JL 
Sweden Moderate Rally Party M 
Sweden Liberal People's Party FP 
Sweden Christian Democrats KD 
Sweden Environment Party The Greens MP 
Sweden New Democracy NyD 
Sweden Sweden Democrats SD 
The Netherlands Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 
The Netherlands Labour Party PvdA 
The Netherlands Socialist Party SP 
The Netherlands People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy 
VVD 
The Netherlands Centre Democrats CD 
The Netherlands Freedom Party PVV 
The Netherlands Green Left GL 
The Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn LPF 
The Netherlands Christian Union CU 
The Netherlands Democrats 66 D66 
The Netherlands Party for the Animals PvdD 
The Netherlands Reformed Political Party SGP 
UK Labour Party LAB 
UK Conservative Party CON 
UK Liberal Democrats LD 
UK The United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
UKIP 










Classification of Countries III: Electoral Years (1999Ð2007) 
	
Austria (1999; 2002; 2006) 
 
Belgium (1999; 2003; 2007) 
	
Bulgaria (2001; 2005) 
 
Czech Republic (2002; 2006) 
 
Denmark (2001; 2005 2007) 
 
Estonia (1999; 2003; 2007) 
 
Finland (1999; 2003; 2007) 
 
France (2002; 2007) 
 
Germany (2002; 2005) 
 
Greece (2000; 2004; 2007) 
 
Hungary (2002; 2006) 
 
Ireland (2002; 2007) 
 
Italy (2001; 2006) 
 
Latvia (1998; 2002; 2006) 
 
Lithuania (2000; 2004) 
 
Poland (2001; 2005; 2007) 
 
Portugal (2001; 2005; 2007) 
 
Romania (2000; 2004) 
 
Slovakia (2002; 2006) 
 
Slovenia (2000; 2004) 
 
Spain (2000; 2004) 
 
Sweden (2002; 2006) 
 
The Netherlands (2003; 2006) 
 






Appendix D: Classification of Parties and Countries: Country/Electoral Years/Party 
Classification of Parties and Countries IV 
	
Belgium: 2007Ð2010 
Christian-Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) 
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 
Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH) 
Ecologists (ECOLO) 
National Front (FN) 
The Flemish Greens (GROEN) 
List Dedecker (LDD) 
Reform Movement (MR) 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Socialist Party Different (SPA) 
Flemish Interest (VB) 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) 
--------- 
The Netherlands: 2006Ð2010 
Democrats 66 (D66) 
Labour Party (PvdA) 
Party for the Animals (PvdD) 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
Christian Union (CU) 
Green Left (GL) 
Freedom Party (PVV) 
Reformed Political Party (SGP) 
Socialist Party (SP) 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 
--------- 
Finland: 2007Ð2011 
Finnish Centre (KESK) 
National Coalition Party (KOK) 
The Finns (PS) 
Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
Swedish People's Party (SFP) 
Left Alliance (VAS) 
Green Alliance (VIHR) 
Finnish Christian Democrats (KD) 
--------- 
France: 2007Ð2012 
National Front (FN) 
New Center (NC) 
Left Radical Party (PRG) 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 
The Greens (VEC) 
--------- 
